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Groundwater,' which is located in rock and soil formations beneath the
earth's surface, constitutes a substantial proportion of the water used in the
United States. 2 In recent decades, national water use has increased dramati-
cally,3 placing strains on these underground supplies. The western states
4
are particularly reliant on groundwater sources,5 and many of them, as well
as some eastern states, have sizeable areas that are withdrawing more
groundwater from aquifers6 than is being replenished through such means as
rainfall and stream inflow. 7 This situation, known as groundwater over-
* A.B., 1976, Dartmouth College; M.S., 1977, New York University Graduate School of
Business Administration; J.D., 1982, Stanford University. Attorney at law, Holme Roberts &
Owen. The views expressed herein are the author's, and do not necessarily represent the views
of Holme Roberts & Owen.
Special thanks to James W. Johnson of Fennemore, Craig, von Ammon, Udall & Powers,
Phoenix, Arizona, and A. Dan Tarlock, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology, for their review of and comments on an early draft of this article.
1. Geologists usually limit the definition of "groundwater" to water beneath the "water
table," the subsurface depth at which the rock or soil in a particular area is saturated with
water. See C. FETTER, JR., APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 5 (1980); R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY,
GROUNDWATER (1979). Legal rules for "groundwater" use do not distinguish between subsur-
face water below the water table and that which is above the water table, but they sometimes
do distinguish between different types of subsurface water. In a number of states, subsurface
water is classified as either percolating or part of an underground stream. See W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 631-34 (1974) (chapter on ground-
water rights by W. Champion); Aiken, Nebraska Groundwater Law and Adminirsraion, 59 NEB. L.
REV. 917, 937-38 (1980). Use of percolating subsurface water is governed by the state's rules for
"groundwater" withdrawals, while use of water comprising an underground stream is governed
by the state's rules for surface water exploitation. See W. HUTCHINS, supra, at 633.
In this article, "groundwater" refers to all subsurface water, and it is assumed that the legal
rules for use of "groundwater" apply to the use of all subsurface water. Because only a small
fraction of subsurface water exists as underground streams, this assumption is reasonable. W.
HAMBLIN, THE EARTH'S DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 210 (1975).
2. See C. FETrER, supra note 1, at 3; R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 6-7.
3. See C. FETER, supra note 1, at 2-3 (from 1955 to 1970, total water usage in the U.S.,
excluding that for hydroelectric power generation, increased by 54 percent).
4. In this article, the seventeen western states are those continental states west of the
ninety-eighth meridian: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming.
5. See R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 6.
6. Rock and soil layers that can store and transmit groundwater fast enough to supply
wells with reasonable amounts of water are known as groundwater basins or aquifers. C. FET-
TER, supra note 1, at 92. Geologists use a variety of terms to describe rock and soil layers that
are too impermeable to support productive wells. See, e.g., id at 93 (using the term "confining
layer"); R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 47 (using the term "aquitard").
7. See, e.g., U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES-
1975-2000, at 11-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL]; id at 4 SOUTH
ATLANTIC-GULF REGION 27; id at 4 MID-ATLANTIC REGION 26-27; J.W. WRIGHT, THE COM-
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draft,8 threatens both the quantity and quality of groundwater supplies.9
Unfortunately, the prevailing legal doctrines regulating groundwater
rights are inadequate to control groundwater depletion. This article argues
that effective control of groundwater overdraft can be achieved through
adoption of a groundwater management plan that imposes mandatory,
need-based quotas on all groundwater users. Because it authorizes the state
to restrict the pumping rights of current groundwater users, however, such a
plan is subject to the challenge that it is an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty without compensation. This article further asserts that, despite the un-
compensated curtailing of current users' pumping rights, a mandatory
conservation plan for controlling groundwater overdraft should be upheld as
a constitutional exercise of the police power.
Part I of this article analyzes the prevailing common law and statutory
groundwater property systems, and concludes that they do not provide a
satisfactory means of controlling groundwater overdraft. It then discusses
the advantages of combatting depletion through the use of mandatory, need-
based quotas applied to all groundwater pumpers. Part II argues that, al-
though there are precedents suggesting otherwise, applying such restrictions
to existing groundwater users would not constitute an illegal, uncompen-
sated taking of private property. Both the public rights theory and more
traditional takings theories support this result.
ING WATER FAMINE 28 (1966); GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 135-40 (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as CAL. COMM'N REPORT];
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 231, 238-39 (Final Re-
port 1973) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L WATER COMM'N]; Comptroller General, Ground Water
Overdrafting Must Be Controlled i-ii (General Accounting Office, Sept. 12, 1980); Lowe,
Ruedisili, and Graham, Beyond Section 858: A Proposed Ground- Water Liabiiy and Management Ss-
tanfor the Eastern United States, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 132-33, 149 (1979). In some places, the amount
of overdraft is extreme, making overdraft a particularly critical problem. WATER RESOURCES
COUNCIL, supra, at 11. For example, in Pima County, Arizona, which includes the city of Tuc-
son, 4.7 times more groundwater is being pumped than is being recharged. ARIZONA GROUND-
WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 1-3 (June 1980) (citing 1975
ARIZONA WATER COMMISSION STUDY) [hereinafter cited as ARIZ. STUDY COMM'N] Tucson
depends entirely on groundwater for its water supply. Higdon & Thompson, The 1980 Arizona
Groundwater Management Code, 1980 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 621, 623 n.6 (citing Arizona Daily Star).
8. See, e.g., C. FETTER, supra note 1, at 389; E. JOHNSON, INC., GROUNDWATER AND
WELLS 414 (1966). The term "mining" is also used. See, e.g., Aiken & Supalla, Ground Water
Minig and Western Water Rights Law." The Nebraska Expertncen, 24 S.D.L. REV. 607, 608 (1979).
A related concept is "safe yield", which is defined as the rate at which water can be with-
drawn from a groundwater basin without producing an undesired result. See C. FETrER, supra
note 1, at 477; R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 364. Safe yield used to be considered
equivalent to the amount of water that could be withdrawn annually without creating over-
draft. C. FETrER, supra note 1, at 385. But conceptions of "undesired result" have expanded,
giving rise to uncertainty as to how to calculate safe yield. See id. at 385-86; R. FREEZE & J.
CHERRY, supra note 1, at 364-65. A further complication in calculation of safe yield is that
overdraft does not always decrease the net availability of groundwater. See infia note 10,
9. See infta notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
Although importation of surface water has been suggested as a solution to overdraft, it is
largely infeasible because of its cost and legislation protecting water supplies in areas of origin.
See infia note 41.
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I. GROUNDWATER OVERDRAFT AND GROUNDWATER PROPERTY
SYSTEMS
Groundwater overdraft is an increasingly widespread phenomenon that
causes serious problems. As water is withdrawn from an aquifer, the water
level drops, making pumping increasingly difficult and expensive. If over-
draft is sustained, the groundwater source will eventually be exhausted or
pumping may become so uneconomical as to be infeasible. '0
Besides increased pumping expense and depletion of groundwater sup-
plies, overdraft can create other problems. Groundwater and surface water
are hydrologically connected;" l therefore, overdraft can lead to sharp de-
creases in the availability of surface water. 12 Furthermore, sustained over-
draft can cause the porous material surrounding an aquifer to compact,
which can reduce the storage capability of the aquifer and cause overlying
land to subside. 13 Saltwater contamination of the groundwater supply can
also result from overdraft.
14
The prevailing legal doctrines regulating groundwater use were devel-
oped primarily to resolve conflicts among individual users, not to prevent
depletion of groundwater supplies. Consequently, the doctrines have been
ineffective in managing overdraft and in preventing the problems it creates.
The following section of this article describes and evaluates these doctrines
and then presents an alternative approach for managing groundwater.
A. The Common Law Groundwater Doctrines
Under the common law, an individual's right to use groundwater arises
10. An aquifer may actually become "economically depleted" before all water has been
pumped from it. Aiken & Supalla, supra note 8, at 608. In Texas, for example, increased drill-
ing costs associated with a declining water table have reduced the amount of drilling for
groundwater from the Ogallala aquifer underlying the High Plains. Trelease, Legal Solutions
to Groundwater Problems-A General Overview (address delivered at the Twelfth Biennial
Conference on Groundwater, Sacramento, Cal.) (Sept. 20, 1979), reprited in 11 PAC. LJ. 863,
864, 871 (1980). See also The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1982, at 33, col. 1 (citing Kansas City
Federal Reserve Bank study predicting reduced feedlot business in Kansas, Oklahoma and
Texas primarily because of unavailability of groundwater for producing feed). Under certain
circumstances, temporary, limited overdraft can increase, rather than decrease, the net availa-
bility of groundwater by stimulating the outflow of water from surrounding, permeable mate-
rial. See C. FETTER, supra note 1, at 379, 394-96.
11. Groundwater feeds streams and other surface water bodies, and surface water
recharges aquifers. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 233.
12. C. FErrER, supra note 1, at 385 (groundwater withdrawals may reduce streamflow,
which in turn would lower lake levels and dry wetlands); W. HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 225;
NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 233-34. Conflicts between users of groundwater and
users of surface water are well-documented. See, e.g., Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447
P.2d 986 (1968); NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 233-34; Harrison & Sandstrom, The
Groundwater-Surface Water Conct And Recent Colorado Legislation, 43 U. CoLw. L. REV. 1, 20-22
(1971).
13. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 370; W. HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 228;
Trelease, supra note 10, at 871-72. A groundwater aquifer is regarded by many as superior to an
above-ground storage reservoir because water is not lost to evaporation and the stored water is
not subjected to atmospheric pollutants, such as acid rain.
14. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 375; W. HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 225;
Trelease, supra note 10, at 872. Salt water can intrude into the aquifer either from the ocean or
from saltwater brines trapped in sandstone surrounding the aquifer. Id
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from ownership of the overlying land. One of the three common law doc-
trines, absolute ownership, reasonable use, or correlative rights, is used in
most of the eastern states and in the four western states that account for sixty
one percent of the total groundwater overdraft in that region.'
5
The absolute ownership doctrine was first articulated in 1843 in the
English case of Acton v. Blundell.t 6 Knowing little about groundwater,' 7 the
Court of Exchequer Chamber applied the doctrine that he who owns the
land also owns everything beneath the land,18 and held that the owner of a
parcel of land has an unrestricted right to capture groundwater through
pumping on the parcel.' 9
The right of absolute ownership was the first groundwater ownership
rule to be used in the United States. 20 Contrary to the Court of Exchequer
Chamber's characterization, subsequent decisions held that under the abso-
lute ownership doctrine landowners do not actually own the water beneath
their land. Rather, they have an unrestricted entitlement to pump on their
land, even if the pumping dries up the wells of their neighbors.2 ' At first,
the doctrine permitted even malicious pumping;22 but later most states mod-
ified the rule to prohibit such acts.2 3 Aside from this minor restriction, the
doctrine places no limits on groundwater withdrawals, and consequently can
neither prevent nor correct an overdraft situation. Although Texas still fol-
lows the absolute ownership rule, most states have now rejected it.
2 4
New Hampshire was the first. In Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co. ,25
15. See Johnson, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act and Trends in Western States
Groundwater Adminstration and Management: A Minerals Industr Perspective, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1031, 1035-36 (1980). The four western states are: Arizona, California, Nebraska, and
Texas. Arizona recently enacted a statute that regulates much of the groundwater pumping in
the state. See infra note 66.
16. 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843).
17. The court recognized its ignorance, referring to groundwater's mysterious source and
movement. Id at 350, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233.
18. Id at 353-54, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235.
19. Id at 354, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235.
20. See Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 501, 505-06, 522
(1968).
21. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 329-30, 374 P.2d 578, 588 (1962).
In Acton, for example, pumping by the defendant lowered the water level in the well of the
plaintiff, an adjoining landowner. The plaintiff was denied relief because the defendant was
said to have an unrestricted right to pump groundwater. 12 M. & W. at 354, 152 Eng. Rep. at
1235. Such a result is inconsistent with the idea that the plaintiff actually owned the water
beneath his land.
22. See, e.g., Huber v. Markel, 117 Wis. 355, 363, 94 N.W. 354, 357 (1903) (defendant
permitted to pump at full capacity, 24 hours a day, even though not using much of the water
pumped), overuled in State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 294-98, 217
N.W.2d 339, 346-48 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 696, 72 N.E. 849, 851
(1904) (appellate court upheld enjoining of pumping from wells whose owners were attempting
to stop the flow from plaintiff's well); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289,
293-94, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (1955) (dictum).
24. Texas's adherence to the absolute ownership rule was recently reaffirmed, with some
legislative modification to protect neighboring landowners from land subsidence. See Friend-
swood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978). The rule apparently
still prevails in the country of its origin. See Langbrook Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey County
Council, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1424, 1439-40.
25. 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
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the state supreme court, emphasizing the interdependence of groundwater
users who pump from a common pool, adopted the rule of reasonable use.
26
That rule, which is still widely followed in the East, 27 allows overlying land-
owners to capture unlimited amounts of groundwater as long as they apply
the water to reasonable uses of their property. 28 Like the absolute ownership
rule, the reasonable use doctrine holds that the owner of a parcel of land has
no ownership right in the corpus of water beneath the parcel. Only when
water comes into the landowner's control does it become his personal
property.
29
The reasonable use doctrine differs from the absolute ownership rule in
two respects. First, it restricts transportation of groundwater, holding that
groundwater can be used only on the parcel of land from which it was
pumped, and provides injunctive relief and damages to a neighboring user
injured as a result of an illegal transfer. 30 Second, the reasonable use rule
bans flagrantly wasteful uses of groundwater, 3 1 and provides injunctive relief
to an injured neighboring pumper.
3 2
Neither of these restrictions, however, is equipped to solve a basin-wide
groundwater overdraft problem. Courts have not always enforced the re-
striction on transportation of groundwater. 33 Although it is a pervasive rule
in water law, 34 courts rarely interpret the doctrine against waste to declare a
26. Id. at 573-77.
27. See, e.g., Jones v. Oz-Arc-Val. Poultry, 228 Ark. 76, 306 S.W.2d 111 (1957); Higday v.
Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339
Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940).
28. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 965 (1979); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Meeker v. City
of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 638, 74 A. 379, 385 (1909); Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co.,
104 W. Va. 368, 375-76, 140 S.E. 57, 60 (1927).
29. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 82, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (1981);
Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 667 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965
(1979).
30. Farmers Investment Co. v. Bettwy, 113 Ariz. 520, 558 P.2d 14 (1976) (en banc); Bristor
v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953); Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 196 Mich. 75, 163
N.W. 109 (1917); Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Higday v.
Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
31. Aiken & Supalla, supra note 8, at 612; Harnsberger, Oeltjen, & Fischer, Groundwater.
From Windmil/L to Comprehensu'e Pubic Management, 52 NEB. L. REv. 179, 205 (1973). The rule
against waste, once solely a common law rule, see Basinger v. Taylor, 36 Idaho 591, 596-97, 211
P. 1085, 1086 (1922); De Bok v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 604-05, 176 N.W. 631, 633 (1920); Barclay
v. Abraham, 121 Iowa 619, 624, 96 N.W. 1080, 1082 (1903); Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89
Minn. 58, 63, 93 N.W. 907, 909 (1903); Doherty v. Pratt, 34 Nev. 343, 348, 124 P. 574, 576
(1912), has since been codified in statutes regulating both groundwater and surface water. See,
e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-107(5), 37-92-103(4), 37-92-502 (1973); MoNT. CODE ANN
§ 85-2-505 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. 46-265 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (West
Supp. 1982).
32. See, e.g., De Bok v. Doak, 188 Iowa 597, 176 N.W. 631 (1920) (use of groundwater for
standing pond in which hogs wallowed enjoined); Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58,
93 N.W. 907 (1903) (diverting groundwater into city sewer enjoined).
33. See, e.g., Jarvis v. State Land Dep't, 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970). Injarvis, a
municipality transported groundwater in violation of the reasonable use rule, but the Arizona
Supreme Court allowed the transportation. The court invoked the state's preference statute,
which gives preference to municipalities over irrigators in the processing of applications for
surface water permits. Id. at 511, 479 P.2d at 174.
34. See supra note 31.
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use unreasonable or to require restrictions on pumping.35 Moreover, courts
define waste according to local custom, allowing many inefficient uses simply
because they are standard practice. 36 Thus, the reasonable use doctrine, as
applied by the courts, does not significantly limit the quantity of ground-
water landowners may use on their overlying land, and cannot prevent the
development of an overdraft problem or correct an existing problem.
Only the third common law doctrine, the correlative rights rule, antici-
pates the possibility of a groundwater shortage. The rule was developed in
California in recognition of the arid conditions existing in many areas of the
state,3 7 and today is followed most conspicuously in that state. 38 In addition
to prohibiting wasteful uses of groundwater, the correlative rights rule re-
quires that all users "share" groundwater shortages. When a water scarcity
develops, the rule proportionately cuts back pumping and allows each user
the right to draw a "reasonable share" of the available water. 39 California
courts have determined share size on the basis of past use:4° for example, if a
35. Clark, Background And Trends In Water Salvage Law, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 421,
461 (1969). Professor Sax reviewed the Utah Supreme Court's interpretations of the waste doc-
trine and concluded that, although the court often expounds the need to avoid waste, it rarely
enjoins allegedly wasteful uses. J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY 273 (1968). In City
of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955), the Texas
Supreme Court held that transporting groundwater in natural channels 118 miles from where it
was pumped would not be enjoined, even though evidence showed that 63 to 74 percent of the
water was lost to evaporation, transpiration, and seepage when it was being transported. Id at
291, 276 S.W.2d at 800. Once the court determined that the end use of the water was lawful, it
made no further inquiry into how the groundwater was being transported or used, and deferred
to the legislature to decide that particular means of transporting water are wasteful.
36. A study of the waste doctrine as it has been applied in certain appropriation states, see
infra text accompanying notes 47-54, concludes that "custom is unquestionably the most impor-
tant factor bearing upon the waste standard." Note, Water Waste-Ascertainment and Abatement,
1973 UTAH L. REV. 449, 454. Community custom was used as a standard to judge the wasteful-
ness of the use of groundwater and surface water in Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935); acts resulting in the loss of 40 to
45 percent of water while it was being transported were not enjoined. Note, supra, at 455; Tulare
Imgaton Dist., 3 Cal. 2d at 572-73, 45 P.2d 1009-10. It seems that, because the costs of remedy-
ing a wasteful use are often significant, courts, out of a sense of equity, refuse to place the costs
on an individual user. See Pring & Tomb, License to Waste. Legal Barriers to Conservation and Efi-
cient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-19 (1979). The courts'
reluctance to question wasteful local custom places the burden on legislatures to prevent waste-
ful uses.
37. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663 (Cal. 1902), rev'don rehearing, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766
(1903). Both Justice Temple, in the original decision, and Justice Show, in the rehearing, recog-
nized that the common law of groundwater use and regulation must be adapted to the arid
conditions in Southern California. See 70 P. at 665-66; 141 Cal. at 123-24, 74 P. at 767-69, 772-
73. See also Barton v. Riverside Water Co., 155 Cal. 509, 516, 101 P. 790, 793 (1909).
38. The correlative rights doctrine is also followed in Nebraska, see Prather v. Eisenmann,
200 Neb. 1, 6-7, 261 N.W.2d 766, 769-70 (1978); Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 811, 248
N.W. 304, 308 (1933), and in New Jersey, see Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton, 172 N.J.
Super. 489, 510, 412 A.2d 1064, 1075 (1980), afd, 177 N.J. Super. 639, 427 A.2d 615 (1981).
39. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926, 207 P.2d 17, 30
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135-36, 74 P. 766,
772 (1903); Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 5, 261 N.W.2d 766, 771 (1978); Woodsum v.
Township of Pemberton, 172 N.J. Super. 489, 501-02, 412 A.2d 1064, 1071 (1980),af d, 177 N.J.
Super. 639, 427 A.2d 615 (1981).
40. California has a complicated system for determining who is entitled to share in the
available water. Groundwater users include both overlying landowners and "appropriators"
(non-overlying users). Overlying landowners have equal rights to the available water except as
to share size. Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 628, 105 P. 748, 753 (1909). Appropriators'
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thirty percent reduction in withdrawals from a groundwater basin is neces-
sary to eliminate overdraft, each groundwater user is required to pump
thirty percent less water than in the past.4
California courts, however, have restricted rights to pump groundwater
only where supplemental surface supplies were available to make up the
shortage.42 Rather than using the correlative rights doctrine to force
groundwater users to reduce water consumption, California courts have used
rights, however, are subordinate: their use can be completely cut off if necessary to protect
overlying landowners. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926, 207 P.2d 17,
28-29 (1949). "As between appropriators . . . the one first in time is the first in right, and a
prior appropriator is entitled to all the water he needs, up to the amount that he has taken in
the past, before a subsequent appropriator may take any." Id. at 926, 207 P.2d at 29.
If, however, appropriators use groundwater for a certain period of time and under certain
conditions, their appropriative rights are converted into "prescriptive" rights, which are equal
in status to the rights of overlying landowners. Id. at 926-33, 207 P.2d at 28-29. An appropria-
tive right "ripen[s] into a prescriptive right where the use is actual, open and notorious, hostile
and adverse to the original owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five
years, and under a claim of right." d. at 926-27, 207 P.2d at 29.
Overdraft can qualify as an adverse use, California Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham
& Son, 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 726, 37 Cal. Rptr. I, 7 (1964), if the prescripted parties have
notice that overdraft is occurring. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199,
282, 537 P.2d 1250, 1311, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 62. Such rights, however, cannot be acquired
against public entities. Id at 270-77, 537 P.2d at 1301-07, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 52-58. Because
prescriptive rights are limited to acquisition only against private parties, their usefulness to
control groundwater pumping is limited. Often the pumping of groundwater by municipalities
accounts for the majority of a basin's overdraft, see Gleason, Los Angeles v. San Fernando:
Ground Water Management in the Grand Tradition, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 703, 704, 706 (1977),
and enforcing prescriptive rights only against private users would be inequitable.
41. See, e.g., City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 933, 207 P.2d 17, 32-33
(1949); California Water Serv. Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 727, 37
Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1964). But see Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 992, 1000, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (1975) (calculating share size not on past use, "but
solely on . . . current reasonable and beneficial need for water"). Because the courts in these
and other cases relied on the doctrine of mutual prescription as the basis for forcing reductions
in pumping, see, e.g., City of Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 924-33, 207 P.2d at 28-33, and since that
doctrine cannot be applied against municipalities, see note 40 supra, it is not clear how share size
will be determined where a municipality is a party to an adjudication of a groundwater basin.
It is not yet clear how Nebraska and New Jersey courts will assess share size. See Prather v.
Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 9, 261 N.W.2d 766, 771 (1978); Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton,
172 N.J. Super. 489, 510-12, 412 A.2d 1064, 1075-76 (1980), afd, 177 N.J. Super. 639, 427 A.2d
615 (1981).
42. J. BAIN, R. CAVES, &J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA'S WATER INDUSTRY 454-
55 (1966); CAL. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 7, at 146; Aiken & Supalla, supra note 8, at 616-17;
Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 61, 69 (1962); Trelease,
supra note 10, at 865-66. Because of the unavailability of alternative sources of water nearby,
and the expense of and legal barriers to importing water from distant points, imported water
may be difficult or impossible to obtain in the future. Trelease, supra note 10, at 866.
For the same reasons, prospects for importing water to solve overdraft problems occurring
outside of California are also dim. See, e.g. ,Johnson, supra note 15, at 1033; Pring & Tomb, supra
note 36, at 25-2; Schad, Western Water Resources. Means to Augment the Supply, in WESTERN
WATER RESOURCES: COMING PROBLEMS AND THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES 113, 120 (1980);
Henry, Commentary, in Id 134, 135-36; The University of California Agricultural Issues Task
Force, Agricultural Policy Challenges for California in the 1980's, at 17, 18 (1978). See generally
R.H. BOYLE, J. GRAVES, & T.H. WATKINS, THE WATER HUSTLERS (1971).
Although Orange County, California's use of water imported from the Colorado River to
augment its supply of groundwater is often cited as an example of good conjunctive manage-
ment of groundwater and surface water supplies, see, e.g., NAT'L WATER COMM'N,.supra note 7,
at 235; K. Buckwalter, Management of Groundwater in Southern California 29-34 (spring
1970) (unpublished paper in Stanford Law School Library), it will be interesting to evaluate
that management plan once Orange County's supply from the Colorado River is reduced in
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the doctrine merely to allocate the cost of importing supplemental surface
supplies to the overdrafted basin.
43
Even assuming that courts could implement the doctrine to curtail
pumping when no alternative sources of water were available, the correlative
rights rule is an inappropriate vehicle for resolving overdraft problems. Be-
cause share size is based on past use, users who anticipate court adjudication
of rights to pump from their groundwater basin may increase their current
withdrawals in hopes of maximizing their future shares.44 This "race to the
pumphouse" creates inequities45 and accelerates depletion of groundwater
supplies.
4 6
Thus, although the correlative rights doctrine is more sensitive to over-
draft problems than are other common law doctrines, it nevertheless does
not provide a satisfactory means of combatting groundwater depletion. Nu-
merous commentators have criticized the common law doctrines for this
failure.
4 7
B. The Prior Appropriation Doctrine: A Statutory Approach to Regulating
Groundwater Use
Most of the western states have replaced the common law groundwater
schemes with "prior appropriation" statutes. 48 Because these statutes pro-
order to supply the Central Arizona Project. Kovitz, Water Experts See Mid-Decade Criis in South-
tand, Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1981, Part IX (Real Estate), at 1.
43. See, e.g., the description of the management plans developed pursuant to adjudications
of the Central and West Basins, the Upper San Gabriel Valley, and the Chino Basin, in A.
Schneider, Groundwater Rights in California, Staff Paper No. 2, Governor's Comm'n To Re-
view California Water Rights Law 50-58 (1977).
44. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 267, 537 P.2d 1250, 1299,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 50 (1975); Gleason, supra note 40, at 709. Krieger & Banks, supra note 42, at
61-62.
45. Those who do not participate in the race will receive relatively small shares when the
rights in the basin are adjudicated and will therefore have greater difficulty adjusting to the
reduced supply than will their greedy fellow users.
46. Gleason, supra note 40, at 709.
47. See, e.g., Comptroller General, supra note 7, at iii; Trelease, supra note 10, at 865-68;
Clark, The Role ofState Legislation in Ground Water Management, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 469, 475
(1977).
48. See Radosevich, Better Use of Water Management Tools, in WESTERN WATER RESOURCES
253, 258-59 (1979). California, Nebraska and Texas, the three common law states in the West,
plus Arizona, which was a common law state until 1980, see Johnson, supra note 15, at 1031,
1035 n.15, account for 61% of the total groundwater overdraft occurring in the West. Id. at
1035-36. In this article, Nebraska will be considered a common law state because of the limited
application to date of its groundwater management statute. Set infra note 82.
A few eastern states have enacted statutes that provide for comprehensive regulation of
groundwater. See, e.g., FiA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.013 to -.617 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 455A.1-A.40 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.010 to
-. 990 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.37 to -. 81 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1983).
The Kentucky statute has been criticized because it exempts a large number of uses from
regulation. Ausness, Water Use Permits tn a Riparian State.- Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191,
229-32 (1977). A review of the first ten years of administration of the Iowa statute indicates
that, although almost every request for a water use permit was granted, permits were not always
granted for the amount of water requested. Hines, A Decade ofExperience Under The Iowa Water
Permit System-Part On7e, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 499, 532-35 (1967).
Georgia's Groundwater Use Act of 1972, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-1101 to -1115 (Supp. 1981)
and South Carolina's Groundwater Use Act of 1969, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 49-5-10 to 49-5-120
[Vol. 61:1
3 MANAGEMENT OF GR O UND WA TER
vide for quantification of existing rights to pump groundwater, they are su-
perior to the common law which relies on expensive, time-consuming
litigation to define pumping rights. Although many of the statutes preserve
common law groundwater rights that existed on the effective date of the
statute,49 most declare that all unclaimed groundwater in the state belongs
to the public, 50 and that any subsequent users must obtain a permit before
pumping.
5 1
Prior appropriation statutes do not base the right to pump groundwater
on ownership of the overlying land. Rather, they establish a first-in-time,
first-in-right priority system among users. 52 In times of shortage, junior ap-
propriators, the last to obtain permits, may have their rights to pump com-
pletely curtailed to protect the water supply of senior appropriators.
53
Frequently, the statutes also provide that water rights can be lost if not exer-
cised. 54 Thus, prior appropriation statutes can be used to prevent serious
overdraft problems from developing.
55
Nonetheless, they have critical drawbacks. Under prior appropriation
(Law. Co-op. 1977), both require users who pump more than 100,000 gallons per day to obtain
a permit.
49. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.060 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1983); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701(d) to -703 (1977 & Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.585 (1981).
50. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-101 (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.040 (1962). But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109 (1973 &
Supp. 1982) (abolishing existing rights, but giving the holders of those rights priority under the
prior appropriation statute).
51. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-229 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-302 (1981); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-905 (1977) (permit required before
building well). Many statutes require all groundwater pumpers to obtain a permit, regardless of
whether the pumper has a common law right that is preserved under the statute. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.040, 46.15.065 (1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.585-610 (1981).
52. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.050 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.130 (1962).
53. See, e.g., Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973) (junior appro-
priator can be enjoined from further pumping where overdraft is occurring). Cf. Mathers v.
Texaco Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966) (senior appropriator's rights not impaired when
junior appropriator permitted to pump, even though aquifer is being mined). These cases illus-
trate contrasting means of determining when groundwater is so scarce that junior appropriators
can be enjoined from further pumping. While Idaho law restricts pumping by junior appropri-
ators whenever overdraft is occurring, see IDAHO CODE § 42-237a(g) (Supp. 1983), New Mexico
gives its State Engineer broad discretion to determine when there is sufficient water for later
appropriators. For example, in Mathers he determined that water could be appropriated from
an essentially nonrecharging aquifer at a rate that would leave one-third of the aquifer's current
stock in storage after 40 years. 77 N.M. at 242, 421 P.2d at 774.
Commentators have criticized the prior appropriation doctrine as applied in some states
because of its failure to clearly define when a junior appropriator is entitled to pump. See, e.g.,
Corker, Inadequacy of Te Present Law to Protect, Conserve and Develop Groundwater Use, 25 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23-1, 23-12, 23-13 (1979).
54. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-237 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.090 (1981); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 72-12-8 (Supp. 1982).
55. Johnson, supra note 15, at 1036. In 1927, New Mexico became one of the first states to
enact a prior appropriation statute. See 1927 N.M. Laws 450 (amended 1931 N.M. Laws 229)
(current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-12-I to -28 (1978 & Supp. 1982)). Numerous com-
mentators have cited New Mexico as an example of a state where groundwater resources are
managed well. C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, 225-
26, 340 n.17 (Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 6, 1971); Clark, supra note 47, at 469-70;




statutes, the most senior appropriators have little incentive to use ground-
water efficiently, because termination of their water supply is unlikely. 56 In-
deed, statutes that call for forfeiture of unused groundwater rights actually
discourage appropriators from undertaking conservation measures: 57 if ap-
propriators conserve, they lose their rights to the amount of water conserved.
Hence, such statutes do not ensure efficient use of groundwater.
Prior appropriation statutes that preserve existing groundwater rights
raise an additional problem. They do not provide a means for alleviating
pre-enactment overdraft conditions. Regulation of subsequent pumping
only prevents the depletion rate from increasing. It does not eliminate de-
pletion or even reduce the rate. 58 Thus, there are serious flaws in relying on
prior appropriation statutes to control the use of groundwater.
C. Imposing Quantitive, Need-Based Limits on All Pumpers of Groundwater
None of the four prevailing groundwater property doctrines-absolute
ownership, reasonable use, correlative rights, or prior appropriation-pro-
vides a fully satisfactory means of regulating groundwater use. The short-
comings, however, could be remedied by adopting an approach that imposes
quantitative, need-based limits on all groundwater pumpers. 59
56. Although the doctrine against waste could be used to restrict a senior appropriator's
use of groundwater, see supra note 31, that doctrine has not been applied to force conservation of
groundwater use. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Pring & Tomb, supra note 36, at 25-20 to -22; CAL. COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 7, at 60.
58. Many of the states that have enacted prior appropriation statutes did not have serious
overdraft conditions when their statutes were enacted and therefore did not need a mechanism
for decreasing pre-enactment rates of water consumption. For example, New Mexico's ground-
water statute was passed in 1927, see supra note 55; however, substantial groundwater pumping
did not begin in most of that state's groundwater basins until after World War II. See, e.g.,
Harris, Water Alocation Under The Appropriation Doctrine In The Lea County Underground Basin of New
Mexico, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 155 (D. Haber
and S.W. Bergen eds. 1958).
Oregon was another of the first states to pass a prior appropriation statute. 1927 Or. Laws
410 (current version at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.505 to .795 (1981)). Pumping of substantial
amounts of water from Oregon's aquifers did not begin until after 1940. Note, Rights to Under-
ground Waters in Oregon Past, Present and Future, 3 WILLAMETTE L.J. 317, 318 (1965) (quoting
Thirtieth Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor of Oregon [ 1962-1964] at 20).
In Colorado, nontributary groundwater was essentially unregulated until 1957. 1957 Col.
Sess. Laws 863 (repealed 1965). See Note, A Survey of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 312-
13 (1970). Pumping of substantial quantities of groundwater, however, did not begin until the
early 1960's. G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE, D. ALLARDICE, and C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLUTION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976, at 114-15 (1976).
59. Another possible approach would be to use a price mechanism to encourage more effi-
cient use of water. Numerous commentators have extolled the virtues of such an approach. See,
e.g., NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 247-59. But see Note, Indan Claims to Groundwater.-
Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 103, 106 n.12 (1980) (noting externalities
that a market system would ignore). But it is doubtful that use of markets alone could return a
seriously overdrafted aquifer to a safe condition. The price elasticity of demand for water, that
is, the responsiveness of demand to changes in price, varies according to type of use. See, e.g.,
CORKER, supra note 55, at A 1-83 n.23. For virtually all uses it is much lower than one: a one
percent rise in price results in less than a one percent decline in the quantity of water used. See,
e.g., ud.; NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 252-53, 256-57; Pope, Stepp, and Lytle, Eects
of Pne Change Upon the Domestic Use of Water Over Time (Water Resources Research Institute
Report No. 56, March 1975).
Because demand for water is relatively inelastic, only a steep hike in prices could reduce
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Such an approach would first call for determination of the rates at
which groundwater is being withdrawn from and replenished to the aquifer.
Next, the implementing authority would be required to decide what rate of
overdraft, if any, should be permitted. Although the determination of rates
of withdrawal and recharge will present a formidable challenge, 6° the more
difficult question may be deciding the optimal rate of net withdrawal. 6' Fi-
nally, the selected withdrawal rate must be divided among the groundwater
users, by placing a quantitative limit on the amount of water that each user
can pump.
Quotas should be set not according to past use, as under the correlative
rights doctrine,62 nor according to time of initial pumping, as under the
prior appropriation doctrine,63 but simply according to need. Need would
be determined by classifying all groundwater users according to type of use,
such as irrigation or domestic. All persons using water for the same purpose
would be given the same quota. Thus, for example, all irrigators growing
similar crops under similar conditions would be allowed to pump the same
amount of water per acre.64 Existing users would be allowed to continue
pumping significantly; however, such an increase would be politically unacceptable. See, e.g.,
Arizona Daily Star, Nov. 18, 1977, at I (raising water prices in Tucson resulted in three mem-
bers of the city council being recalled). But a gradual price rise might not bring about enough
conservation to save the aquifer. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the response to a price hike
would make planning the depletion of the aquifer difficult.
Nonetheless, financial incentives could play an important part in any groundwater man-
agement scheme. For example, Arizona's groundwater statute provides for a pumping tax, the
proceeds of which are to be used to defray administrative costs, purchase supplemental water
supplies, and purchase and retire agricultural land. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-611 (Supp.
1982-1983).
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that a state cannot attempt to solve its
groundwater problems by preventing groundwater from being taken out of the state. See
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982). Furthermore, as noted earlier,
importation of surface water is not generally a feasible solution to overdraft. See supra note 42.
60. See CORKER, supra note 55, at 77, 80-81.
61. Not only is it difficult to calculate safe yield, see supra note 8, but safe yield may not be
equivalent to the optimal withdrawal rate. Most notably, where an aquifer's rate of replenish-
ment is zero or close to zero, see Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights.: A Note on Cappaert v.
United States, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 382 (1978), optimum benefits may be achieved
by allowing a certain amount of overdraft, even though such use will eventually leave an area
without a groundwater supply. The goal of Arizona's new statute is to return Arizona's major
groundwater basins to safe yield by 2025, or 45 years after enactment of the statute. See infta
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
64. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-462 to -466 (Supp. 1982-1983) (providing for
"irrigation grandfathered rights" and two types of "non-irrigation grandfathered rights"). See
also Connall, A HsoO , of the Arizona Groundwater Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313; Higdon & Thomp-
son, supra note 7, at 650-51.
Under the Arizona statute, existing users who wish to change their type of use are often
restricted from changing, by provisions designed to encourage conservation of groundwater gen-
erally and the retirement of land irrigated by groundwater. For example, owners of non-irriga-
tion grandfathered rights may use their rights only for non-irrigation purposes, ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-470 to -471 (Supp. 1982-1983), and may convey them only for non-irrigation
purposes. Id at §§ 45-473 to -474. When an irrigation grandfathered right is changed to a non-
irrigation use, the quantity of groundwater that may then be used is limited to the lesser of the
amount of the irrigation grandfathered right or three acre-feet per acre per year. Id at § 45-469
(average consumptive use of crops grown in central Arizona is approximately 3.6 acre-feet per
acre per year, Johnson, supra note 15, at 1071 n.129).
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their previous type of use,65 pursuant to their pre-existing rights, but subse-
quent users would need a permit to engage in a particular use.
6 6
This proposed approach is similar to the groundwater management
plan recently adopted in Arizona.6 7 For groundwater basins in areas of the
state initially covered by the statute,68 the legislature has established the
goal of safe yield 69 by January 1, 2025.70 The goal of balancing ground-
water withdrawals and recharge is to be achieved primarily by imposing
increasingly stringent quotas on all groundwater users. 7 1 Under the Arizona
plan, the quotas will be established by type of use: agricultural users will be
subject to an "irrigation water duty" based on "the quantity of water reason-
ably required to irrigate the crops historically grown," and presuming that
65. Ste, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-512 (Supp. 1982-1983) (creating six classes of
permits). See also Connall, supra note 64, at 337. Some types of uses are exempt from Arizona's
permit requirement. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-491 to -498 (Supp. 1982-1983) (cities, towns,
and private water companies in service areas need not obtain permits), § 45-454 (Supp. 1982-
1983) (permit exemption for small domestic wells).
66. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-512 (Supp. 1982-1983).
67. See id. at §§ 45-401 to -637 (Supp. 1982-1983). For good summaries of the statute, see
Connall, supra note 64, at 330-43; Higdon & Thompson, supra note 7, at 632-34; Johnson, supra
note 15, at 1045-57, 1062-63 (1980); Pontius, Groundwater Management in Arizona." A New Set of
Rules, 16 ARIz. B.J. 28 (1980).
Before Arizona passed its new statute, groundwater use in the state was governed almost
entirely by the reasonable use doctrine. See Connall, supra note 63, at 315. The only statutory
control was a law that gave the State Land Department authority to delineate "critical ground-
water areas." ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-301 to -324 (1956) (repealed 1980). Within these
areas the law prohibited additional pumping for agricultural uses, § 45-314, but did not em-
power the state to restrict current pumping. The statute frequently was criticized for being
inadequate to solve Arizona's groundwater mining problem. See, e.g. , Trelease, supra note 10, at
867; Clark, Ariona Ground Water Law.- The Needfor Legislation, 16 ARIz. L. REv. 799, 818 (1974).
68. These are called the "initial active management areas." See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-411, 45-563 (Supp. 1982-1983). Together they include 80% of the state's population and
69% of the state's groundwater overdraft. Johnson, supra note 15, at 1046 (citing the Arizona
Department of Water Resources). The statute also provides mechanisms for creation of "subse-
quent" active management areas. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-412, 45-415 (Supp. 1982-
1983).
69. The statute defines safe yield strictly in terms of the quantity of groundwater with-
drawn from and recharged to the aquifer: "'safe yield' means a groundwater management goal
which attempts to achieve and thereafter maintain a long-term balance between the annual
amount of groundwater withdrawn in an active management area and the annual amount of
natural and artificial groundwater recharge. ... ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-561(6) (Supp.
1982-1983). This definition has been criticized as being too inflexible. Higdon & Thompson,
supra note 7, at 638-39. See also supra note 8. Given that many of the undesirable results of
persistent overdraft may be irreversible, see, e.g., Corker, supra note 53, at 23-20 to -21 (noting
that once a groundwater basin is contaminated, it is likely to remain that way for decades or
centuries), and given that some areas of the state rely exclusively on groundwater as their source
of water, see Johnson, supra note 15, at 1043 (Tucson is one of the largest cities in the world
relying on groundwater for all of its water supply), the statute's narrowly defined goal is perhaps
the best way to manage the state's precious groundwater resources at this time.
70. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-562(A) (Supp. 1982-1983). This is the goal for the Tuc-
son, Phoenix, and Prescott active management areas. The management goal for the Pinal ac-
tive management area is more flexible. Id at § 45-562(B). The state water director will set the
management goals for subsequent active management areas. Id. at § 45-569(A).
71. See id at §§ 45-563 to -568. A groundwater user can obtain a variance from the conser-
vation timetable by showing "compelling economic circumstances." Id at § 45-574(C). Other
means to achieve the management goal include a program for augmentation of the water sup-
ply and purchase and retirement of grandfathered rights. See id. at §§ 45-565(A)(4), 45-
566(A) (4) and (A)(6), 45-567(A)(4) and (A)(6). The Central Arizona Project is expected to bring
into the state an average of 1.2 million acre-feet per year from the Colorado River, Johnson,
supra note 15, at 1044, not enough water to solve the state's overdraft problem. Id
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various conservation methods, such as lined ditches, are used. 72 Municipal
users will be subject to "reasonable reductions in per capita use;"' 73 and, in-
dustrial users will be required to use the "latest commercially available con-
servation technology consistent with reasonable economic return."
'74
The adoption of need-based quotas as exemplified in the Arizona plan
would result in more effective management of groundwater than is provided
by any of the current groundwater property doctrines. It would prevent the
wasteful and inequitable "races to the pumphouse" encouraged by the cor-
relative rights doctrine, 75 and unlike the prior appropriation doctrine,
76
would force all groundwater pumpers to achieve a certain degree of effi-
ciency in their use of water. Because the proposed approach provides for
quantitative adjustment of all pumping, including that by existing users, it
could not only prevent overdraft from developing or worsening, but could
also correct existing overdraft problems.
77
Efficient use of water could be further encouraged by providing that
pumpers who use only part of their quotas do not forfeit their rights to use
full quotas.78 Without fear of losing legal rights, pumpers could then adopt
conservation measures that reduce pumping below their legal quotas.
79
The proposed approach probably would be most effective if imple-
mented at the state rather than the local level, because localities have shown
great reluctance to impose significant restrictions on their groundwater
use.80 Furthermore, state control would facilitate conjunctive management
of groundwater and surface water supplies.8 ' The Arizona statute described
above provides for local participation in the management process, with final
72. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-564(A)(1), 45-565(A)(1), 45-566(A)(1) (Supp. 1982-
1983).
73. d at §§ 45-564(A)(2), 45-565(A)(2), 45-566(A)(2).
74. Id
75. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
76. See supra text accompanying note 56.
77. Cf supra text accompanying note 58 (prior appropriation statutes that preserve existing
groundwater rights are inadequate to correct pre-enactment overdraft conditions).
The goal of the Arizona statute is to return major overdrafted groundwater basins initially
covered by the act to a condition of safe yield 45 years after the statute was enacted. See supra
notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
78. Pumpers who discontinue particular types of use, however, could be held to have for-
feited their right to engage in the discontinued activity. See supra note 63.
79. Cf supra text accompanying note 57 (forfeiture rule discourages adoption of conserva-
tion measures). The Arizona groundwater statute permits farmers to "bank" groundwater for
future use if they use less than the amount permitted by their water duty. ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-467 (Supp. 1982-1983).
80. See, e.g. ,Johnson,supra note 15, at 1047-49; Smith, The Valley Water Suit and Its Impact on
Texas Water Pohcy: Some Practical Advice for the Future, 8 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 577, 634-35 (1977);
Comment, Ground Water Management- A Proposalfor Texas, 51 TEx. L. REV. 289, 297-98 (1973).
81. A state management body would have more incentive than a local authority to man-
age state groundwater and surface water with a goal of conservation, because it probably would
not be dominated by local concerns of preserving the status quo. See supra note 79. Further-
more, because state control would mean that all state water supplies would be considered in
making any management decision, a state body would be in a better position than a local
authority to manage state groundwater and surface water supplies conjunctively. See Com-
ment, Texas Underground Water Law. The Needfor Conservation and Protection of a Limited Resource, I I
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 637, 652 (1980).
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decisions being made by the State Water Director.8 2 Although Nebraska
has also shown support for mandatory conservation of groundwater use, it
has adopted a statute that gives localities authority to impose such con-
trols.8 3 These statutory restrictions raise the question of whether it is consti-
tutional to require existing groundwater users to reduce their pumping.
8 4
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO A MANDATORY CONSERVATION
PLAN-IMPAIRMENT OF "VESTED RIGHTS"
The constitutionality of quantitative, need-based limits is most likely to
be challenged under the takings clause of the fifth amendment,8 5 which pro-
vides that if the government takes private property for public use, it must
82. See Connall,supra note 64, at 333. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-103(B) (Supp.
1982-83) (granting director broad authority), and §§ 45-418 to -421 (Supp. 1982-83) (establish-
ing an area director and a groundwater users advisory council for each active management
area).
83. In 1975, Nebraska, a common law state, enacted the Nebraska Ground Water Man-
agement Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-656 to -674 (1978 & Supp. 1982). This statute provides
that the State Director of Water Resources, upon local initiative, may designate control areas
where there is "[ain inadequate ground water supply to meet present or reasonably foreseeable
needs for beneficial use of such water supply .... " Id. at § 46-658(l)(a)(i) (Supp. 1982). Once
this designation has been made, the local district "shall" adopt one or more of the following
controls: mandatory conservation for all current users, rotation of wells, well-spacing, installation of
meters, and "such other reasonable regulations as are necessary to carry out the intent of this
act." Id at § 46-666(1)(a) to (e) (emphasis added). As of July 1, 1979, five control hearings had
been held, three areas had been designated control areas, two of these had established controls,
and only one had firmly decided to impose quantitative limits on groundwater withdrawal.
Aiken & Supalla, supra note 8, at 628-29, 640-41.
84. The issue could also arise under several other statutes, depending on how those statutes
were applied and interpreted. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-109 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (impos-
ing prior appropriation system on existing, as well as subsequent users); id. at § 37-90-137(4)
("We believe that the Colorado legislature in enacting the 1965 Act and adding section 37-90-
137(4) exercised the power-long recognized but previously virtually dormant--to legislate con-
cerning nontributary waters. . . . We recognize, however, that many landowners may have
come to rely on wells tapping non-tributary sources based on local custom, well permits, and
judicial decrees. We express no opinion on the scope of those rights or the extent to which the
1965 Act, including section 37-90-137(4), can be applied to limit them." State of Colo. v.
Southwestern Colo. Water Conservation Dist., Civ. Action No. 79SA38 (Colo. 1983)); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-507(4)(d) (1981) (in "controlled groundwater areas," board of natural re-
sources can "reduc[e] the permissible withdrawal of groundwater by any appropriator"); OR.
REV. STAT. § 537.735(4)(d) (1981) (in "critical groundwater areas," Water Resources Director
can "reduc[e] the permissible withdrawal of groundwater by any one or more appropriators");
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 46-6-6.2 (Supp. 1982) (where groundwater shortage exists, water
management board shall reduce equally the permissible output of all large capacity wells).
85. Other questions that a court might face are whether the conservation criteria are rea-
sonably related to the goal of preserving the water supply, and whether they are being applied
fairly to all groundwater users.
The conservation criteria must be reasonably related to the goal of the management plan,
whether it be planned depletion or safe yield. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S.
183, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Bushnell v.
Sapp, 194 Colo. 273, 279-80, 571 P.2d 1100, 1104 (1977); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of
Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 228, 284 N.E.2d 891, 896 (1972). This prevents the government from
using the criteria arbitrarily.
Furthermore, no group of groundwater users should be required to make a disproportion-
ate sacrifice nor should the conservation criteria be used to redistribute groundwater from one
group of users to another. Although the courts give the legislature great deference to classify in
the exercise of the police power, see, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352,
370-71 (1932); In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 752-54 (Me. 1973), that power may not
be used to favor one group of citizens over another. See, e.g., Hale v. City and County of Denver,
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justly compensate the owner.8 6 Existing users would contend that a forced
reduction in pumping without compensation constitutes an illegal taking of
their private property right to pump groundwater, a right that has been
vested in them by the common law or by statute. They would focus on the
lack of compensation rather than challenge the authority of the state, be-
cause there is little question that, if compensation were afforded, need-based
quotas would qualify as a public use restriction and thus would be upheld as
a constitutional exercise of state police power.
8 7
Precedential support for such a challenge appears in cases that have
tested the constitutionality of other statutory restrictions on groundwater
use, particularly laws replacing common law systems with prior appropria-
tion systems. These decisions have upheld restrictions on common law rights
to pump groundwater, 88 but have stressed that the restrictions applied only
159 Colo. 341, 346, 411 P.2d 332, 335 (1966); State v. Lee, 356 So. 2d 276, 279-82 (Fla. 1978);
Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 388 (Fla. 1949).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1. The takings clause of the fifth amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 326 (1897). Numerous state constitutions provide that compensation must be paid
when property is either taken or damaged. See, e.g. , CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19. For a list of these
state constitutional provisions, see Note, Inverse Condemnation. Its Availabih'ty in Challenging the Va-
lidity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439, 1439 n.3 (1974). The California Supreme
Court has suggested that these provisions expand the range of governmental action requiring
compensation. See Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
This article will analyze only the interpretation given to the Just Compensation Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
Rights to pump oil and gas have, however, been more extensively regulated than rights to
pump groundwater. See H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 13-19 (1964). Extensive regulation of oil and gas pumping has
been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. See, e.g., Champlain Ref. Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Woody v. State Corp. Comm'n, 265 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1954).
Given the absence of such an activist history in the regulation of rights to pump groundwater, it
would be incorrect to argue that, simply based on precedent from the regulation of oil and gas
pumping, greater restrictions on groundwater pumping should be upheld as a constitutional
exercise of the police power. In the latter case, property owners expectations would be signifi-
cantly altered, suggesting that compensation would be required. See infta note 115.
87. "The role of the judiciary in determining whether [the power of eminent domain] is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32 (1954). Courts uphold, as valid exercises of the police power, many laws that restrict
private property to protect the environment. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80
(1928); Callopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981); Morshead v. California Re-
gional Water Quality Control Bd., 45 Cal. App. 3d 442, 119 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975); State v.
Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, afd per curiam, 338 U.S. 863 (1949); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1922). Moreover, in upholding a state law restricting
use of river water, the Supreme Court stated that "[flew public interests are more obvious,
indisputable and independent of particular theory" than the public interest in preserving the
water supply in its rivers. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
That statement carries strong implications for laws designed to preserve groundwater supplies.
Most importantly, courts have explicitly recognized the power of states to impose restrictions for
purposes of protecting groundwater supplies. See, e.g., Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott,
131 Ariz. 78, 83, 638 P.2d 1324, 1329 (1981), appeal dismised, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982); Southwest
Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 409, 291 P.2d 764, 768 (1955). Thus, courts are unlikely to
hold that a law imposing need-based quotas fails to meet the public use requirement for state
restrictions on private property. Nevertheless, a groundwater regulation statute enacted for a
legitimate public purpose may not unduly burden interstate commerce. See Sporhase v. Ne-
braska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3463-67 (1982).
88. See, e.g., F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 230 Kan. 224, 630 P.2d 1164 (1981); Wil-
liams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963);
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to unexercised rights to pump.8 9 Several cases clearly indicate that impair-
ment of exercised pumping rights would require compensation.9°
For example, in Baeth v. Hoisveen,9 1 plaintiffs were granted a permit by
the State Water Commission to pump 200 gallons per minute. Plaintiffs had
applied for a right to pump 900 gallons per minute, and challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute which gave the state the power to limit their
pumping. In deciding that the statute was constitutional, the court reasoned
that, had the plaintiffs been pumping groundwater at the time the statute
was enacted, they would have acquired a "vested right" to the amount they
were then applying to a beneficial use, and the state could not have retroac-
tively limited their pumping without providing compensation. 92 This article
argues, however, that requiring existing users to conform to quantitative,
Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan.), affdper cur'am, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Baeth v.
Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
89. See, e.g., F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 230 Kan. 224, 229, 232, 630 P.2d 1164,
1169, 1171 (1981); Williams v. City ofWichita, 190 Kan. 317, 334-35, 374 P.2d 578, 591 (1962),
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968).
90. See, e.g., Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. at 624-25 (in enacting statutes regulating
groundwater use, state must recognize and afford protection to exercised pumping rights), afd
per cunrnm, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Undlin v. City of Surrey, 262 N.W.2d 742, 746 (N.D. 1978)
(holding that if city had interfered with plaintiff's exercised pumping right, city must compen-
sate plaintiff). Commentators have also recognized the possibility of drawing a distinction be-
tween impairment of exercised water rights and impairment of unexercised water rights. See
Beck & Hart, The Nature And Extent OfRights In Water In North Dakota, 51 N.D.L. REV. 249, 260-
64 (1974); Larson, The Development of Water Rights and Suggested Improvements in the Water Law of
North Dakota, 38 N.D.L. REV. 243, 254-56, 269-70 (1962); O'Connell, Iowa's New Water Statute-
The Constitutionality ofRegulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 IOWA L. REv. 549, 606-09 (1962).
Although some decisions suggest that the state has broad police power to regulate ground-
water, see, e.g., Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 409, 291 P.2d 764, 768 (1955); Town
of Chino Valley v. Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 83, 638 P.2d 1324, 1329 (1981), none of these decisions
endorsed state action depriving a groundwater user of the quantity of water that he was pump-
ing at the time that the state imposed additional restrictions. In Southwest Eng'g Co., the Arizona
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Arizona's 1948 "critical groundwater area"
legislation, which altered the reasonable use rule by prohibiting any additional pumping in
designated areas. Although the court endorsed a broad use of the police power, it emphasized
the importance of protecting the rights of existing users.
In Friendswood Dev. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978), the issue was
whether land subsidence caused by groundwater pumping was actionable in tort. The court
held that groundwater users pumping under the absolute ownership rule would not be liable for
subsidence of their neighbors' land since the users' rights to take groundwater were an estab-
lished rule of property. The court, however, pursuant to legislative act or policy, could limit
future groundwater withdrawals if the pumping was performed so negligently that it caused
land subsidence.
In Chino Valley, the Arizona Supreme Court was called upon to rule on the constitutionality
of Arizona's 1980 groundwater legislation insofar as it limited a user's right, under the reason-
able use rule, to enjoin a neighbor from using groundwater away from the overlying land. The
court held that the Act did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the plaintiff's right to protect
its groundwater by preventing non-overlying uses, because the plaintiff possessed only a usufruc-
tuary right and did not own the groundwater. Although the court declared that the state's
power to regulate groundwater is broad, it was careful to limit its decision to the facts. The
decision did not restrict the quantity of groundwater that the plaintiff was pumping. Rather,
the court based its decision on two previously recognized principles. First, the court emphasized
that, under the reasonable use rule, the plaintiff did not own the groundwater beneath his land.
Second, the court held that the state could change one of the plaintiff's rights under the reason-
able use rule, the right to prevent non-overlying uses, a right which had not been of much value
in the past. See supra note 33.
91. 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
92. Id. at 733.
[Vol. 61:1
MA NA GEMENT OF GR 0 UND WA TER
need-based pumping limits does not constitute a taking of property and thus
does not require compensation. Both a theory of public rights and a more
traditional takings approach support this conclusion.
A. Public Rights Theoy
It has proved difficult to develop coherent guidelines for determining
when government restrictions on private property constitute a compensable
taking.93 Professor Sax has suggested that the problem is best conceptual-
ized by recognizing that one individual's property use often affects other in-
dividuals' property uses. 94 The "public rights" of owners holding diffuse
interests should be accorded the same protection as the property right of an
individual.95
For example, a factory owner who uses his property for activities that
release pollutants into the air affects the availability of clean air to other
parcels of property. Conversely, an individual who insists on being able to
breathe unpolluted air affects the factory owner's ability to use his property
for activities that release pollutants into the air.96 Each activity has a spill-
over effect. Whereas releasing pollutants imposes a burden on a wide seg-
ment of the population, insisting on being able to breathe unpolluted air
imposes a burden on a single property owner.
When the government permits the factory owner to release pollutants,
the government is not required to compensate the public for the resulting
decline in air quality. Similarly, under public rights theory, as propounded
by Professor Sax, the government should not be required to compensate the
factory owner when the government restricts the release of pollutants to safe-
guard the public interest in breathing clean air. 97 The theory thus permits
the government to vindicate either of the two conflicting rights-the factory
93. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); Sax, Takings,
Pnvate Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971). See also Dunham, Griggs v.
Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT.
REV. 63, 105-06 (1962).
94. Sax, supra note 93, at 152.
95. See bifia note 97. Professor Sax explains that neither nuisance law nor the public trust
doctrine is capable of protecting "public rights" as he defines them. See Sax, supra note 93, at
155 n. 16. Private nuisance law is inadequate because it is available only when the individual
claimant suffers substantial, particularized harm, not shared by the public. W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 88, 585-87 (4th ed. 1971). Although nuisance law protects some public rights, public
nuisance law is inadequate because it depends on community representatives deciding that a
particular case offends the public, id, and, in Sax's view, this decision is often weighed heavily
in favor of private property rights. Sax, supra note 93, at 155 n. 16. The public trust doctrine is
incapable of protecting public rights because its protection is limited to property owned by a
public body. See id
96. See Sax, supra note 93, at 162.
97. See id at 162. Thus, central to the theory is the belief that courts should accord dif-
fusely held interests the same level of protection as they accord interests that are not diffusely
held. See id at 159-60. Sax illustrates this point with a wetlands example. Because marine life
that breeds along the wetlands shorelines requires maintenance of the shoreline to survive, the
wetlands owner who wants to develop his tract demands that ocean users tolerate a change in
their use of the ocean. Ocean users, on the other hand, demand that the wetlands owner restrict
the use of his land. Traditional takings law may hold that a restriction on the wetlands owner's
ability to develop his land is a taking of property for which the public must compensate the
landowner. The public rights critique, however, questions why, if the wetlands owner's activi-
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owner's right to use his property for polluting activities and the public's right
to breathe clean air-without affording compensation. 98
The theory does not, however, hold that whenever the government reg-
ulates or infringes a private interest in the name of public welfare, the gov-
ernment need not compensate the owner of the infringed right.9 9 When the
government restricts an activity to alleviate spillover effects, it is not required
to compensate, because it is merely vindicating a pre-existing public right. 00
But when the government restricts an activity that has no such spillover ef-
fects, it is acquiring something to which it was not previously entitled, and it
must therefore pay for what it has obtained. 101
Groundwater pumping is an activity that can have significant spillover
effects. 10 2 Just as the public has a right to clean air, it has a right to protect
groundwater supplies. In the past, the public did not overtly assert its right
because water appeared to be plentiful and overdraft problems were either
unknown, not significant enough to cause alarm, or ignored. Consequently,
landowners freely pumped groundwater within the confines of rules designed
to mediate disputes among individual users rather than disputes between
individual users and the public as a whole10 3 Now that overdraft is wide-
spread and poses a significant threat to the adequacy of water supplies,'
°4
the public must assert its dormant right to protect groundwater supplies.
In some regions, the problem of overdraft has become such a serious
ties impose restrictions on the use of the ocean, "the wetlands owner ought not be compelled to
buy that right." Id. at 160 (emphasis in original).
By ignoring the cumulative right, each person having an interest in the use of the ocean is
treated not as a legitimate interest holder but as an interloper, and is forced to pay for the
protection of his interest. This result is the consequence of our traditional inability to recognize
public rights; i.e., our inability to see that claims of rights to use resources ought not to be
discriminated against simply because they are held in one, rather than another, conventional
form of ownership. Id
98. See id at 163.
99. Id at 161.
100. See id at 155-61.
101. See id at 164-66. Using an airport and a neighboring farmer as an example, if the
airport wants to construct a tall building, it will obstruct the farmer's sunlight. If the farmer
asserts a right to quiet, it will interfere with the airport's ability to operate. No matter how
these conflicts are resolved, the government should not be required to compensate, because the
rights asserted by each party have spillover effects. If, however, the airport wants to take part of
the farmer's land to build another runway, thus infringing the farmer's right to his land, the
situation is different. Compensation is due, because the right asserted by the farmer affects the
airport's ability to undertake a use beyond its domain. Id
102. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
103. See, e.g., State ex re. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 555, 207 P.2d 440, 447 (1949).
Speaking of the recently enacted statute regulating surface water and groundwater, the court
said: "Heretofore we have approached the questions [of water rights] largely on the basis of
individual interest alone. Under this declaration and other provisions of the act we now ap-
proach them upon the basis of the interest of the people of the state. ... See also the descrip-
tions of the reasonable use, correlative rights, and appropriation doctrines at text accompanying
notes 25-57. The right to pump groundwater is defined primarily according to what other
groundwater users are doing and not according to an overall management scheme.
Under the appropriation doctrine, the standard usually employed to determine whether a
permit to pump should be granted is whether existing groundwater uses will be impaired. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-107(3) to -107(4) (1973 & Supp. 1982) (regulating ground-
water pumped from "designated" groundwater basins).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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threat that the state must require landowners to pump less water than they
are presently taking. 10 5 Under public rights theory, the introduction of such
limits should not require compensation, because the government is simply
regulating the spillover effects of groundwater pumping.
0 6
To hold otherwise would be to assume that currently exercised private
interests enjoy a special status vzs-a-vis a previously existing but unasserted
public interest.' 0 7 Such a position defines rights according to what the sta-
tus quo presently recognizes, rather than according to some other notion that
may be more just. Recognizing rights and defining fairness solely according
to expectations developed from previously acceptable practices is dangerous
because it shelters the status quo from the normal process of legislative
change without questioning whether existing expectations make some larger
normative sense. '0 8 When individual and public interests collide, an individ-
ual claiming a private right should not necessarily be preferred simply be-
cause he has been exercising his right while the public has not been asserting
its right. 109
Although courts have never formally adopted a public rights takings
105. This is what has happened in Arizona. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
106. Even if the government regulates water from an overdrafted basin in an area where the
general public has an adequate alternative source of water, the state's conservation require-
ments should not constitute a taking. In such a case, the government is not regulating private
property for the purpose of directly enhancing the public resource base; rather, the government
is essentially arbitrating private property owners' competing claims to a common pool. When
the government acts to resolve conflict among private property owners, the regulation should
not constitute a taking, because the government is not expropriating private property for its
own benefits. See Sax, Takings and the Polce Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-64 (1964). Although
Professor Sax later disowned the view expressed in 1964, see Sax, supra note 93, at 150 n.5, under
his later view no compensation would be required in the above situation because the govern-
ment would be regulating spillover effects. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
107. Assuming the continued vitality of the cases allowing uncompensated restrictions on
unexercised pumping rights, see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text, to require compensa-
tion would be to hold that currently exercised water rights enjoy special status compared to
currently unexercised water rights. Legal commentary has explicitly questioned the wisdom of
attaching constitutional significance to whether a water right is presently being invoked. See
O'Connell, supra note 90, at 608-09.
108. B. AcKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 105 (1977). See also
Graetz, Legal Transitions." The Case of Retroatwiiy in hIncome Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47,
74-75 (1977). The Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of the police power (and hence
the scope of individuals' private property rights) may expand or contract as living conditions
change. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926). Indeed, the Supreme Court
has recognized that a state's interest in and power to protect the water in its rivers may increase
as its population and the demand for water increase. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
To question the degree of protection that should be given to expectations developed from
previously acceptable practices does not mean that such expectations should not be given great
weight when attempting to determine the permissible extent of the government's power to regu-
late the interests of individual property owners. See, e.g., discussion of Michelman's utilitarian
takings theory, at note 115 in/fa.
109. See Sax, supra note 93, at 15 7-58. Professor Sax illustrates with the following example:
If two property owners have adjoining tracts, one of which has traditionally absorbed
drainage water, the upper owner is not necessarily entitled to drain that water to the
lower land. Analogously, one should be prepared to recognize a public interest in
flood control equal in stature to the private property owner's interests. In this way, the
conflict can be resolved so as to maximize net benefits from the resource network in





theory as described above, they have held in specific cases that the public
interest may be weighed against a landowner's currently exercised interest,
and that the public interest may demand that the landowner's interest be
restricted without compensation. An example is State v. Dexter,"o where a
state statute restricted logging activity by requiring owners of forested land
to leave a certain number of trees standing for reseeding and restocking pur-
poses. In Dexter, the Washington Supreme Court held, and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, that the statute did not constitute a taking
requiring compensation.I' I The court explained that if the landowners were
allowed to continue their unrestricted logging efforts, it would create a dan-
ger of floods and soil erosion, as well as eventually lead to destruction of the
forested lands in the state, thereby destroying a permanent source of employ-
ment for the state's citizens and endangering the state's economic stand-
ing.'1 2 The court based its holding on the premise that private enterprise
must use its property in ways that are consistent with the public welfare.1
3
By the same reasoning, when a state attempts to save its water supply
from the consequences of overdraft by enacting a statute that requires
groundwater users to reduce their current pumping, the statute should not
constitute a taking requiring compensation. Like owners of forested land,
owners of land overlying an aquifer must use their land in ways consistent
with the public welfare. The government should therefore be allowed to
restrict pumping that contributes to groundwater overdraft, which endan-
gers a permanent source of the region's water supply.
While a theory of public rights may be appealing, particularly to con-
servationists, because it accords equal treatment to privately and diffusely
held interests, it arguably underemphasizes a central premise of the just
compensation requirement, that the government's ability to single out par-
ticular citizens' rights for sacrifice to the general welfare should be lim-
ited."t 4 This "flaw" in a pure theory of public rights is not fatal to the
conclusion that restrictions on groundwater pumping do not constitute a
taking requiring compensation. Even if one rejects the public rights theory,
and asserts that whenever state regulation severely burdens a few the public
must compensate them for their losses, the imposition of mandatory conser-
vation requirements survives takings analysis.
110. 32 Wash. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, af'dper cunam, 338 U.S. 863 (1949).
111. Id at 559-60, 202 P.2d at 910.
112. Id. at 553-55, 202 P.2d at 908.
113. Id at 555, 202 P.2d at 908. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), the Supreme Court also appeared, at least implicitly, to recognize the potential
importance that "public rights" may have in a takings analysis. Emphasizing the social value of
historic preservation, id at 107-09, the Court held that no compensable taking occurred when
enforcement of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law prevented the owners of
Grand Central Station from constructing an office building in the air space above the station,
even though the proposed building met all zoning requirements.
114. For cases stating this premise, see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61
(1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). Set also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-4 at 463 (1978).
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B. Traditional Takings Analysis
There are a number of different taking theories, and it can be argued
that noncompensatory conservation requirements are constitutional under
any of the prominent ones.115 This discussion, however, is limited to the
diminution in value theory, which is the model most predominantly in use
115. Prominent takings theories not discussed in the text include the physical invasion the-
ory, the noxious use theory, the social balancing theory, and Professor Michelman's utilitarian
theory. The physical invasion theory states that the government may not physically invade
private property without compensating the property owner. See, e.g., United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. 166 (1871). Some commentators have criticized the theory as being underinclusive and
overinclusive, see, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utlity and Fairness: Comments On The Ethical Founda-
tions Of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1226-28 (1967), but others have
praised it as being fair, efficient, supported by history, and predictable. Note, Reexamining the
Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1464-67 (1980). Under this
theory, noncompensatory conservation requirements do not constitute a taking because limita-
tions on the usufructuary right to pump groundwater, a right that is of uncertain duration and
value in an overdrafted aquifer, are not as offensive as an actual invasion of one's territory,
Michelman, supra, at 1228, qjch as, the purposeful flooding of property. See Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871); but -f Note, Water Use Regulation in Colorado: The Consitutional
Limitations, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 493, 502-03 (1978).
The noxious use theory focuses on the degree to which regulated uses of property are com-
patible with community welfare. See Berger, A Pohy Analysis Of The Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 165, 172-75 (1974); Sax, Takigs and The Poce Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50 (1964). If a
use is deemed noxious, wrongful, or harmful to the public, the government may validly regulate
it without compensating for any resultant decrease in value. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915). The theory differs from public rights theory in that when uses conflict, as
when one property owner wants to pollute and another wants clean air, it identifies one of the
two parties as the harm-causer and the other as the innocent victim, and it subjects only the
harm-causer to noncompensatory regulation. See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Pohe Power, 74 YALE
LJ. 36, 48-50 (1964). Commentators have criticized the theory because the concept of harm
creation is manipulable. See, e.g., id.; Michelman, supra, at 1196-1200. Just as the brickyard
owner in Hadacheck was identified as the harm-causer because his activities impaired air quality,
so too can groundwater users be identified as harm-causers because their activities threaten
water supplies.
The social balancing theory weighs society's gains from a regulation against the private
losses it causes. If the gains exceed the losses, no taking has occurred and no compensation need
be paid. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (dictum). See also
Michelman, supra, at 1193-94. Although the right to pump groundwater in an overdrafted
basin would suffer little or no decline in value when it was subjected to a management plan
requiring conservation, see ina text accompanying notes 119-130, the gains to society from
preventing impairment of the water supply would be enormous, especially where most of the
water supply is obtained from beneath the surface.
The utilitarian theory proposed by Michelman performs the social balancing analysis more
systematically. Michelman,supra, at 1208-18. Professor Michelman's theory weighs the gains to
society from regulation, efficiency gains, against productivity losses due to regulated parties'
upset expectations, demoralization costs, and states that regulation should not be undertaken
unless the efficiency gains exceed the demoralization costs. Id at 1215. The theory also consid-
ers the costs of locating and compensating those persons burdened by regulation, settlement
costs, and argues that compensation should be paid only when the settlement costs are lower
than the demoralization costs. Id
Although difficult to measure, the efficiency gains from enacting a management plan quan-
tifying rights in an overdrafted basin would be significant. The transaction costs associated
with obtaining or disposing of water rights would be lower than under many current systems
because each right would represent a specific quantity of water available over a certain time
span. In such circumstances, an efficient market for water rights could evolve, making it easier
to buy and sell water rights. With a more predictable supply, investment would increase. The
investment would be an indicator of the future value of water, a value that would be so specula-
tive as to discourage further investment until rights were adequately quantified through
mandatory conservation limits. Pumping costs would stabilize once overdraft was reduced or
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today,' 1 6 and which best illuminates the purpose of the just compensation
clause of protecting against unfairly burdening those being regulated.
Under the diminution in value theory, determining whether the govern-
ment has taken a property right requires assessment of the extent to which
the government's action has diminished the property's market value."1
7
Courts generally require a total or near total economic loss." 8 Where an
aquifer is seriously overdrafted, enactment of a management plan that re-
stricts pumping will not cause such economic loss.
Groundwater overdraft can impose costly burdens on those who pump
groundwater. In addition to higher costs of pumping from a lower water
table,"19 contamination and limited storage capacity pose serious
problems. 120 Overdraft can lead to subsidence of land, which may result in
the cracking of buildings, collapse of well casings, increased flood hazards,
damage to roads and underground pipelines, and other expensive destruc-
tion.1 2 1 Where groundwater overdraft is causing or is about to cause these
eliminated. Finally, the social resource base would be enhanced by obtaining an aquifer with a
stable supply of clean water.
The short-term demoralization costs from upsetting the existing groundwater property
scheme probably would vary inversely with the severity of the overdraft problem. Where a
serious overdraft problem existed, user expectations might not be seriously upset by imposition
of quotas. Given the severe consequences of allowing uncontrolled depletion to continue,
groundwater users may be expecting some government intervention. ("Water users have long
been on notice that the [sltate would at some point have to intervene to regulate prospective
uses of a dwindling resource in face of increased use." Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270,
1280 (D. Ariz. 1982).) Furthermore, any demoralization costs would be exceeded by the "mor-
alization gains" accruing over the long run. Existing users forced to curtail their pumping
would use their water more productively in the future because they would have a dependable
supply. Thus, the net demoralization costs of enacting a groundwater management plan requir-
ing conservation would be low, while the efficiency gains would be high, suggesting that such a
plan should be implemented.
Settlement costs would vary directly with the alleged demoralization costs. Where the
overdraft problem was serious and there was no history or expectation of government interven-
tion, conservation requirements would have to be especially intrusive on existing rights, result-
ing in high demoralization costs and high settlement costs. If the groundwater supply were
saved, however, the long-term moralization gains would be significant. Given the low net de-
moralization costs, compensation would not be required.
116. Sax, supra note 93, at 152 n.8. The diminution in value theory made its debut in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). For more recent examples of its
use, see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 294-97 (1981);
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-85 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1979).
117. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). Many commentators have urged that this factor
alone should not determine whether a taking has occurred. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 115,
at 1191-93; Note, Water Use Regulation in Colorado: The Constitutional Limitations, supra note 115, at
493-94. They agree, however, that the diminution in value of private property caused by regu-
lation is an important factor to consider when attempting to resolve the takings issue. See, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note 115, at 1191.
118. See, e.g. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); L. TRIBE,supra note 113, § 9-3 at
460 n.3; Sax, supra note 92, at 151 n.7, and 152 n.8.
119. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
121. See, eg., Bouwer, Land Subsidence and Cracking Due to Groundwater Depletion, 15 GROUND
WATER 358, 358 (1977); R. FREEZE &J. CHERRY, supra note 1, at 370; W. HAMBLIN, supra note
1, at 228. Furthermore, the decrease in availability of groundwater and surface water caused by
sustained overdraft, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text, means that water may be
unavailable to protect life or property in an emergency. See HAMBLIN, supra note 1, at 225.
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problems, control of overdraft through pumping restrictions may yield a net
economic benefit to those who are forced to reduce their pumping.
Even where overdraft is not creating such hazards, the introduction of
need-based quotas may result in economic gains for groundwater pumpers in
overdrafted aquifers. While common law groundwater systems entitle users
to pump large amounts of water, they do not provide users with much cer-
tainty that water supplies will remain available at nonnegligible levels.
Under the absolute ownership and reasonable use doctrines, groundwater
users have an essentially unrestricted right to pump, but they have little con-
trol over the quantity of water other users will pump.' 22 Thus, their water
supply is indefinite: they face the prospect of overdraft leading to steadily
increasing pumping costs and depletion of their aquifer at an uncertain time
in the future.123 Under the correlative rights doctrine, groundwater users in
unadjudicated basins also have undependable water supplies. They bear the
risk that litigation costs or delays 124 may prevent final adjudication of their
groundwater rights. If their basin is adjudicated, they bear the risk that
their share size will be miniscule. 125 Prior appropriation statutes that pre-
serve common law groundwater rights at overdraft levels 126 incorporate the
indefinite nature of the common law rights.
127
Under any of these groundwater doctrines, property values in over-
drafted basins will be negatively affected both by the serious threat that
groundwater will become unavailable, and by the uncertainty of when
groundwater will be available. 128 For many groundwater users, a right to an
annual quantity of water that is certain to be available both now and for
many years in the future may be preferable to, and more valuable than, a
right to a larger but less secure annual quantity of water. 129 Thus, control of
overdraft through the use of need-based quotas, which gives groundwater
users secure water supplies, 130 may yield economic benefits to existing
groundwater users even when overdraft is not causing harmful side effects
such as land subsidence.
Not all groundwater users, however, will regard pumping restrictions as
122. See supra text accompanying notes 16-36.
123. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
124. Krieger & Banks, supra note 42, at 66; Trelease, supra note 10, at 867-68.
125. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 49, 58.
127. Prior appropriation statutes that do not preserve such common law pumping rights
result in less uncertainty, particularly for the most senior appropriators. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 52-53.
128. The assertion that most investors are risk-averse, and therefore demand a higher return
before they will invest in riskier projects, is generally accepted in the financial community. See,
e.g., R. BREARLY & S. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 141 (1981).
129. Economic analyses of groundwater pumping in the high plains of Texas and
Oklahoma have shown that restrictions on groundwater withdrawals would result in higher
farm income than if groundwater pumping continued unrestricted. Aiken, The Natianal Water
Pohy Review and Western Water Rights Law Reform; An Overview, 59 NEB. L. REv. 327, 334 (1980)
(citing H. Mapp & V. Eidman, An Economic Analysis of Regulating Water Use in the Central
Ogallala Formation 58-63 (Okla. Stat. Univ. Tech. Bull. No. T-141, 1976)).
130. Users know what quantity of water they can pump and how long their supply will last.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-83. Of course, control of overdraft does not elminate the
uncertainty of the availability of water caused by weather conditions.
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economically beneficial. For some, the decrease in property value attributa-
ble to a reduction in the permissible pumping level may not be outweighed
by the increase attributable to the enhanced certainty of future groundwater
supplies. In such cases, the reduction in value will not be extreme enough to
constitute a taking under the diminution in value theory, because the
groundwater user will retain a right to a dependable supply of a specific
quantity of water. So long as that quantity of water is nonnegligible, which
it would be when the state imposes quotas that are designed to allow existing
uses to continue under conservation conditions, the right will not be value-
less and the groundwater user will not suffer the total or near total economic
loss that is required by the diminution in value theory.
1 3 '
CONCLUSION
Groundwater overdraft is a serious problem in many parts of the
United States. Prevailing groundwater property systems do not deal with
-the problem satisfactorily: the absolute ownership and reasonable use doc-
trines provide no means of controlling overdraft; the correlative rights doc-
trine may lead to wasteful and inequitable "races to the pumphouse"; the
prior appropriation doctrine provides inadequate incentives for efficient
water use, and, if common law pumping rights are preserved, provides no
means of correcting preexisting overdraft problems. The drawbacks in these
systems can be overcome by determining the rate at which water can be
safely withdrawn from an overdrafted aquifer, and then using need-based
quotas to achieve that depletion rate.
Although the introduction of such an approach would force existing
groundwater users to reduce their pumping, it would not constitute a taking
requiring compensation. All prominent takings theories support this conclu-
sion, but two are of particular note: the public rights theory, which is attrac-
tive from a policy perspective, and the diminution in value theory, which is
the approach most widely used today. The public rights theory holds that
when uses of property have mutually incompatible spillover effects, the gov-
ernment can restrict either use without affording compensation. Because
groundwater pumping is an activity with serious spillover effects, mandatory
limits on pumping would be constitutional under this theory.
Under the diminution in value theory, the government is not required
to compensate unless its restrictions on property cause such a large decrease
in property value that the owner suffers total or near total economic loss.
Groundwater users forced to reduce their pumping to comply with need-
based quotas would not suffer such loss. Not only would the use of need-
based quotas prevent the costly side effects that overdraft sometimes causes,
it would also ensure the availability of future water supplies, thus leaving
groundwater users with a property right that can hardly be considered val-
ueless. States should not hesitate to restrict groundwater pumping to com-
bat groundwater overdraft.
131. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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Long ignored by the courts as well as by legal and political scholars, the
ninth amendment to the United States Constitution has recently attracted
considerable attention in the federal courts. The source of this new focus on
the ninth amendment is found in Justice Douglas' majority and Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut. I The new promi-
nence of the ninth amendment is illustrated by examining Shepard's Cita-
tions. Prior to Griswold, the number of federal court citations to the ninth
amendment was less than 100. In the fifteen years after Griswold, the
number of citations to the ninth amendment exceeded 400. Despite the phe-
nomenal increase in reliance on the ninth amendment in litigation, the legal
and political literature does not demonstrate any serious interest in exploring
the nature, outcome, or consequences of such reliance.
Only two law review articles offer insight into this concern. In 1972,
A.F. Ringold reviewed the Griswold ninth amendment legacy in federal court
cases. 2 He concluded that the "current success ratio for asserted ninth
amendment rights has been so phenomenally large that an attorney would
almost be derelict if [s]he did not at least include" the ninth amendment in
her or his claim. 3 Lyman Rhoades and Rodney Patula, who examined fed-
eral court cases decided during roughly the same period, were less enthusias-
tic. 4 They concluded that the federal courts exhibited a "reluctance" to use
the ninth amendment. 5 Neither article contains a comprehensive analysis of
the federal courts' application of the ninth amendment. Each article offers
* B.A., Eastern Illinois University; M.A., Ph.D., Southern Illinois University at Carbon-
dale. The author is indebted to Professor Randall Nelson of Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale for his extensive advice and guidance in the writing of his doctoral thesis, from
which the research and inspiration for this article originates.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold involved a criminal prosecution for advising married
persons on the use of contraceptives. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions. Justice
Douglas' majority opinion was based on the existence of a zone of privacy for married couples in
matters of contraception and marital privacy. This was formed by emanations from the first,
third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments. Justice Douglas did not expound on the
future implications of the ninth amendment in litigation. However, Justice Goldberg's concur-
rence advances the proposition that the ninth amendment is a source of unenumerated rights
not located in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, so long as the ninth amendment claim is
grounded in a liberty interest.
2. Ringold, The Hirtoqv of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and As Recent Development, 8
TULSA L.J. 1 (1972).
3. Id. at 36.
4. Rhoades and Patula, The Ninth Amendment- A Survey of Theory and Practice in ihe Federal
Courts Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DEN. L.J. 153 (1973).
5. Id. at 163-67.
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only a glimpse of the disposition of a group of ninth amendment claims,
some of which the courts resolved on grounds other than the merits of the
ninth amendment. Rhoades and Patula reviewed claims made under the
ninth amendment for the right to teach sex education,6 the right to demon-
strate,7 and for the rights of prisoners. In each instance, however, the ninth
amendment claim was not considered by the courts, as Rhoades and Patula
note. For example, questions regarding sex education and public demon-
stration were decided on first amendment grounds, while the prisoner rights
case was decided on the failure to show a violation under the eighth and
fourteenth amendment. The court summarily dismissed or failed to address
the ninth amendment claim in each instance.8
In the years since Ringold's, and Rhoades and Patula's articles, no ex-
amination of ninth amendment cases has been published in either the legal
or the political science literature. Some effort is necessary to: 1) reexamine
the cases covered by Ringold, and Rhoades and Patula, 2) to examine the
period through 1979, and 3) to discuss the relevant Supreme Court cases
decided after Griswold.9 The central focus of this article is directed at deter-
mining what rights are accorded constitutional protection via the ninth
amendment in the federal courts.
I. A SURVEY OF NINTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS
A. The Ninth Amendment in the Supreme Court
After Griswold, only seven majority opinions in the cases decided refer to
the ninth amendment.' 0 Not one of these uses the ninth amendment as a
constitutional source for protecting unenumerated rights. In each the Court
6. Manfredonia v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. People v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I.), rev'don other grounds, 468 F. 2d 1143 (1st
Cir. 1972).
8. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971); Burns v. Swenson, 430
F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Negrich v. Hohn,
246 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aft'd, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
9. Only majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals,
and the District Courts are included in the analysis of this inquiry. Shepard's Citations and
LEXIS were used to identify those cases in which the ninth amendment is cited. Only those
cases decided during the period commencing with June 7, 1965, through December 31, 1979,
were considered for relevancy, as defined below. Approximately 560 federal court citations
were generated through the two legal indexes. Court opinions in which the ninth amendment is
cited, but which are not included in this inquiry, include those in which the court disposed of
the case for one of the following reasons: 1) on the basis of statutory construction, without
reaching the constitutional claims, and 2) on procedural questions, e.g., standing, jurisdiction,
abstention. In addition, this inquiry does not include those cases in which the issue of the ninth
amendment, as opposed to the case as a whole, was disposed of by one of the following reasons:
1) the court states that the claim asserted under the ninth amendment is a question arising
under some other constitutional provision and will, therefore, be treated as such, 2) the court
notes that there is no need to consider the ninth amendment claim because its decision concern-
ing other constitutional claims effectively disposes of the case, and 3) the court notes that the
merits of the ninth amendment claim are not considered because plaintiff, or appellant, empha-
sized some other constitutional provision and failed to address the ninth amendment claim.
10. Selection of Supreme Court opinions differed from the selection process for the Courts
of Appeals and the District Courts. All majority opinions which could conceivably be inter-
preted as bearing on the Court's predilections towards the ninth amendment have been in-
cluded for consideration. Those majority opinions in which the ninth amendment is cited solely
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declined the opportunity to explicitly accept or to reject the ninth amend-
ment as a source of authority for identifying unenumerated rights. Justice
Douglas' and Justice Goldberg's ninth amendment contributions in Griswold,
however, have not been modified, limited or overruled. Since subsequent
discussions of the ninth amendment have been extremely terse, efforts to
identify acceptance of their views on ninth amendment protection for
unenumerated rights would involve a speculative process of surmise. A re-
view of these decisions shows the cursory manner in which the Supreme
Court has dealt with ninth amendment questions.
Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond" I involved objections to certain
questions on the New York State Bar application. Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, identified and then summarily dismissed the appellant's ninth
amendment claims.12 In response to a privacy claim, Justice Stewart stated:
"We think it borders on the frivolous to say that such an inquiry offends the
applicant's right to privacy by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 13 Thereafter, Justice Stewart addressed the substance of ap-
pellant's claims and ignored the constitutional source of the right to privacy.
Justice White gave a ninth amendment claim similar treatment in the
majority opinion in CiilService Commission v. Letter Carriers. 14 Without specif-
ically addressing the relevance of the ninth amendment, Justice White im-
plicitly rejected any ninth amendment bar to Hatch Act' 5 restrictions on
political activities of civil service employees: "Our judgment is that neither
the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a
law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees."'
16
The Supreme Court denied ninth amendment privacy claims in two
abortion cases, Roe v. Wade 17 and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth .l
Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in Roe that:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy,' 9
Yet, Blackmun's silences are more interesting than his affirmative state-
to identify the constitutional claims are not included, nor are concurring or dissenting opinions
in which the ninth amendment is discussed or cited.
11. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
12. The Law Students Research Council argued that certain questions included in the
"third-party affidavits attesting to an applicant's good moral character" violated the applicant's
right to privacy. One question objected to was whether the affiant visited the applicant's home.
Id. at 160.
13. Id.
14. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
16. 413 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added). The National Association of Letter Carriers sought
to have the Hatch Act's "prohibition against active participation in political management or
political campaigns with respect to certain defined activity" declared unconstitutional. For a
description of the prohibited activities in which the Union sought to partake, see id. at 551 n.3.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
19. 410 U.S. at 153 (cited with approval in 428 U.S. at 60).
19831
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ments. Blackmun neither avers nor denies that the ninth amendment is an
adequate source of constitutional restraint. Moreover, Blackmun does not
suggest that the lower court erred by relying on the ninth amendment. Per-
haps Blackmun's silence was in deference to the discretion of the lower court.
Or possibly he intimated that it was inconsequential whether either the
ninth amendment, or the liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment,
was relied on, or even whether both were relied on, in a case. Thus, Black-
mun might have unintentionally advanced the use of the ninth amendment
as constitutional authority to protect an unenumerated, fundamental right.
However, in Whalen v. Roe 2° Justice Stevens dispelled any speculation that
Blackmun's statement constituted an implicit acceptance of the ninth
amendment as the source of the right to privacy. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Stevens noted that the decision in Roe v. Wade rested on the personal
liberty concept of the fourteenth amendment, and not on the ninth
amendment .21
The ninth amendment was treated more graciously in Stanley v. I"-
nois, 22 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland.23 In both cases the Court used the
liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to strike down the chal-
lenged laws. Justice White in Stanley and Justice Powell in Moore, however,
look to seize upon Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold, for authority
to infuse the claims in these cases with constitutionl protection.
24
In short, the later Supreme Court opinions reflect tolerance; certainly
there is no hearty embrace of the ninth amendment as a constitutional
source for the right of privacy which Griswold generated. Although the
Court has approved of Douglas' and Goldberg's general theories, there has
been no disposition to rely on the ninth amendment as interpreted in
Griswold.25
B. The Ninth Amendment in the Courts of Appeal
A group of twenty-seven representative Court of Appeals opinions
26
20. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
21. Id. at 598 n.23. Whalen involved a privacy challenge against a New York record keep-
ing system. The law required that the names and addresses of all persons who obtained, pursu-
ant to a doctor's prescription, certain drugs, be stored in a centralized computer file. Although
the plaintiff relied, in part, on the ninth amendment, Justice Stevens did not address that claim
at length, his opinion emphasized that the right of privacy was protected by the liberty concept
of the fourteenth amendment.
22. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Stanley involved a challenge to an Illinois state law which pro-
vided for taking an illegitimate child from the father at the time of the mother's death without a
hearing as to the father's fitness. Justice White notes that the right at issue is the "private
interest . . . of a man in the children he has sired and raised." Id. at 651.
23. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Moore involved an attack on a city ordinance limiting the occu-
pancy of dwelling units to a single family. The ordinance defined "family" in such a manner as
to prohibit appellant from housing two of her grandsons, who were first cousins, in her home.
24. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland 431 U.S. at
503 n.12, respectively.
25. The Supreme Court's most recent abortion decision, City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive llealth, Inc. 51 U.S.L.W, 4767 (U.S. June 15, 1983), reinforces the Court's pat-
tern of express reliance on the fourteenth amendment for constitutional protection for freedom
of choice in marital and familial matters. Id at 4770.
26. For an explanation of the method used to develop the sample of cases, see note 9 supra.
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were considered in this inquiry. Only four of these cases, however, suggest
that the courts accepted constitutional claims based at least in part on the
ninth amendment. The rights upheld in these cases include the right of pub-
lic school students to control their personal appearance in spite of high
school grooming codes, 27 the right of a woman to choose an abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy without the imposition of state restrictions,28
and the right of parents to rear their children without the state unreasonably
taking the youngster's life. 29 An additional seven opinions exhibit acquies-
cence in the notion that the ninth amendment does protect unenumerated
rights. In these cases, however, the courts refused to extend protection to the
rights asserted. Generally, this refusal was based on a finding that the
claimed right was not within the original notion of privacy enunciated in
Grswold.
Three separate challenges to public grooming regulations were rejected
on the basis that the right to publicly wear one's hair in the style of one's
choosing was not a right protected by the Griswold marital-familial right of
privacy. 30 A request to extend ninth amendment protection to an inmate
incarcerated in a penal institution was declined by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Burns v. Sioerson.3 ' Other rights which were asserted
27. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Note that Judge Myron Bright, in his opinion for the
court in Bishop, cited the opinion in Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) for reliance
on the ninth and fourteenth amendments to uphold a claim to a similar right. 450 F.2d at 1071.
While the court's opinion in Crews contains no mention of the ninth amendment, Crews states
one's choice in hair style is an element of personal freedom protected by the Constitution. See
Breen, 419 F.2d at 1036, for authority that the ninth amendment is a possible source for such
protection. Crews, 432 F.2d at 1203, cites Griswold without mentioning the ninth amendment
for certain "additional fundamental rights" existing alongside those enumerated in the first
eight amendments.
28. Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 447 U.S.
918 (1980) (no discussion of ninth amendment). Examples of requirements set by the regulation
include: that anesthesia be administered by an anesthesiologist; that nursing personnel must be
supervised and directed by a registered nurse who has post-graduate education or experience in
obstetric or gynecological nursing. The clinic was also required to have various "expensive and
elaborate equipment." Id. at 458.
29. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (no discus-
sion of ninth amendment). Mattis's eighteen year old son, Michael, and a friend had broken
into a golf course office to steal money. When the police arrived, the youths attempted to flee.
One of the police officers gave chase after Michael. When the officer realized that he could not
keep up, he ordered Michael to halt, which Michael refused to do. The officer then fired what
he thought was "well above" Michael, but struck Michael in the head. The court of appeals
held that the father had a constitutional right to "raise his son," and could, therefore, challenge
the validity of the shooting for the purpose of seeking declaratory relief. d. at 595.
30. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); Freeman v. Falke, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1970). Not included in this inquiry, but of some interest, are two court of appeals opinions
in which the judges relied on Karr orJackon, but did not mention the ninth amendment. In
Sherling v. Townley, 464 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1972), decided shortly after Kar, the court stated it
felt bound by the holding in Kar. (But note Judge Tuttle's concurring opinion, in which he
expresses agreement with the dissenting judges in Karr). In Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444,
446 (6th Cir. 1971), the court reaffirmed the "principles of"Jackson.
31. 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). The exact nature of the
ninth amendment claim is not clear from a reading of the court's opinion. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's holding that the isolated detention in maximum security to which
the inmate was committed violated the prisoner's due process rights. On appeal Bums argued
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but found to be without ninth amendment protection include the asserted
right of a husband to stay with his wife in a public hospital's delivery
room,32 an individual's right to possess an unregistered submachine gun, 33 a
postal patron's right to be free from mail covers by the United States Bureau
of Customs,3 4 and Florida state legislators' right to be free from compelled
disclosure of certain personal financial information.
35
In the remaining sixteen cases, the Courts of Appeals disposed of claims,
based in part on the ninth amendment, by concluding that the government
possessed the constitutional authority to engage in the challenged activity.
In these cases the courts did not explicitly reject the proposition that the
ninth amendment may be invoked for asserting an unenumerated right.
The courts ruled against challenges to induction orders,3 6 the "equal time"
provision of the "Fairness Doctrine" for broadcasters,37 the manner of con-
gressional representation in the District of Columbia,38 a deportation order
issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 39 subpoenas issued
that, iter a/ta, the district court's order to expunge his record of the detention was supported by
the ninth amendment. Id. at 778.
32. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 916 (1976).
33. United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
34. United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 181 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
The Bureau of Customs had arranged with the United States Postal Inspector to obtain ad-
dresses from the face of the envelopes addressed to Choate for the purpose of locating a source of
narcotics in South America.
35. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
The disclosure was mandated by an amendment to the Florida Constitution, which required
elected and other public officials and employees to file a public statement detailing their assets
and liabilities over $1,000.
36. United States v. Murray, 452 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 935 (1972);
United States v. Sowul, 447 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972); United
States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Farrell, 443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971); United States v. Uhl, 436 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Diaz, 427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970). Appellants challenged their induction orders on
such grounds as: the induction unconstitutionally interfered with the "right to life" (Diaz, 427
F.2d at 639), that the Selective Service law was unconstitutional during a period in which there
was no "dire emergency" (Uhl, 436 F.2d at 774), or that one is exempt from military service
because of one's "religious scruples under the First and Ninth Amendments" (Murray, 452 F.2d
at 504). The courts rejected these challenges on the ground that the Congress has the power to
conscript individuals into the armed forces.
37. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), a d, 395 U.S. 367
(1969) (no discussion of ninth amendment). Red Lion Broadcasting argued that the "equal
time" provision of the FCC mandated by the "fairness in broadcasting" doctrine constituted a
prior restraint and, therefore, deprived them of their political rights retained by the ninth
amendment. Id. at 925.
38. Breakefield v. District of Columbia, 442 F.2d 1227, 1228-29, 1228 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971); Carliner v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1968) cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
39. Cervantes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 510 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1975).
Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes were in the United States illegally. The husband had exceeded the six
month temporary stay originally granted by the Department of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. In addition, he moved to Kansas for employment without informing the Depart-
ment of his move. His fiancee entered the country illegally from Mexico, and joined him in
New York where they were married and continued to live. During this period, they had a child.
The couple filed suit in the court of appeals arguing that their son, an American minor, had a
ninth amendment right "to continue to have the love and affection of his parents in the United
States." Id. at 91.
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by federal grand juries, 4° and an army reservist grooming code. 4' Other
failed challenges include an effort to avoid an Internal Revenue summons,
42
and a claim by a school board that a "freedom of choice" school placement
policy was justified by the ninth amendment. 43 Finally, in Mapco Inc. v.
Carter,4 4 an Emergency Court of Appeals rejected an oil company's conten-
tion that it had a ninth amendment right "to trust the federal government
and rely on the integrity of its pronouncements.
45
In general, the Courts of Appeals have restricted ninth amendment pro-
tection to the right of privacy in Griswold. When the claim asserted under
the ninth amendment was too broad, several courts expressed the view that
only those rights specified in Griswold, such as the right to privacy of the
home, the general rights of family and procreation, and the right to marital
privacy, were protected through the ninth amendment. However, some
cases did begin to expand the limits. A broader conceptual framework was
offered in Plante v. Gonzalez,46 which limited the right to privacy to those
situations involving personal autonomy and confidentiality. In Breen v.
Kahl,4 7 the court of appeals upheld the right to choose one's hair style, be-
cause the issue was one of personal freedom; the judgment in Mathts v.
Schnarr4 8 found that a father had a right to rear his son based on the right to
raise a family, a right implicitly recognized in Griswold; and, the court's judg-
ment in Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter4 9 rested upon the determination
that a woman's right to have an abortion during the first trimester of preg-
nancy involved the constitutionally protected area of a woman's autonomy.
The unwillingness to extend the Griswold concept of the ninth amend-
40. In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 730 (7th Cir. 1976).
41. Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 404 U.S. 865 (1971). While in
the Army Reserves, Anderson had a number of unexcused absences from obligatory meetings.
Although he attended the meetings, he was recorded as absent because his hair length violated
army grooming codes. As a result, Anderson was ordered to active duty. His attempt to reverse
the induction order by challenging the army's grooming code was rebuffed by Judge Wilbur
Pell, Jr. Judge Pell reasoned that if Anderson "were completely in civilian status, his position
would have legally persuasive stature." But, Judge Pell concluded, the rights of individuals in
the armed forces are balanced against compelling governmental interests, and that "it is not for
civil courts to judge whether the military has properly determined the balance between military
needs and personal rights." Id. at 914.
42. United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1220 (8th Cir. 1976),cert. dened, 431 U.S. 919
(1977).
43. United States v. School Board of Franklin City, 428 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1970). School
Board of Frankhin 0'y consists of three cases consolidated into one. The ninth amendment claim
was made in Covington v. United States, id.
44. 573 F.2d 1268 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. dented, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
45. Id. at 1273. Mapco sought to enjoin implementation of a "rollback" of prices of "up-
per-tier" domestic crude oil, arguing that the establishment of the two-tier pricing system was
devised and pronounced by the federal government for the purpose of providing oil companies
with incentive to increase domestic drilling and development. Consequently, Mapco main-
tained, it had a ninth amendment right to the "expectation that the maximum prices of upper-
tier oil would never be regulated or reduced by the federal government." Id. at 1280.
46. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
47. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denzed, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
48. 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (no discussion of the ninth
amendment). See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
49. 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 447 U.S. 918 (1980) (no discussion of the ninth
amendment). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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ment is also evident in those decisions where the court determined that the
right asserted was foreclosed because the government had constitutionally
derived power to control that area. None of the cases that were disposed of
on this basis involve a right similar, either in nature or in circumstance, to
those specified earlier by the courts as appropriate for ninth amendment
protection.
Of the cases outlined, the only real conflict pits the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits against the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. While the former hold
that an individual's choice of hair style is not a fundamental right under the
ninth amendment, the latter two circuits conclude otherwise. 50
C. The Ninth Amendment in the Distrzct Courts
A representative group of fifty-seven district court decisions were gath-
ered for this discussion. Twenty-seven decisions of these relevant cases held
that the rights asserted were protected, at least in part, by the ninth amend-
ment. Of these, eighteen involved matters of personal decisions; it was
claimed in most cases that the consequences of these decisions were confined
to the individual making the decision. This category includes suits brought
by military reservists who wanted to wear wigs during training,5 ' challenges
by public high school students to school grooming codes, 52 an individual's
claimed right to obtain obscene material,53 challenges to state abortion regu-
lations, 54 and the asserted individual right to use "a nontoxic substance [in
50. Note that the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question of the
constitutionality of a public school's grooming code. The Court, however, examined a police
department's grooming code in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). Justice Rehnquist
wrote that the regulations involved in Kelley did not violate any substantive rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. Rehnquist argued that for that case's purpose, it was "as-
sume[d]" that "the citizenry at large has some sort of 'liberty' interest within the Fourteenth
Amendment in matters of personal appearance ..... Id. at 244. However, the "claim of a
member of a civilian service based on the 'liberty' interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must [not] necessarily be treated for constitutional purposes the same as a similar claim by
a member of the general public." Id. at 249.
51. Etheridge v. Schlesinger, 362 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1973); Brown v. Schlesinger, 365
F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973).
52. Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. I11. 1973); Watson v. Thompson, 321 F.
Supp. 394 (E.D. Tex. 1971), vacated, 458 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1972); Berryman v. Hein 329 F.
Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Black v.
Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb.
1970); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970).
53. United States v. Orito, 338 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 413 U.S. 139 (1973);
United States v. B & H Distrib. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S.
927 (1971), affdon othergrowzds, 347 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. Wis. 1972),vacated, 413 U.S. 909 (1973),
acq. 375 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Wis. 1974). The original opinions in Onto and B &H rely princi-
pally on Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 566 (1968), for the proposition that the first amendment
protects the right to read obscene material in the privacy of one's home. While the judges in
Ont0o and B &H argued that the right to obtain such material was also protected, the Supreme
Court rejected this, citing" U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 35, (1971); and United States v. Thirty
Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
54. Doe v. Mundy, 378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aftd, 514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975);
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), vacated 410 U.S. 950 (1972); YWCA v.
Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D. N.J. 1972) af'd mem., 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974); Abele v.
Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 314 F.
Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), modif*don othergrounds, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970).
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this case the drug Laetrile] in connection with one's personal health care."'55
Five cases concern claims involving interpersonal relationships of a formal
familial or informal associational nature. The issues in these cases include a
challenge to a Merchant Marine Academy's regulation prohibiting its cadets
from marrying,56 the claimed rights of a parent and minor child to attend a
lecture on contraception, 57 and the asserted right of a parent to protect her
child from state distribution of contraceptive information. 58 Other actions
objected to on this basis include the dismissal of an unmarried teacher 59 and
an unmarried civil servant 6° for sleeping or living with a member of the
opposite sex. The other opinions in this category upheld a residential anti-
picketing ordinance on the ground that the right to privacy includes tran-
quility, protected in part by the ninth amendment; 6 ' a racially discrimina-
tory membership policy of a private country club, because associational
rights are protected privacy interests;62 upheld an indictment of a private
individual for conspiring to electronically intercept business communications
because the ninth amendment protects a bundle of unexpressed privacy in-
terests. 63 Finally, on grounds that prison overcrowding constituted severe
confinement conditions, offensive to the ninth amendment, the court ordered
a change in the prison conditions. 64
A second major category of district court cases are those in which the
courts acknowledged the ninth amendment as a source of constitutional pro-
tection for the right to privacy, but concluded that the case presented cir-
cumstances which did not involve privacy interests protected by the Gnswold
decision. Thus, the courts upheld two state statutes requiring unwed
mothers to furnish the name of the child's putative father,65 rejected a plain-
tiff's claim to an environment free from tobacco smoke,66 upheld a public
55. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977), rev'd, 616 F.2d 455
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1980).
56. O'Neil v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).
57. Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. N.Y. 1975). Ms. Manfredonia was ar-
rested for bringing her fourteen month old daughter to a lecture, given by William Baird, on the
subject of contraceptives. She was charged under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1974)
which makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to endanger the welfare of a child.
58. Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated mem., 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.
1977),af'g 441 F. Supp. 1247 (6th Cir. 1977),dtsmissed, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1829 (1980).
59. Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), a~fd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973).
60. Mindel v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
61. People v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574 (D. R.I.), rev'd, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972).
62. Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd, 632 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1980) (since the "private" club involved was not a truly private social organization, the
court dismissed the ninth amendment argument).
63. United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
64. Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). Although the court specifi-
cally found a violation of the ninth amendment, the opinion is unclear as to the nature of the
ninth amendment right that was involved.
65. Burdick v. Miech, 385 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65
(D. Conn. 1973), acatedper curiam, 422 U.S. 391 (1975), modifiedrub noa. Doe v. Maher, 414 F.
Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976), vacatedper cuaim, 432 U.S. 526 (1977).
66. Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976),
afd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1979).
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high school's grooming code, 67 and held that the Mann Act's prohibition on
the interstate transportation of women for prostitution purposes did not vio-
late a ninth amendment guarantee to privacy.6 Other district court's have
rejected a claim that the right to privacy protected one from unwarranted
publicity,69 upheld a city ordinance prohibiting the use of the word "Sa-
loon" for any premise on which alcohol was sold, 70 and held that a New
York statutory eviction procedure did not infringe upon any " 'right to hous-
ing' within the ambit of the ninth amendment.
'7 t
In a number of environmental cases, the courts held that the right to a
clean environment was not protected by the ninth amendment. 72 The
courts made no effort in these cases to identify when the environment might
conceivably be protected by the ninth amendment. The opinions, however,
do not dispute that the ninth amendment is a source of constitutional protec-
tion for other unidentified rights.
In eight cases, the courts rejected challenges to the government impos-
ing restrictions or obligations, on the basis that the sovereign possessed the
requisite constitutional authority to impose such restrictions or obligations.
In two instances, the courts upheld the dismissal of civil servants for partici-
pating in political activities in violation of the Hatch Act. 73 A Seventh Day
Adventist's refusal to pay union dues was rejected on the ground that Con-
gress, under its power to regulate interstate commerce, could provide for col-
lective bargaining under which the "employer and the federally-employed
representative of employees . . . [could] make a collective bargain requiring
union membership."'74 A serviceman's challenge to transfer orders which
would have sent him to Vietnam, 75 and a civilian's challenge to an induc-
67. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), af'd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir.
1969).
68. United States v. Ceasar, 368 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Wis. 1973), affdmem. sub noa., United
States v. Harden, 519 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1975).
69. Reilly v. Leonard, 459 F. Supp. 291 (D. Conn. 1978). Reilly filed a suit alleging that
his right to privacy had been violated when the police published an -investigative report which
concluded that he was the murderer of his mother. The report was published after the Attorney
General rejected it and an information against Reilly was dismissed with prejudice.
70. Boscia v. Warren, 359 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
71. Velazquez v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), a d 451 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1971).
72. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. N.Y. 1979);
Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D. N.J. 1978); Upper West
Fork River Watershed Ass'n v. Corps of Engineers, 414 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. W. Va. 1976), affd
me., 556 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977),cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978); River v. Richmond Metro-
politan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973), af'dper curiam 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp. 363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Virginians for Dulles
v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir.
1976); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970),afd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
73. Hatch Political Activities Act, Ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 1501-1505 (1976). Democratic Cent. Comm. for Montgomery County v. Andolsek,
249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966); Fishkin v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40
(N.D. Cal. 1969), dismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970).
74. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (D. Mass. 1970), af'd, 440 F.2d 14
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
75. Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. N.Y. 1970),aj'd, 443 F.2d 1039. cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971). Orlando sought to void the orders by arguing that his rights as a citizen
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tion notice,76 were rejected, as was the challenge of a military reservist to a
requirement that he participate in a Veteran's Foreign War parade. 77 Envi-
ronmentalists seeking to prevent mining operations in the Challis National
Forest, located in Idaho, were rebuffed; the court found that Congress, and
not the citizenry, has the constitutional power to dispose of minerals in land
owned by the United States. 78 A challenge to an indictment under the
Hobbs Act 79 was also rejected by the court. 80
In three of the remaining cases, the district courts held that the asserted
rights were indeed fundamental but, under the circumstances, the state had
a more compelling interest. Consequently, the courts upheld grooming
codes for inmates,8a and for police officers,8 2 and upheld the discharge of.a
teacher for expressing, in her economics class, her opinions concerning the
issue of students' rights and corporal punishment.8 3 The final two cases,
involving a challenge to a high school grooming code,8 4 and a claim to a
protected environment,8 5 are the only ones which state that the ninth
were violated because the conduct of the war in Vietnam was not authorized by Congress and
the Executive had no constitutional authority to continue it.
76. United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
77. Jones v. United States Secretary of Defense, 346 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972). Jones
maintained that because the parade coincided with a speech that was to be delivered by then
Vice President Spiro Agnew, the parade indirectly promoted the Vice President's political can-
didacy for reelection. Jones supported the Democrats and the presidential candidacy of Senator
George McGovern.
78. Honchok v. Hardin, 326 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1971).
79. Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 793 (1948) codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1951-1955 (1976).
80. United States v. Howe, 353 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Mo. 1973). Howe was indicted for
compelling a tavern owner to provide space for various coin operated machines.
81. Howard v. Warden, Petersburg Reformatory, 348 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1972), d-
missedmem., 474 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1973).
82. Stradley v. Andersen, 349 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Neb. 1972), afd, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1973).
83. Ahern v. Board of Education, 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 399
(8th Cir. 1972). Ms. Ahern was suspended when, during class time, she criticized the action of a
substitute teacher who slapped a student. In addition, during the discussion Ms. Ahern raised
issues pertaining to students' rights. Judge Urbom argued that although Ms. Ahern had a right
to express her opinions, there is no right to express them during class in violation of a superior's
admonition not to do so when the subject of her opinion is directly related to student and
teacher discipline. Id. at 1397.
84. Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School District, 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex.
1970). Judge Allen Hannay dismissed the relevance of the ninth amendment in the following
words:
The Ninth Amendment . . . has traditionally been construed to pertain to the proper
allocation of governmental power between the federal and state sovereigns. . . . It
would be the opposite of this to ascribe to the stately 18th century rhetoric of the
Ninth Amendment an intent to enlarge at the expense of the several states the federal
judicial power created by Article III of the Federal Constitution-a judicial power
amply extended by the Fourteenth Amendment and its authoritative interpretation
across the years.
Id. at 577.
85. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd,
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). Judge Robert Taylor rejected any
contention that the ninth amendment could be invoked as a source of constitutional protection
for the area to be flooded, by pointedly stating that "the Ninth Amendment grants no substan-
tive rights." Thereafter, Judge Taylor also stated: "The Ninth Amendment simply provides
that the specification of certain rights in the Constitution shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights retained by the people." Id. at 611. Note also that Judge Taylor cited
the opinion in Tanner to support his assertion that the ninth amendment grants no substantive
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amendment affords no protection to unenumerated rights.
To summarize, in every case where the judges addressed rights which
they considered to be protected by the ninth amendment, the judges re-
stricted the protection to the general right of privacy. In most cases, the
judges only addressed the question whether the right that a plaintiff asserted
was included in the definition. The courts did this without attempting to
criticize or limit the right to privacy itself. Only Chief Judge Clarie, in Reily
v. Leonard,86 tried to define the scope of the right to privacy. According to
Judge Clarie, the right to privacy protects one "from substantive regulation
by the government"8 7 only in those areas involving "private conduct in
'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, and child rearing and education'."88 With few exceptions, the other
judges who sought to characterize an aspect of the right to privacy and
whether it is protected by the ninth amendment, restricted their identifica-
tions to aspects of privacy equivalent to or similar to those identified by
Judge Clarie. While those opinions extending ninth amendment privacy
protection to the choice of hair style or the receipt of obscene material may
not fit exactly within Judge Clarie's conception of the constitutional right to
privacy, nevertheless, according to other judges, such conduct also finds
shelter under the wings of ninth amendment privacy.
II. DISCUSSION
As this review illustrates, the federal courts have, with few exceptions,
restricted the scope of ninth amendment protection to the marital-familial
aspect of the right to privacy. Where efforts to define the scope of this right
have been made, they have generally been limited to protecting the auton-
omy of the individual, matters concerning the family and procreation, (in-
cluding marriage and contraception), and such aspects of family
relationships as child rearing and education. Other rights which are easily
distinguished from the marital-familial axis were held by the courts to be
unprotected by the ninth amendment. For example, the courts consistently
rejected contentions that the ninth amendment includes protection for a
clean environment.8 9 The courts were unwilling to extend ninth amend-
ment protection to the naming of one's tavern as one pleased,9° or to the
discussion of corporal punishment in a classroom.9 1 Moreover, the decisions
reviewed demonstrate that ninth amendment rights are not absolute; they
may be balanced against legitimate governmental interests. In addition,
courts rejected ninth amendment claims which infringed on the exercise of
other legitimate constitutional powers.
rights. In so doing, Judge Taylor interpreted the treatment of the ninth amendment claim in
Tanner expansively and erroneously. Judge Noel's ruling in Tanner concerning the ninth amend-
ment is limited to the question of environmental concerns, and not to the ninth amendment
proper.
86. 459 F. Supp. 291 (D. Conn. 1978).
87. Id. at 299.
88. Id. at 300, quoting, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
89. See supra note 70.
90. See supra note 68.
91. See supra note 81.
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Beyond these obvious conclusions lie some intriguing undercurrents
which provide portents of the future significance of the ninth amendment to
the protection of unenumerated rights. Ostensibly, Ringold's, and Rhoades
and Patula's views of the status of the ninth amendment are correct. It ap-
pears that, as Ringold has written, the "success ratio for asserted ninth
amendment rights has been so phenomenally large that an attorney would
almost be derelict if (s)he did not at least include" the ninth amendment in
her or his claim.92 This is most probably the result of the marked growth in
ninth amendment claims made since Griswold, and success of even a small
number of those actions. This also accommodates Rhoades and Patula's as-
sessment that the courts have exhibited a "reluctance" to use the ninth
amendment.9 3 The matter is obviously one of perspective. Significantly,
however, both articles ignore altogether the rationales underlying the ulti-
mate decisions of the courts. The rationale for the result in these cases indi-
cate, however, the scope of the ninth amendment's status, and its future in
the judiciary.
An overwhelming number of the cases examined do not directly address
whether, under the circumstances of each case, the ninth amendment was
properly invoked. Grzswold is the only case in which the Supreme Court
found a right, the right to privacy, and rested it squarely upon the ninth
amendment. Yet in subsequent cases involving privacy questions the Court
deliberately avoided connecting that right to the ninth amendment, holding
instead that the right was encompassed within the liberty concept of the
fourteenth amendment. Moreover, in every instance after Griswold, the
Court avoided the question of the relationship of the ninth amendment to
the constitutional scheme of fundamental rights. In effect, immediately after
the Court gave life to the right of privacy on ninth amendment grounds, the
new child privacy was placed under the aegis of the more structured and
familiar guardian "liberty," to be nurtured and cultivated. Thus, while the
right to privacy has become firmly entrenched in the American scheme of
constitutional rights, the ninth amendment basis for this right has become
relegated to limbo; it is neither repudiated nor immuted as a constitutional
source of protection. This effect is evident in many lower federal court deci-
sions. Rather than moving toward an acceptance or rejection of the ninth
amendment, the lower courts have focused on the more general question of
whether the particular right asserted was encompassed by the broader con-
cept of the right to privacy.94 This approach is illustrated by Judge Myron
Bright's opinion in Bishop v. Colaw.9 5 Judge Bright cited a number of cases
for the point that while courts found protection in the ninth amendment
right to privacy for the right to choice in governing personal appearance,
92. See Ringold, supra note 2, at 36.
93. See Rhoades and Patula, supra note 4, at 163-67.
94. This may also account for another tactic used by a number of judges in addressing a
claim of privacy based, in part, upon the ninth amendment. In these cases (not included in this
inquiry), the judges cite the ninth amendment, among others, upon which the petitioners based
their privacy claim. The judges then direct their attention to the substantive questions respect-
ing the nature of the right to privacy, and the particular claim presented, without any consider-
ation of the specific constitutional provisions from whence the right to privacy derives.
95. 450 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1970).
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others found the same protection in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, and still others found it in the privacy penumbra of the Bill of
Rights. Rather than indicating a preference, Judge Bright dismissed the
need to make a choice:
A close reading of these cases reveals, however, that the differ-
ences are more semantic than real. The common theme underlying
decisions striking down hair style regulations is that the Constitu-
tion guarantees rights other than those specifically enumerated,
and that the right to govern one's personal appearance is one of
those guaranteed.
The existence of rights other than those specifically enumer-
ated in the Constitution was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Griswold. . . . Much of the present divergence of opinions as to the
source of the right asserted here can be traced to the different ap-
proaches adopted by the Justices in Griswold. We see no point in
rehashing these different approaches, since under any of them, the
conclusion follows that certain additional rights exist.
96
The current ninth amendment dilemma may be traced to the lack of
clarity in Justices Douglas' and Goldberg's opinions in Griswold concerning
the proper interpretation of the ninth amendment. 97 These questions arise:
how is the ninth amendment to be applied, and what is its relation to the
rest of the Constitution?98 Although both Justices Douglas and Goldberg
use the ninth amendment, courts and commentators disagree as to the appli-
cation and impact of that invocation. 99 Moreover, Justice Harlan and Jus-
tice White each wrote a concurrence in Griswold, in which they relied
exclusively upon the liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. With
96. Id. at 1075. This is not to suggest, however, that every judge exhibited such equivoca-
tion. Writing for the Court of Appeals in Mahoning, Judge Merritt is representative of a few
judges who expressed at least partial reliance on the ninth amendment:
In addition to formulating specific limitations on government in the first eight
amendments of the Constitution, the founding fathers in a more general way carved
out a slice of human affairs of a private nature which should be 'retained by the peo-
ple' without legislative interference. The ninth amendment provides that '[tlhe
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.'
456 F.2d at 459.
97. A number of legal commentators differ as to the proper interpretation of Goldberg's
and Douglas' opinions; this is some indication of possible ambiguities in these opinions.
98. Although this is a matter of considerable constitutional importance, satisfactory discus-
sion here is beyond the scope of this inquiry. A brief descriptive statement of each of the four
theories is set forth to provide some guidance, however: 1) the "Independent Source" theory:
the ninth amendment operates as a shield to protect unspecified, fundamental rights, just as
each of the first eight amendments directly protects the rights specified in text, 2) the "Opera-
tionalize Due Process" theory: the ninth amendment directs the courts to interpret broadly the
due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, 3) the "Enabling Analogous
Rights" theory: the ninth amendment may be invoked for the sole purpose of expanding or
protecting those rights enumerated throughout the Constitution, most particularly rights identi-
fied in the first eight amendments and, 4) the "Rule of Construction" theory: the ninth amend-
ment adds nothing in the way of substantive rights, its sole purpose being to guard against a
misconstruction of any enumerated or interpreted constitutional guarantee.
99. See, e.g. , Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wts. L. REV.
979, 982; Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten.- The
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235, 243 (1965-66); and Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The
Justices and Connectzcut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680, 686 (1966-67).
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this panoply of viewpoints before them, it is no wonder that the lower federal
courts generally remain silent on the details of ninth amendment jurispru-
dence. 00 The absence of an established form for ninth amendment adjudi-
cation has, however, proven to be less a barrier than might be expected in
justifying the final judgment of the courts. Where there was a case factually
similar to the one under consideration, which recognized a similar substan-
tive right, the examining court would follow the earlier case and recognize
the asserted right. On the other hand, where precedent was unavailable, the
courts were not inclined to extend constitutional protection. This pattern
was reflected by comments in those cases which intimated the court could
not recognize the asserted ninth amendment right because of the absence of
guiding precedent.
CONCLUSION
The courts have been willing to recognize that constitutional claims
may be based on the ninth amendment. The courts are more willing to give
ninth amendment protection, however, to matters that fall within the mari-
tal-familial aspects of privacy. Because of this hesitancy to push Griswold
beyond the family, a complete view of the breadth and depth of the ninth
amendment in the federal courts has yet to develop. The overwhelming
number of lower federal court cases examined lend themselves to the follow-
ing general assessment: A ninth amendment claim is more likely to receive
favorable judicial recognition when it is used in asserting the marital-famil-
ial form of the right to privacy. The further the ninth amendment claim is
from the marital-familial axis, the less acceptance it will receive.
If the ninth amendment is to be expanded, or explained, the responsi-
bility for doing so resides with the Supreme Court. Should the Supreme
Court choose to invoke the ninth amendment for the purpose of protecting a
particular right, lower courts will follow suit. The absence of Supreme
Court guidance has discouraged an expansive interpretation of the ninth
amendment rights by the lower federal courts.5 0t Judge Garnett Eisele's
100. Judge Cummings' opinion in United States v. Choate, is the exception. His opinion is
worth quoting at length.
The specific sources for zones of privacy in the Constitution seem only to include the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484, . . . . If a zone of privacy cannot be grounded on neutral principles rooted
in one of these constitutional sources, it simply does not enjoy constitutional protec-
tion . ..
Requiring that a constitutional right be locatable in the Constitution most em-
phatically does not, of course, suggest a strict circumscription of the various specific
constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Each guarantee still has its Griswold
penumbras and emanations. But if it is demonstrated seriatim that none of the specific
guarantees creates a zone of privacy in a given case, then there simply is not a constitu-
tional 'right of privacy' in that case. Nor is there any question of synergistic coupling
between the several Bill of Rights guarantees to create by the operation of all of them
together a constitutional right not locatable in any one of them.
576 F.2d at 173-74. See also supra notes 84 and 85.
101. Two possible additional factors inhibiting efforts by the lower courts to undertake such
an endeavor include 1) the failure on the part of the litigants to provide the courts with suffi-
cient elaboration concerning the relevance of the ninth amendment (a concern specifically
noted by some judges); and 2) the apparent lack of awareness, on the part of the judges and
justices, of the ninth amendment literature.
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opinion in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army
expresses the hesitancy of the lower federal courts to formulate new jurispru-
dence independent of Supreme Court guidance:
[Sluch claims, even under our present Constitution are not fanciful
and may, indeed, someday, in one way or another, obtain judicial
recognition. But, as stated by Judge Learned Hand in Spector Motor
Sew., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944):
Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhila-
rating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may
be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant.
The Ninth Amendment may well be as important in the develop-
ment of constitutional law during the remainder of this century as
the Fourteenth Amendment has been since the beginning of the
century. But . . . the plaintiffs have not stated facts which would
under the present state of the law constitute a violation of their
constitutional rights as alleged . . . in their complaint.
0 2
This opinion intimates that lower courts are justifiably unwilling to
bring the ninth amendment from the "womb" to the courtroom without
some strong assistance from the Supreme Court. This reluctance remains in
spite of the ninth amendment's promising future. Of course, this bodes
poorly for the incorporation, at least in the near future, of novel unenumer-
ated rights through the mechanism of the ninth amendment. The federal
courts remain firm in their resolve to look to the Supreme Court for gui-
dance. The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to invoke the ninth
amendment when a more specific constitutional provision guarantees the
constitutional right at issue.
Insofar as substantive unenumerated rights are concerned, the develop-
ment of the ninth amendment has been limited. Nevertheless, the treatment
given to the ninth amendment to this date may have greater significance in
the future. So far, some federal courts have recognized that the ninth
amendment provides sustenance for unenumerated fundamental rights.
While Griswold may have sown the ninth amendment seed, it did so
without regard for the fertility or receptivity of the judicial furrows in which
it was sown. Nevertheless, the courts of appeal and the district courts have
nurtured that seed to the point where it has developed its own root system,
anchoring it into the field where fundamental rights are found.
An expansion of the ninth amendment might occur one day provided
the Supreme Court becomes convinced that such an expansion is necessary.
Ultimately, the ninth amendment's potential may not begin to be seriously
explored until such time as the Justices of the Supreme Court are confronted
with a political or judicial climate which compels them to seek out reliance
on unchartered constitutional guarantees.
0 3
102. 325 F. Supp. at 739.
103. A recent case which gives some sense of the direction in which the Court is headed with
the ninth amendment is the opinion in Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980). Only Justices White and Stevens joined in Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist registered the only dissent, while others wrote concurring opinions. Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Burger found that the right of the public and the press to attend crimi-
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nal trials is guaranteed under the first and fourteenth amendments and could be restricted only
upon a showing of an "overriding interest." The first amendment, Burger argued, "can be read
as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to .. .[the] explicit
guarantees [such as freedom of speech and press]." To support this contention, Justice Burger
invokes the ninth amendment, reviewing briefly the Federalists' and Anti-Federalists' debate
over the formulation of the Bill of Rights. Justice Burger concluded, in a footnote, that James
Madison's efforts to end the debate "culminate[d] in the Ninth Amendment, [and] served to
allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as
excluding others." Id. at 579, n.15. See a/so supra note 25.

EXPLORATION OF THE "OUTER LIMITS": THE
MISDIRECTED EVOLUTION OF RECKLESS
DISREGARD
JEROME S. KALUR*
[Als a matter of either practice or philosophy, I do not see how we
can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as
to what is believable.
Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting
in United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 92 (1944).
INTRODUCTION
The American common law of defamation evolved without first amend-
ment free speech or expression limitations until 1964. Before that time, the
states were free to formulate such tests for liability as they deemed appropri-
ate. Generally, liability for defamatory statements' rested upon proof that a
statement was of the kind to cause damage to reputation, was false, and had
been published to a third party.2 Once such a prma face case had been
made out, injury to reputation was presumed. 3 The United States Supreme
Court had consistently refused to enter this area of largely settled tort law.
4
The status quo was altered by the Court's landmark decision of New
York Times Co. v. Sulli'van.-' With its decision in New York Times, the Court
made defamation actions brought by public officials subject to a proof bur-
den not previously required under tort law for libel and slander. This addi-
tion was deemed necessary because of the free speech and expression
provisions of the first amendment. 6 Added to the actual falsity and proof of
publication requirements of defamatory nature was the necessity that a
plaintiff prove with convincing clarity that, at the time of publication, the
defamer either knew the statement to be false or recklessly disregarded
whether or not it was false. 7 As a consequence of the employment of the
. The author is a principal in the Cleveland law firm of Nurenberg, Plevin, Jacobson,
Heller & McCarthy. The author wishes to acknowledge the thoughts and assistance of James L.
McCrystal, Jr. in the preparation of this article.
1. As defined in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938), "[a] communication is defama-
tory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
2. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 613 (1938).
3. This presumption arose when the defamatory statement was obvious or per se. When
the language required explanation to comprehend a defamatory meaning in its context, it re-
ceived the designation of per quod and damages were not presumed. See the discussion of the
common law of defamation contained in Justice White's dissenting opinion in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369-76 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. id at 279-80.
7. Id
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ephemeral term "reckless," the Supreme Court, with the appellate and trial
courts following in its wake,8 began the search for the "outer limits"9 of what
may constitute the reckless disregard1 ° element of actual malice.1 1
This article traces the judicial gloss that has been placed upon the reck-
less disregard proof standard. It is argued that the Garrison v. Louisiana falsity
definition, 12 and the subsequent St. Amani v. Thompson truth definition,
13 of
reckless disregard incorrectly directed a search for evidence of a subjective
and culpable mental state. 14 The emphasis, as shown in these two cases,
upon the requirement of proving a publisher's state of mind "in fact"' 5 has
led to a continuing judicial struggle with the legal fictions of whether one
8. The lower courts' efforts to apply the holding in New York Tines have been described as
a problem in "how to reason by analogy." See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amend-
ment." Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267, 278.
9. The Court first employed this term in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31
(1968). The full statement reads:
Inevitably [what constitutes reckless disregard's] outer limits will be marked out
through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal standards for judging
concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes, or case
law.
Id.
10. 376 U.S. at 280. The New York Times decision concerned defamation allegations
against a public official. Id. at 279. The reckless disregard standard was expanded to "public
figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1976); to invasion of privacy
actions in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 376 U.S. 374, 390 (1967); and to punitive damages claims in so-
called "private" plaintiff defamation cases in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974). While reckless disregard has been used in these different contexts, no definitional dis-
tinction based upon the claim for relief has occurred.
11. 376 U.S. at 280. The term "actual malice," as employed by the Court did not carry
with it the common law concept of ill will or spite. See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357
(1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 66 (1964). The change in accepted meaning was not
an easy one for the lower courts. "Although these definitions distort common English, they
must be taken at face value." Reliance Ins. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). Justice Stewart would eventually come to "regret" the use of the term. See Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The statement of the actual malice
rule reads in full as follows:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"--that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
376 U.S. at 279-80. Semantically, this statement implies that in the event a publisher is indiffer-
ent to determining the truth of the article or disregards that issue altogether, he would be culpa-
ble. Nevertheless, the Court's defining process as to the words "false or not," has exempted the
neutral mental state and put a "premium on ignorance" by the "irresponsible publisher." See
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731; Redick, Freedom of the Press, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581,
600 (1964).
12. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("Only those false statements made with the high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either
civil or criminal sanctions.").
13. 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.").
14. This mental state inquiry was foreshadowed in New York Times by reference to the
"state of mind required for actual malice." 376 U.S. at 287. This inquiry was branded in a
dissent by Justice Goldberg as an "elusive concept." Id. at 302 n.4.
15. 390 U.S. at 731. Typical of the judicial struggle over interpretation of these two words
is a statement made by Rovira, J., dissenting in Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Pub. Co., 637
P.2d 315, 324 (Colo. 1981) ("Actual malice is not a proposition that can be supported by a
normative conclusion that the publisher should have known of the falsity of the statement.
Rather, evidence of the publisher's subjective awareness is required.").
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may be subjectively "deemed" to have had, 16 or "should" have had, 17 or
"could" have had18 the required malicious state of mind.
Instead of a limited inquiry about uncertain assumptions' 9 arising out
of the countless subtleties of a defendant's mind, 20 the earlier decision of New
York Times had offered a much different formula: proving that a defendant
knew or should have known that the risk of falsity outweighed the social
utility of publication to such an unwarranted degree as to make publication,
under such a state of actual or constructive knowledge, an act of recklessness.
It is the thesis of this article that those who publish with heedless indifference
to truth or falsity should be objectively culpable under the New York Times
reckless disregard standard and that the Garrison-S. Amant subjective aware-
ness standard, which attempts to actually discern the state of mind of a de-
fendant, should be overruled.
I. DEFINING RECKLESS DISREGARD
A. The Initial Defmning Process- Trial and Error
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
New York Times marked the first effort by the Court to strike a balance
between the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression and the
common law's remedy for damage to reputation. 2 1 In that case, a city com-
missioner of Montgomery, Alabama brought suit against the New York Times
for publication of a paid advertisement describing the mistreatment of black
students protesting segregation in the South. The Supreme Court reversed
the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, prohibiting recovery unless there was
proof that the newspaper had defamed the commissioner by virtue of a de-
liberate falsehood, or reckless disregard as to whether the advertisement was
true or false.22 The New York Times rule prohibited recovery unless there was
proof that the defendant had defamed a person by virtue of a deliberate
falsehood, or through reckless disregard as to whether the item published
was true or false. This decision by the court represented an effort to shield
the defamatory error from culpability, even if this error was committed neg-
ligently.23 Such a shield was established in order to assure that freedom of
expression is afforded the requisite "breathing space."
'24
16. See, e.g., Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 123, n.5, 413
N.E.2d 1187, 1192, n.5 (1981). The suggested struggle is illustrated by the Ohio Supreme
Court's impliedly contra ruling just eleven months later in Bukky v. Painesville Telegraph &
Lake Geauga Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 48, 428 N.E.2d 405, 407 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238, 1259 (1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 962 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Alioto v. Cowles Comm., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1363, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
19. 418 U.S. 323, 353 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. DiLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 669, 671, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1980).
21. 376 U.S. at 299. "We must recognize that we are writing on a clean slate." (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
22. 376 U.S. 256.
23. Id. at 271, 278. This conditional or qualified privilege is also referred to as protecting
"honest misstatements." Id at 282, n.21. See also id at 288 ("The evidence against the Times
supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitu-
tionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.").
24. Id at 272.
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While the phrase "knowledge of falsity" as stated in New York Tines
required little explanation, reckless disregard inherently bespoke a need for
judicial interpretation on a case-by-case basis. 25 This interpretive process
was initiated by the Supreme Court with a review of the New York Times trial
record and a determination of whether the defendant's pre-publication
knowledge could 26 support a jury finding of reckless disregard. The evi-
dence selected for discussion related only to what employees of the New York
Times knew before publication of the defamatory material. 2 7 This investiga-
tion disclosed that the defendant's employees believed the advertisement to
be substantially correct, 28 that no evidence had been produced to impeach
that claim, and that the defendant's belief in its correctness was based upon
a reasonable factual basis.
29
The Times references to a reasonable or good faith belief in the truth of
what was published opened the door to evidentiary considerations of what
demonstrated the reasonableness of such a conclusion. The pre-publication
conduct of the publisher may be the subject of objective evidence
30 with
respect to the defendant's reasonable 3' justification in holding a belief that
assertions were true. Consequently, Justice Brennan's majority opinion
turned to an analysis of the New York Times' conduct to determine if the
claimed pre-publication belief in the truth of the article had been proven
justifiable. 32 Looking to the content of the advertisement alone, and the
failure of the Times to investigate its claims, the Court rejected the Alabama
Supreme Court's conclusion that this conduct could be termed cavalier.
33
The Court stated that admissible evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove
knowledge of the risk of falsity was that form of testimony or exhibit which
25. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 730. Significantly, the Court later rejected devel-
opment of factual criteria on a case-by-case basis with respect to private-person libel actions, to
which the New York Times' rule was deemed inapplicable. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 343 ("this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations").
The same statement could also be made for reckless disregard's case-by-case development.
26. 376 U.S. at 287.
27. Id. at 286.
28. Id
29. It is important to note that the evidentiary review repeatedly characterized the basis
for the Times' belief in the accuracy of its publication as a reasonable one. For instance, the
Court stated: "that opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no evidence to impeach
the witness' good faith in holding it." Id at 286 (emphasis added). The Court also stated:
"First, the letter written by the Times reflected a reasonable doubt on its part as to whether the
advertisement could reasonably be taken to refer to respondent at all." Id (emphasis added).
The Court continued: "the distinction between respondent and the Governor was a reasonable
one, the good faith of which was not impeached." Id. at 287 (emphasis added). Furthermore,
"their failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable." Id (emphasis added).
Despite these statements, the Court, less than eight months later, in Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1964), found a trial judge in error for holding a violation of "the reasonable
belief standard" to be a basis for a finding of reckless disregard. This seemingly incredible
reversal was made without reference to the New York Times' language, quoted above, and justi-
fied by Justice Brennan's belief that use of such a test was a "suggestion" that the "immunity
from . . . responsibility . . . disappears on proof that the exercise of ordinary care would have
revealed that the statement was false." Id at 79.
30. This form of inquiry (as opposed to impeachment by direct evidence) has been used
only in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286-89 n.28.
31. Id. But see id. at 285 n.26.
32. Id at 286.
33. Id
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demonstrated that the likelihood of falsity had been "brought home" 34
before publication. Given that it was "brought home," the evidence must
also show that the likelihood of falsity was ignored or, if not ignored, so
inadequately investigated that the claim of a belief in truth was not justified.
The nature of the publication alone was rejected as capable of raising an
inference as to the risk of falsity. 35 According to the Court, a failure to inves-
tigate entirely, or a failure to adequately investigate, would be subject to
jury evaluation for recklessness only when the risk of falsity had been
brought home to such a degree that the belief in truth was no longer
justified.
36
New York Times never reached the issue of state of mind analysis because
no evidentiary basis to bring home the risk of falsity had been proven. As
indicative of an honestly-held belief in the truth, the Court pointed to the
Times' knowledge of the good reputation of many of the sponsors of the
advertisement. 37 There was also a letter from a person known to the Times
as a responsible individual certifying that the use of the listed names was
authorized. 38 Lastly, the Tmes staff reviewed the article and found that it
did not violate its policy against publishing advertising that contained per-
sonal attacks. 39 Based upon the circumstances, the Court concluded that it
was uncontroverted that the Times had published with reasonable belief that
the article was true.
2. Garrson v. Louisiana
The Court continued the process of defining and interpreting reckless
disregard in Garrison v. Louisiana.4° In Garrison, the District Attorney for New
Orleans had conducted a press conference during which he accused eight
judges of the parish of inefficiency, laziness and of taking excessive vacations.
He was convicted of criminal defamation and appealed, attacking the consti-
tutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, hold-
ing that false statements were constitutionally protected unless they were
made with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. 41 While the
New York Times decision had suggested that an awareness of the risk of false-
hood might be "brought home" and under certain circumstances, without
an adequate investigation, negate claims of good faith,42 it had not ad-
dressed the question of whether a specific level of awareness of the risk of
falsity must be proven43 in order to demonstrate recklessness. While Garrison
34. Id at 287. This statement sounds very similar to the "brought home" language
adopted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587, comment c: "It is enough that he [the
tortfeasor] knows or has reason to know of circumstances which would bring home to the reali-
zation of the ordinary reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his conduct."
35. 376 U.S. at 286.
36. Id at 287. Seealso Redick, supra note 10, at 600 n.ll.
37. 376 U.S. at 287.
38. Id
39. Id
40. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
41. Id at 66-67, 74.
42. 376 U.S. at 287.
43. See Note, In Defense of Fault in Defamation Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1735, 1735 (1979) ("When
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did provide the yardstick of probability,44 it also altered the standard for
determining who would be culpable, as compared to what had been previ-
ously implied in New York Times. 45 Instead of a reasonable basis for believ-
ing in truth, the standard as stated in Garnson was now to be determined by
the subjective mental belief of the defamer.
46
Under the holding in Garrison, one is reckless when an erroneous publi-
cation is made with a pre-existing cognizance of the probability of falsity. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court made reference to the "brought home-
state of mind" 4 7 language of New York Times, but applied it only to what the
defendant actually knew, and not as to what a reasonable person would have
believed. By restricting proof of reckless disregard to that method only, 48 the
Garrison majority ignored the defamer who is unaware of, or who does not
care, whether the story is true or false. Such a person would have no justified
basis for a subsequent claim of good faith. The New York Thnes rule had
implied that this category of defamer could also be deemed reckless.4 9
While the person who is aware of a probability of falsity may appear as
more malicious than the person who is without justification for a belief in
truth, or seeks no justification, this is not always true. One may be aware of
a probability of falsity, but decide to accept the risk of falsity because of the
societal importance of publication. 50 Under such circumstances, at least
truth or falsity has been considered and the risk evaluated. A jury might
well decide that given the circumstances, the publication, even with a
probability of falsity, was not reckless. On the other hand, those who pub-
lish with no valid basis for believing truth or who print it without regard to
considerations of truth may be even more culpable. Yet, the latter group is
freed of the possibility of a reckless designation by Garrison's probable aware-
ness formula.
The freeing of defamers who have a cavalier attitude toward the truth
was made logically mandatory by the last portion of the Garrison opinion.5
Justice Brennan appears to have confused a breach of ordinary care, negli-
gence,5 2 with the standard for measuring the breach of that duty, i.e. the
conduct of a reasonably prudent man under the same or similar circum-
the Court has formulated standards of journalistic care in the libel area, it has failed to address
the evidentiary dimension of these standards.").
44. 379 U.S. at 74. The term probability inherently signals the concept of more likely than
not or more than fifty percent. See Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 253, 272
N.E.2d 97, 100 (1971); Price v. Neyland, 320 F.2d 674, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
45. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74.
46. The Court states that culpability for reckless disregard may arise from "only those false
statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New
York Times . . ." Id The use of the word "only" limits proof of reckless disregard to those
situations where the defendant actually perceived, as more likely than not, that what he was
about to publish was false.
47. 376 U.S. at 280.
48. 379 U.S. at 74.
49. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
50. Ste RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, comment a ("There may be exceptional
circumstances which make it reasonable to adopt a course of conduct which involves a high
degree of risk of serious harm to others.").
51. 379 U.S. at 78-79.
52. Id
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stances. 53 Because he believed reasonable men served as standards ony in
negligence situations, he held that standard inapplicable. 54 This eliminated
the objective, reasonable person, standard for recklessness, and with it, its
inherent risk versus social utility evaluation. 55 From that day, until the pres-
ent, the tort concept of recklessness has not existed in libel cases. All that is
left is a credibility evaluation based upon whether there was, or was not, a
subjective awareness of probable falsity. This limited standard presents a
potential plaintiff with an almost impossible proof burden.
56
3. Curtis Pubhshing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker
The Gamson modified definition of reckless disregard met its first major
test in the companion cases of Curtis Pubhshing Co. v. Butts 57 and Associated
Press v. Walker.5" Curtis Pubhshing involved an article in the Saturday Eening
Post which asserted that a college coach had conspired to "fix" a football
game. 59 The second case, Associated Press, arose from a news dispatch which
stated that a former army general had led the violent resistence to efforts by
federal marshals to enforce a desegregation order at the University of
Mississippi. 6°
The difficulty of attempting to divine a mental conclusory process was
demonstrated quickly. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion disclosed that the
Saturday Evenig Post recognized the need to confirm an improbable story.
6 1
The story informant was of dubious background, 62 the editing function was
not carried out properly, 63 inconsistencies were not checked 64 and confirma-
tion was not obtained when it easily could have been through trained sports
experts.65  Publication under such an inadequate state of knowledge was
termed by the Harlan plurality opinion as an "extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers."
66
Conversely, the record in Associated Press demonstrated "very little evi-
53. Id
54. Id at 79.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282, comment e ("'Negligence' excludes con-
duct which the actor does or should realize as involving a risk to others which is not merely in
excess of its utility, but which is out of all proportion thereto and is therefore recklessly disre-
gardful of the interests of others.").
56. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Dunn & Bradstreet v. C.R.
Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 898 (1971), noted that, "the actual malice test has been tightened by
virtually eliminating reckless disregard as a component."
57. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
58. Id
59. Id at 135.
60. Id at 140.
61. Id. at 157. As a result, the Curis discussion of what constitutes reckless disregard picks
up where New York Tints left off.
62. Id at 157.
63. Id at 158-59, 169-70.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id at 155. This was a lesser standard for the plaintiff than that enunciated in New York




dence relating to the preparation of the news dispatch." 6 7 The little evi-
dence available, however, reasonably justified the decision to publish.
68
Chief Justice Warren, however, believed Justice Harlan's references to
extreme departure from investigation and reporting standards to be an unu-
sual and speculative formulation.69 Although the Chief Justice made similar
references to the defendant's "slipshod and sketchy investigatory tech-
niques", 70 and the Post's "muckraking and expos6" 7 1 journalism style, he
differed from Justice Harlan in his conviction that the New York Times hold-
ing was an adequate basis for disposing of Curtis Publishing. It is in this diver-
gence of viewpoints that the fruit of Garrison's underlying reasoning may be
observed.
The source of controversy in Curtis Publishing was not how or whether to
reason by analogy72 from New York Times, but how to avoid application of
Garrison's mental state gloss. Only once in the four separate opinions which
were written for these companion cases was reference made to recovery being
permitted for reckless disregard only when there is proof of the publisher's
knowledge of probable falsity. 73 And even on that singular occasion, Justice
Harlan was distinguishing Garrison as a seditious libel action involving claims
of calculated falsehood.74 The plurality opinion then proceeded to avoid the
issue entirely by adopting a less rigorous75 standard applicable to non-gov-
ernmental defamation. 76 Chief Justice Warren also sidestepped awareness
of probable falsity, but in a different manner. Having rejected the Harlan
less rigorous standard, 77 he found New York Times to permit a determination
of reckless disregard measureable by the publisher's conduct.7 8 No mention
was made of the Garrison mental state analysis. Justice Brennan's concurring
and dissenting opinion continued on the same avoidance course.
79
It was obvious that the investigation methods of the Post were found,
both by the jury and the Court, to border on outrageous conduct. The trial
67. Id at 159.
68. Id at 158-59, 165. Justice Harlan, for the plurality, Chief Justice Warren, in his sepa-
rate opinion, and Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion, all agreed that New York Times pro-
vided adequate guidance to decide Associated Press a. Walker. The decision of the Associated
Press to publish was based upon a justified belief in the story's accuracy and therefore privileged
by the first amendment. The story itself was not "unreasonable" and the surrounding facts did
not bring home any substantial risk of falsity.
69. Id at 163.
70. Id. at 169.
71. Id
72. Professor Kalven was of the belief that nothing more was involved. See Kalven, supra
note 8, at 178.
73. 388 U.S. at 153.
74. Id
75. Id at 155.
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id at 163.
78. Id at 164. If one's conduct is the determinant of recklessness, then that conduct, to be
judged, must be compared to a standard. Even if it is said that the conduct might manifest an
awareness of falsity which may be imputed to the defendant, the question remains: to whom is
it made manifest? The standard for such a determination must be the proverbial reasonably
prudent man. Thus, while the Chief Justice's opinion was consistent with New York Times, it
was inconsistent with Gamson, which rejects the reasonable man test.
79. Id at 173-74.
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record made it equally obvious that no evidence had been presented to indi-
cate that the Post was aware of the probability of falsity. Given these two
imperatives, the subjective awareness criteria of Garrison had to be ignored or
overruled. The failure to take the latter course left the Court open to criti-
cism for inconsistency8 ° and continued to leave open the resolution of what
specific circumstances constitute actual malice.
8 1
B. The Watershed--St. Amant v. Thompson
The 1968 decision in St. Amant v. Thompsona2 was devoted to the singular
question of what may constitute reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of
assertions contained in a publication. St. Amant, a candidate for political
office, had made a televised speech in which he charged his opponent, a
labor union official, and Thompson, a deputy sheriff, with criminal con-
duct.8 3 St. Amant had obtained an affidavit from an informant who was
known to him to be in a knowledgeable position within a labor union.84 The
affidavit included defamatory charges which were determined at trial to be
false as to Thompson.8 5 St. Amant did not investigate the accuracy of his
informant's charges before publishing the contents of the affidavit,86 and he
justified his failure to investigate by maintaining that there was no cause to
suspect that the charges were false. 87
In rejecting a claim of a duty to investigate merely because a story is
defamatory,88 the Court's opinion acknowledged the possibility of encourag-
ing irresponsibility and putting a "premium on ignorance. ' ' 89 The Court
justified this position by once again stating that the test was not what a
reasonably prudent man would do in the exercise of ordinary care. 9° The
Court focused instead upon the concept of mental awareness. The qualified
privilege which a publisher enjoys may be lost when the publisher is know-
thgly indifferent to his own doubts. According to the Court in St. Amant,
"There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." 9' t
80. Justice Black's dissent makes the point forcefully:
If this precedent is followed, it means that we must in all libel cases hereafter weigh
the facts and hold that all papers and magazines guilty of gross writing or reporting
are constitutionally liable, while they are not if the quality of the reporting is ap-
proved by a majority of us.
Id at 171.
81. Note, Times Marches On. The Courts' Continuing Expanson ofhe Applcation ofthe "Actual
Malice" Standard, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 153, 160 (1971).
82. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
83. Id at 728.
84. Id at 733.
85. Id at 730.
86. Id at 733.
87. Id Justice White's majority opinion justifies a conclusion of no awareness of probable
falsity by reference to facts which would justify a reasonably prudent man in believing his
publication to be true, e.g. St. Amant had met his source nine months before in connection with
union activities; the information supplied was under oath; and the informant agreed to stand
behind his story at personal risk to himself. Id
88. The Court rejected inferences of recklessness as "colorless." Id at 733.
89. Id. at 731.
90. Id at 731-32.
91. Id at 731.
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Despite the importance such a subjective test places upon a defendant's
own testimony that he had no serious doubts, the St. Amant opinion offered
circumstantial proof alternatives.9 2 Specific examples were afforded as to
what acts or omissions would support a finding that the defendant did, in
fact, publish in bad faith. 93 Defendant's claims of good faith (no serious
doubts as to truth) would not likely prove to be persuasive9 4 where the evi-
dence disclosed: 1) a story fabricated or imagined; 2) a story based wholly
on anonymous and unverified sources; 3) obvious reasons to doubt the truth-
fulness of an informant or his accuracy; or 4) a story, "so inherently improb-
able that only a reckless man would put [it] in circulation. '9 5 These
examples were offered to prove objective evidence of a subjectively malicious
state of mind.9 6 Stated differently, pre-publication conduct could be cir-
cumstantial evidence through which to judge the credibility of the defend-
ant's claim that he had not abused his qualified privilege.
While the St. Amant decision was intended to afford "meaningful gui-
dance" in defining reckless disregard, its logical inconsistencies, born of Garri-
son, made that result impossible. First among the contradictions is the
unexplained adoption of the serious doubt test. Since the word "probable"
is omitted from the serious doubt formulation, it might be concluded that
doubts as to verity which did not reach fifty percent 97 were being included
as indicative of recklessness. Yet, this conclusion proves unwarranted be-
cause the Court concluded that the evidence offered did not prove that St.
Amant was aware of probable falsity.98 Thus, although the words used in
the doubt test appear less exacting, their meaning is the same: either doubts
as to truth or awareness of falsity must subjectively rise to the level of a
"probability" before liability is possible.
While Justice White speaks of "reckless conduct" in St. Amant, 99 the
harbinger of liability is a mental conclusion as to truth or falsity. At the
same time, prepublication conduct is probative in order to determine if the
testimony as to mental conclusion is true. The finder of fact does not decide
if conduct is indicative of an abuse of the first amendment's qualified privi-
lege; instead, he decides if the conclusion made after the acts or omissions
occurred is truthfully reported. The decision affords no explanation regard-
ing why there was no decision that the publication conduct was or was not
reckless.
Under the reasoning of St. Amant, the trier of fact may hear evidence of
examples of inappropriate conduct, but those examples may not be used to
92. Id at 732. ("The defendant ... cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable
verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of
fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith.").
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id The "inherently improbable" criterion has been referred to as a catch-all category.
See, Note, A Clariftation ofthe Actual Malice Test, 47 N.C. L. REV. 471, 475 (1969).
96. See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 238 (1976).
97. See supra note 42.
98. 390 U.S. at 732.
99. Id. at 731.
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determine that the defamer should have had serious doubts. Such a conclu-
sion would require a standard of comparison to the reasonably prudent
man.1° ° The evidentiary inferences that arise must only be used to test the
defendant's credibility.' 0 ' Despite its ban on judgments based on reasona-
bleness, the St. Amant opinion lists the reasons why St. Amant's publication
was made with a reasonably justified belief in its accuracy, thereby negating
any need for further investigation.
10 2
The post-St. Amant evolution of reckless disregard was not indicative of
an area of settled principles. Determining the credibility of a claimed
mental state proved to be an elusive proposition,103 which was further com-
pounded when the standard was not restricted to defamation occurring in
the public or governmental area.l°4 In addition, the concept of judgment
based upon an objective standard of care had to be rejected again and
again. 105
The mental element proved particularly difficult when the issue became
the reporting of what someone else said, rather than what he did. 10 6 If lan-
guage was left out or added to, did this reveal, in itself, serious doubt as to
the truth of the published story? The Court's answer was a qualified no. If
the defendant honestly believed that his editing caused the true meaning of
the speaker's remarks to be revealed, serious doubts, and therefore reckless
disregard, did not exist. 107 If the editing was done with the intent to distort
and falsify, the reporter's claim of good faith could not stand.'10  The Court
did acknowledge, however, that the esoteric nuances of these mental deci-
sions were not always easy to ascertain.109
It is reasonable to suspect that the near or actual impossibility of divin-
ing the motivation behind such esoteric conclusions contributed to a refusal
of a majority of the Court to extend the New York Times rule to all defama-
tion actions involving public issues. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc. ," 1o came closest to acknowledging this difficulty when he
charged the Brennan plurality opinion with having an "inadequate appreci-
ation of the limitations imposed by the legal process in accomodating the
tension between state libel laws and the federal constitutional protection
given to freedom of speech and press.""'
100. Again, the Court was under the belief that the reasonable man only determines what is
ordinary care under the circumstances. See supra note 29.
101. 390 U.S. at 732.
102. Id at 733.
103. See Greenbelt Coop. Publication Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 n.3 (1970).
104. The Curtis Publishing plurality distinction for non-governmental defamation did not
survive as a distinct entity but was merged into the mutated New York Times standard. See
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971).
105. Id at 276.
106. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
107. Id at 289.
108. Id at 292. While thterpretation was proper, deliberate distortion with false intent was
improper. The rationale is that one can be aware of the probability of falsity in the latter
instance.
109. Monitor Patriot, Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. at 276.




In Herbert v. Lando,'1 2 the Court was confronted with one of the neces-
sary consequences of having directed the ultimate issue of reckless disregard
to the mental attitude of the defamer: discovery of the defendant's thoughts
and reasoning process would be a prime concern of plaintiffs seeking to
prove awareness of probable falsity by direct evidence. During the course of
sanctioning such inquiries,' 1 3 the Court had occasion to review the require-
ment that a finding of reckless disregard for truth or falsity hinges upon a
determination as to the defendant's state of mind.' 
1 4
Justice White's majority opinion in Herbert summarized the New York
Times rule as an attempt to discourage "erroneous information known to be
false or probably false." 115 No reason is given as to why the subjective deci-
sional level is placed at a probability. 1 6 Also ignored by the "reason to
suspect" alteration is its objective implications. Deciding whether someone
was consciously aware of a probability implies a much more focused inquiry
on what the defamer was thinking than does the new wording "reason to
suspect." Determining what a defamer had reason to suspect rests much
more heavily on what information was available and what a person of nor-
mal intelligence and experience would suspect based on that information.
C. The Limited Alternative- Outrageous Publications
While the Curtis Publishing plurality standard of care did not survive,'
17
its finding of liability as a reaction to slipshod journalism did. Typical of
such cases is Goldwater v. Ginzburg. " 83 The defendants maintained their good
faith in publishing a "psychological" analysis of presidential candidate
Barry Goldwater. 19 Although there was evidence that the publishers may
have known their publication contained fabrications, 20 the appellate opin-
ion focused upon investigative omissions and what they signified.'
2'
Charges of mental illness were deemed "inherently improbable" based upon
the investigative material available.' 22 Consequently, a thorough investiga-
112. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
113. The Court stated:
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that, although proof of the necessary
state of mind could be in the form of objective circumstances from which the ultimate
fact could be inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defendants whether
they knew or had reason to know or suspect that their damaging publication was in
error.
Id at 160.
114. Id at 158-62.
115. Id at 172.
116. Justice White's statement of "probably false" appears inconsistent with his earlier ref-
erence to culpability when the defamer "had reason.., to suspect. . . error." Id at 160. The
only way to rationalize this inconsistency is to assume that the doubt which gives rise to the
suspicion must be one that rises to at least the level of more likely than not. Justice White later
refers to the degree of awareness as "strongly suspected." Id at 172.
117. Monitor Patriot, Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. at 271.
118. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969).
119. Id at 331.
120. Id at 332.
121. Id at 329, 334.
122. Id at 337 (publication upon the facts known and knowable by a "reasonable" investi-
gation were deemed to create an inference of a preconceived plan to publish without regard to
truth or falsity).
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tion to serve as a reasonable check upon the truth was required.1 23
Following the description of the defendant's careless investigation, the
Second Circuit opinion recognized that the separate items of carelessness,
while alone indicative only of negligence, cumulatively presented an issue of
recklessness.124 The message was that selective reporting (whatever the sub-
jective and honestly-held belief of the defendant) designed to lend credence
to a predetermined result is determinable objectively as reckless disregard. 125
On this basis, and without regard to proof of actual awareness of probable
falsity, the judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.'
26
II. THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE DEFINITION
A. Identication of the Problem
The continuing need for factual reviews of libel judgments was a symp-
tom that easily applied principles had not evolved out of New York Times and
its progeny. In the first seven years after the decision, the Court attempted
to strike an appropriate balance on a case by case basis' 27 no less than six-
teen times. The subsequent decline in review of cases involving claims of
reckless disregard appears to be due more to the denials of certiorari 28 than
to any decline in the volume of cases. As will be discussed, these cases ex-
hibit Justice Stewart's unstated misapprehensions 29 as to what constitutes
valid evidence of reckless disregard.
Perhaps no single case better exemplifies the difficulty of attempting to
apply the Garrison-St. Amant awareness-in-fact concept as does Alioto v. Cowles
Communications, Inc. 130 Spanning almost eleven years, four trials, two appel-
late decisions, and two denials of certiorari, it is a prime example of the
problem of attempting to prove a subjective mental state through objective
123. Id at 339.
124. The full statement reads:
Times does not hold that evidence of negligence is inadmissible; it only holds that
evidence which merely establishes negligence in failing to discover misstatements,
without more, is constitutionally insufficient to support the finding of recklessness re-
quired to establish actual malice from proof of less than prudent conduct. Reckless-
ness is, after all, only negligence raised to a higher power. To hold otherwise would
require that plaintiff prove the ultimate fact of recklessness without being able to ad-
duce proof of the underlying facts from which a jury could infer recklessness. It would
limit successful suits to those cases in which there is direct proof by a party's admission
of ultimate fact, certainly a situation not intended by the Supreme Court.
Id at 343.
125. See also Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star, 337 F. Supp. 421, 424 n.9 (D.D.C.
1972).
126. 414 F.2d at 339. The charge to the jury predicated a finding of reckless disregard upon
proof of heedless indifference to truth or falsity. Goldwater has been referred to as modifying the
Times test to include recovery based not upon state of mind, but upon the "outrageousness" of
the defendant's conduct. See Note, T; New York Times Rule.- An Analysis ofIts Appliation, 55
MNN. L. REv. 299, 317 (1970). Rather than a modification, Goldwater may have been a return
to the tort concept inherent in recklessness and recognized in New York Times. See supra note 29.
127. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 903 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from a denial of certiorari).
128. During the 1980-1981 term, the Court declined to accept review of any of the twenty
libel cases for which petitions for certiorari were filed. 7 Med. L. Rptr., Decisions (BNA) (1981).
129. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 199.
130. 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afd 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1980).
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evidence. The lawsuit was the result of a Look Magazi'ne article which as-
serted that San Francisco's mayor, Joseph Alioto, had extensive financial
dealings with organized crime figures.' 3 ' The hearsay report of such deal-
ings was rendered by a source of questionable background' 32 and based
upon the purported statements of a person who was never interviewed. At-
tempts to confirm Alioto's presence at a critical meeting were fruitless, al-
though at least one of the alleged participants was interviewed but not asked
about the meeting.' 33 Alioto admitted knowing several of the alleged partici-
pants but was never asked if a meeting occurred.' 34 The defendants main-
tained throughout that they honestly believed their informant's story and
had no serious doubt as to its truth at the time of publication.
135
The first Ahoto trial ended in a hung jury. The second trial also resulted
in a hung jury, although the jury did agree that the reported meeting to
arrange underworld financing was defamatory and false. 136 After the sec-
ond trial, the trial judge acknowledged that the jury indecision was caused
by an inability to agree upon whether reckless disregard of the truth had
been proven.13 7 The trial court's subsequent granting of judgment notwith-
standing the verdict for the defendant was reversed by the Ninth Circuit
after an extensive factual review and a finding that the evidence could per-
mit a finding of reckless disregard.' 38 After yet a third trial and another
hung jury, both sides waived a fourth jury. 139 Finally, after four trials, judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff,140 the judgment was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit and, certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.
It is most probable that the second and third juries could not agree
upon whether the defendants had serious doubts in fact. The evidence did
offer sufficient support of the defendant's claims of an honestly-held belief in
the truth of what was printed so as to rule out fabrication.' 4 ' It is not diffi-
cult to conceive of the jurors being convinced that any reasonable man
would have had serious doubts, but not being able to conclude that these
particular defendants had serious doubts. Under these conflicting infer-
131. 623 F.2d at 617.
132. The reports of improper activities were repeated statements of another individual.
Judge Schwarzer noted that almost nothing was known about the background of the informant,
while the person whose alleged statements were repeated, was known as a "notorious hoodlum"
and "liar." 430 F. Supp. at 1370.
133. Id at 1371.
134. Id
135. Id. at 1370. The defendants obtained information from law enforcement authorities
that a series of loans had been made by a bank where the plaintiff served as chairman of the
board. Id at 1366. These loans had been made to the underworld figure whose statements
about the meetings were subsequently repeated. Id at 1366-67. This fact and others obtained
by the reporters gave at least a strong circumstantial rationale for their belief that they were
reporting what had in fact occurred. The trial court found, however, that "[a] leap from this
information to the charge of a nighttime cabal with major hoodlums to provide the financial
where-withal for underworld business activities is too great to be performed without obvious
reasons for doubt." Id at 1370-71.
136. The case history is set out in 623 F.2d at 617-18.
137. 519 F.2d at 779-80.
138. Id. at 781.
139. 430 F. Supp. at 1365.
140. General damages were awarded in the amount of $350,000. Id. at 1372.
141. Id at 1365.
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ences, and the natural desire not to exculpate those who cause damage to
reputation, a hung jury was not a surprising result.
The opinion written after the fourth trial, while couched in the lan-
guage of determining a subjective state of mind, 142 phrases the ultimate
finding of reckless disregard in objective terms: "[the author's] belief could
not have been held in good faith."' 14 3 This conclusion illustrates the consis-
tent difficulty that has pervaded the efforts of the lower courts to deal with
the subjective state of mind concept. This finding in Alioto is based upon
what could or should have been concluded, and not upon what was believed.
For purposes of analysis, the cases most illustrative of this contradiction and
misapplication are best reviewed under the St. Amant objective evidentiary
examples.
1. Fabrication or Fictionalization
Proof that a defendant made up a defamatory and false statement does
not, in and of itself, demonstrate reckless disregard. 144 It must also be
demonstrated that the fabricated statement had no reasonably supportive
4 5
factual background. A defendant may not be liable if he can demonstrate
that, although he did not have information that a particular event occurred,
he did not have serious doubts that it did occur, based on his state of knowl-
edge as to other events and causes of conduct preceeding his speculative
account. 146
An example of these arguments in conflict is afforded by Varnish v. Best
Medium Publishing Co. 147 The defendant had written a story giving reasons
for the suicide of the plaintiff's wife. His conclusions regarding her mental
outlook were not supported by any factual evidence.' 48 On the other hand,
the information obtained from the defendant's investigation could have been
interpreted (without intent of falsity) to suggest a view not consistent with an
awareness of falsity.149 Apparently ignoring these issues, the Second Circuit
found the defendant's fabrication sufficient to justify a jury finding of reck-
lessness because the author's "presumption" had no basis in fact.
150
142. Id at 1371.
143. Id The essence of such a finding is that given the existing state of knowledge, no rea-
sonable person would not have had serious doubts as to the truth. The first court of appeals
opinion used much the same language: "the authors must have had doubts about the veracity
of [the informant]." 519 F.2d at 780.
144. Beckley Newspaper Inc. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
145. Guam Fed. of Teachers Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir. 1974).
146. See Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). ("To establish
recklessness, it is not sufficient to show that the reporting in question was speculative or even
sloppy."). Bui see Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976) (fabricating facts
upon speculation requires a finding of serious doubt).
147. 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968).
148. Id at 612.
149. See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967) and Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279, 283 (1971).
150. The decisive factor in the court's decision is an indifference to truth resulting in a
finding of recklessness. The state of mind of the defendant played little or no part in that
determination. 405 F.2d at 612-13. For a similar reasoning process, see Montandon v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 949, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 193 (1975).
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2. Obvious Reasons to Doubt the Informant or the Inherently
Improbable Tale
The threshold question when referring to "obvious reasons to doubt or
inherent improbability" is: obvious or improbable to whom? Under the Gar-
rzson-St. Amant definition, one would expect the only inquiry to be whether
the defendant found the informant or the story to be of doubtful validity.
Whether the story should have been improbable to him would seem to be
irrelevent. 15 ' But is it really possible to separate considerations of what is
believed from what is believable? Is the scienter requirement applied when
the plaintiff demonstrates by circumstantial evidence that the informant or
his story yielded objective reasons to suspect untruth? The answer to these
questions is often inseparable from the question of the appropriateness of the
investigation conducted in the face of doubtful informants or stories. Ac-
cordingly, both topics must receive attention when examining the represen-
tative decisions.
In Airie Foundation, Inc. v. Evenng Star Newspaper Co. ,152 the defendant
ran a story involving charges of CIA involvement in the plaintiff's activi-
ties.' 53 After the initial publication of the charges, the defendant received
CIA denials which left it questioning the truthfulness of its printed story.
154
Nevertheless, follow-up stories failed to state specifically that the CIA had
denied the truthfulness of the story. 15 5 The defendant's attempt to justify its
equivocal statements as "reasonable" was summarily rejected by the court:
"Viewed objectively this treatment portrayed the existing situation in an ex-
tremely misleading fashion."
156
The basis for the Air/'e court's finding of reckless disregard is the evi-
dence of "selective reporting"1
57 designed to reach a preconceived result.1
58
This conclusion suggests that an investigation must have as its goal the reso-
lution of the doubts that prompted it, and not simply gaining support for the
improbable or questionable story. If the story, and not truth, is the goal, the
defendant may be found to be reckless. When passing upon the selective
reporting claims, the jury was instructed in Airlie that it could decide when
and, by implication, what amount of investigation was justified under the
151. Although this conclusion flows logically from the "in fact" language of St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), that same opinion refers to a "reckless man" as putting
inherently improbable stories into circulation. Id at 732. The use of the unreasonably impru-
dent man as an objective standard is thereby sanctioned in direct contradiction to the earlier
"in fact" subjective standard.
152. 337 F. Supp. 421 (D.D.C. 1972).
153. The essence of the claims made was that plaintiff's activities were financed by the
Central Intelligence Agency and consequently the goals served were not those claimed by plain-
tiffs but those of the CIA. Id at 423.
154. Id at 425 n.10.
155. Id at 426.
156. Id
157. Id at 429.
158. Id In order to bolster its informant's story, the defendant "omitted matters known to it
which would have detracted from the charge or at least presented it in a more balanced fashion,
that it added details, some of which it knew to be false, which tended to lend credence to the
charge ....
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circumstances.' 5 9 In essence, the jury was allowed to pass objective judg-
ment upon what should have been done to investigate the story where there
were obvious reasons to doubt accuracy. If the investigation fell short of
what was reasonable, the defendant was reckless.
Caught in a quandry, some courts have tried to decide both objectively
and subjectively. In Brewer v. Memphis Publshing Co. ,160 after three jury trials
all resulting in verdicts for the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
the evidence incapable of establishing reckless disregard of truth or falsity. 1
6 1
The information giving rise to the allegedly libelous story was received from
an informant who had heard the story from another.162 The subsequent
headlines and the published story were admitted surmises based upon inves-
tigation of the plaintiff's history and the hearsay information. ' 63 The inves-
tigation supplied no direct factual confirmation for the defamatory items in
the story.164 The Brewer factual analysis devoted itself to evaluating the rea-
sonableness of the reporter's investigatory conclusions. Having done so, the
appellate court decided that the defendants neither "entertained serious
doubt, [nor] reasonably should have, about the story's accuracy."
' 6 5
These illustrative cases demonstrate the difficulty in logical and eviden-
tiary application of the subjective state of mind requirement of Garrison-St.
Amant. The cases also exhibit an inconsistency of result and a lack of pre-
dictability.' 66 Such results are indicative of judgmental standards which do
159. 337 F. Supp. at 429.
160. 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. Id at 1259.
162. Nothing was known about the underlying informant's reputation, although the Fifth
Circuit appears to determine that there is a presumption of truthfulness when the underlying
informant is a "friend" of the direct informant and no affirmative reason for disbelief exists. Id
at 1258. The underlying informant was apparently never interviewed. Id
163. Id at 1258-59.
164. Id
165. Id at 1259. The reference to the objective "or should have" is not explained explicitly.
Some insight into the reasoning process is found in the dismissal of the claim that reliance upon
an unknown source of information was reckless. This conclusion is justified by a comparative
reference (Id at 1259): "We certainly ought not to require of the press the degree of reliability
that we must require of the police when several informer links provide them with information
on which they seek a search warrant." A lesser standard of certainty as to truth, below
probability, is thereby suggested.
166. Outcome determination appears to be decided by the emphasis that a court places on
the "in fact" requirement as opposed to ignoring it in the face of sloppy reporting which may be
demonstrated objectively. Examples of cases adhering to the subjective requirement are: Van-
denburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant's choice of whom to
believe from sources he believed reliable, despite conflicting information from other sources, did
not create jury issue over high degree of awareness); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., Inc., 429
F. Supp. 167, 179 (D.D.C. 1977) (defendant's "attitude" of belief in truth of one source fur-
nished adequate basis for no question of serious doubt); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565,
572-73 (5th Cir. 1969) (the jury may not infer inherent improbability where the defendant was
not aware of "contra-indication" as to conclusions which were published); Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161, 173 (1975) (although the information
available would have seemed inherently improbable if viewed objectively, there can be no lia-
bility because the defendant did not so view the information); and Buckley v. Painesville Tele-
graph & Lake Geauga Printing Co., 68 Ohio St. 2d 45, 50, 428 N.E.2d 405 (1981) (defendant's
claims of good faith warranted summary judgment despite 169 deposition answers indicating
lack of knowledge as to reliability of sources, manner of investigation, and verification).
Cases substantially ignoring the subjective awareness formula are: Church of Scientology
of Cal. v. Dell Publishing Co., 362 F. Supp. 767, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (once sources are ques-
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not pass the crucible test of practical evidentiary situations.
III. ADOPTING AN OBJECTIVE TEST FOR RECKLESS DISREGARD
A. The Unreasonably Imprudent Man.: An Appropriate Standard for Judging
Reckless Disregard
The United States Supreme Court consistently has refused to permit a
judgment of libel regarding a publication decision based upon what a rea-
sonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circum-
stances. 16 7 A defamer's attitude toward truth or falsity may not be decided
by what the jury believes was a proper, reasonable response to the informa-
tion available. Instead, the decision is an affirmative or negative response to
the defamer's testimony that he had no serious doubts as to the truth or that
he had no reason to suspect probable falsity. Since the New York Times stan-
dard is founded upon an attitude of recklessness toward truth or falsity, as
opposed to the lower fault concept of negligence, 168 the Goldwater court has
deemed these references to what a reasonably prudent publisher would, or
should, have done if acting under the proper attitude, to be inappropri-
ate.169 This prohibition appears to be ill-founded.
Negligence and recklessness are nothing more than successive degrees of
cognitive fault. Negligence is conduct which falls below the ordinary care
that should be exercised by a reasonably prudent man under the same or
similar circumstances. Because it falls below the level of ordinary care, it
creates a risk of harm to others that is considered to be unreasonable and
thus culpable. Recklessness includes negligence but represents a higher de-
gree of actual or imputed acceptance of unreasonable risk.170 As the risk of
harm rises, the social utility of the conduct decreases. 1' Because this in-
creasing disproportion is, or should become known, and because acts in spite
of it are the assumption of an unreasonable risk, the decision to take the risk
is termed "indifference." 172 The vantage point for assessing reckless disre-
gard of the risk disproportion therefore must be objective. In the event that
tioned, good faith to be measured by the reasonableness of investigation conducted); Akins v.
Altus Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Okla. 1977) (defendant's conduct is determinative
of whether heedless indifference to truth or falsity existed); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 IlI.
App. 3d 300, 337 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1975) (those who publish an expos6 book must thoroughly
investigate allegations before publication); and DeLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d
669, 671, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (1980) (the conduct and underlying circumstances revealed by
investigation may negate good faith claims).
167. 379 U.S. at 79.
168. Id.
169. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 500, comment a (1965) ("To be reckless it must be unreasonable; but to be reckless,
it must be something more than negligent. It must not only be unreasonable, but it must in-
volve a risk of harm to others substantially in excess of that necessary to make the conduct
negligent.").
170. Seesupra note 165.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, comment a (1965). ("So too, there may be
occasions in which action which would ordinarily involve so high a degree of danger as to be
reckless may be better than no action at all, and therefore both reasonable and permissible.").
172. The term was used in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 1068 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1936).
The language of this section may have been consulted for the New York Tmes' actual malice
rule. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 167 n.1
7
(1979). Section 1068 stated that one is liable
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the focus of inquiry is permitted to be upon the defendant's appreciation of
the risk disproportion only, society loses its ability to place a value judgment
upon the conduct of one of its members. Subjective risk appreciation in-
quiry results in culpability only when the jury decides against the credibility
of a defendant. Under such limits, no value judgment is made upon the
state of knowledge of a defamer and his conduct based upon that knowledge.
In the process, the basic fault concept of recklessness is lost.
The reckless disregard portion of the rule' 73 was the result of a hybrid
formed from the common law's qualified privilege regarding comments con-
cerning public officials and the constitutional requirements of free expres-
sion. 1 74 The "like rule," 1 75 from which the qualified privilege was drawn,
was set forth in the Kansas Supreme Court decision in Coleman v. MacLen-
nan. 176 That decision placed upon a defamation defendant the burden of
proving his right to a qualified privilege.' 77 The burden would be carried
only when it was demonstrated that: 1) the publication was made to serve a
public concern or need; 178 and 2) that the defendant had formed an honest
belief (based upon all reasonable effort) as to the truth of what was pub-
lished.' 79 As a result of this proof burden, the objective review function of
the jury, under claims of the public official privilege, had become so ac-
cepted that the Restatement of Torts i80 declared that one who claimed the
qualified privilege, without "reasonable grounds for so believing," was not
entitled to its protection even if he honestly and in fact believed the publica-
tion to be true. There was no premium on unsupported defamatory
statements.
New York Times did not change substantially the public official qualified
privilege. Because of first amendment imperatives, the defendant could
have apresumption of a reasonable and good-faith-truth basis for publication,
simply by claiming it.' 8 ' Liability for abuse of the qualified privilege exists
only through proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether
the story was false or not. 182 Relevant evidence to prove such abuse had to
for punitive damages for libel when: "the defamatory matter was published with knowledge of
its falsity or if it was published in reckless indifference to its truth or falsity."
173. The adoption of the proof standard also encompassed a change in the burden of proof.
See tina note 177.
174. New York Ti~nes, 376 U.S. at 271. "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amend-
ment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth . . .
especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker."
175. Id at 280.
176. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
177. The Kansas Supreme Court approved a jury charge explaining the defendant's burden
when asserting an "honest belief in the truth": "If you believe then from the evidence.., that
the defendant made all reasonable effort to ascertain the facts before publishing the same, and
that the whole thing was done in good faith. . . your verdict must be for the defendant.
98 P. at 282.
178. Id at 293.
179. Id at 282.
180. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 601 (1938). This rule still applies to private libel actions,
at least for compensatory damage. See, e.g., O'Berman v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d
1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1972), and Brown v. Skaggs-Albertson's Properties, Inc., 563 F.2d 983,
986-87 (10th Cir. 1977).
181. 376 U.S. at 279.
182. Id
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
be directed to a showing of an unreasonable or imprudent assumption of
truth based upon the known and properly knowable facts.'
8 3
This objective formula of abuse determination was not meant to be
modified by the Court's reference to the defendant's "state of mind."'184 In
the context of its use, the term applied to the mere existence of information
contra to what was published as not determining an unreasonable belief in
the truth of what was published.' 85 It should be the jury that determines
what extent of belief confirmation was required. The subsequent Garrison
determination that "state of mind" meant conscious awareness of probable
falsity substantially alters Nw York Times by permitting a defamer to have
no concern for truth or to avoid evaluation of the truth conclusion if made.
If he publishes without thought to truthfulness, he does not have a state of
mind toward truth and, indeed, is not required to have one. It is only if the
defamer actually thinks about truth and finds the statement to be probably
false that a jury is permitted to reach a verdict.
The conjunction of the presumption of a reasonable basis for believing
the publication to be accurate, and the necessity that recklessness be proven
only by evidence of the defendant's negative conclusion as to truth seemingly
provided for exclusion of the reasonably prudent man standard. Neverthe-
less, it is questionable if this really occurs when the attempts to define state of
mind are made, as they almost always are,' 86 by circumstantial evidence.
When these avenues of proving reckless disregard are examined, they reveal
a contradictory result: they permit a finding of bad faith only by an im-
puted finding of unreasonable conduct. For example, if the plaintiff's evi-
dence reveals that the primary source for a story had prior convictions for
perjury and his story was deemed by knowledgeable sources to be questiona-
ble, what has been proven regarding the defamer's state of mind with regard
to such a knowledge status? Two inferences have been created: 1) that no
reasonably prudent person would have published without having serious
doubts as to the story's truthfulness; and/or 2) that the defendant must have
had serious doubts as to the truth. The conclusions embodied in both infer-
ences are irrelevant if the only evidentiary goal is to demonstrate a subjective
state of mind. Obviously, these circumstantially founded conclusions about
what should have been believed do not tell us if the defamer actually
thought a statement to be free of serious doubts as to its truthfulness. Yet,
that is what is required of the fact finder in passing upon the "in fact" credi-
bility issue.
It simply does not follow that the mental decision process, gathering
together impressions, historical analysis, and experience factors can be ex-
posed or defined by circumstantial evidence. This is because the aim of such
evidence is not to demonstrate a mental state, but to prove a state of knowl-
edge that was available to the defendant for him to accept, reject, miscon-
183. The New York Times plaintiffs were not given a second trial because the evidence could
not justify an interference of unreasonable imprudence. Id at 286-88.
184. Id at 287.
185. Id.
186. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 729.
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strue, ignore, or develop further by investigation. Consequently, a subjective
state of mind, except when directly provable by admissions against interest,
is a wholly inappropriate standard to the objective tort of recklessness.1
8 7
The reasons that determine when one believes facts to be true and free
from serious doubt are many and complex. They depend not only upon the
information available, but upon impressions obtained when that informa-
tion was received and upon prior life experience as it is used to evaluate
information. By requiring a jury to determine the credibility of a defend-
ant's claim that he did not have serious doubt as to the truth, we counte-
nance a result which may be contrary to fact. Despite a completely adverse
state of knowledge, the defamer, on objectively unreasonable grounds, may
have honestly believed' 8 8 he had no serious doubts as to truth. It is not
surprising that a jury would reach a verdict that is at variance with such
honestly-held beliefs based upon what it will accept as believable and as
manifesting heedless indifference to the consequences of publication.' 8 9
When this occurs, the verdicts are not based upon credibility; instead, they
are based upon a value judgment as to what a reasonably prudent man
should, or should not, have published, based on the information available.
Faced with an impending jury charge that before reckless disregard
may be found, the jury must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
defendant infact had serious doubts as to the truth, counsel for the plaintiff
must make a logically impossible closing argument. He must argue that the
investigatory facts, when objectively analyzed, yield the inference that the
reporter knew he was publishing a falsehood and that his denials at trial are
mere falsehoods to avoid culpability. Logically, however, the inferences
from the objective evidence the plaintiff has offered prove nothing as to the
defendant's pre-publication mental state. They prove only what should
have been known to a prudent reporter. Consequently, the defense's closing
argument will make the point that the failure to check further or await sup-
porting documents, while in retrospect perhaps not diligent, does not in any
way prove that his client did not believe his sources and his story. The de-
fendant may further argue that demonstrating that a story does not sound
believable to a fair-minded person or that a source should not be believed by
the jury in retrospect, does not demonstrate that the defendant was reckless
in believing it. Counsel for defendant would finish by pointing out that his
client is not to be judged by what he should have believed but by what he
did believe, regardless of whether a juror would have believed the story true.
Thus, a struggle over what was the reporter's state of mind is not consistent
with the tortious concept of recklessness. This is true because the concept of
recklessness is not reconcilable with a subjective determination. To ignore
this problem and confine the inquiry to "in fact" proof of knowledge, is to
involve the parties in an evidential quandry. Juries should not be forced to
continue to struggle with these logical contradictions. 190
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
188. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286-87.
189. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
190. Id. at 108. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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B. What Must Be Done to Correct the Problem-Conclusion
The subjective test has misdirected the evolution of the case-by-case de-
fining process through insistence upon defining the defendant's state of
mind. Despite this restrictive standard, plaintiffs occasionally prevail, if only
in the most flagrant' 9 1 instances of libelous endeavor. Those flagrant cases
reveal a judicial effort to obviate the need for adherence to the state of mind
test by substituting accepted objective tests for recklessness.' 9 2 The common
thread of these decisions is to allow culpability for those who publish with
reason to know the unreasonable risk of falsity that is being incurred.
In the forefront of these cases is Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. 193
The requirement of "in fact" recognition of serious doubt was rejected by
the Colorado Supreme Court: t 94 "whether or not a statement is true does
not mean that there must be a finding that the person making the statement
had serious doubts as to the truth thereof." In place of the subjective
probability requirement, Walker adopted a state of knowledge and conduct
inquiry. Reckless disregard could be found if the evidence demonstrated
"indifference to the consequences,"' 19 5 when a justified basis for believing the
article true did not exist.'96 The test is patently objective and the premium
on ignorance is removed.
Approval of such a change in the law should not have to be inferred
from denials of certiorari. The requirement of proving reckless disregard
through efforts aimed at showing an elusive mental state should be abol-
ished.197 An objective test based upon state of knowledge should be substi-
191. Id
192. See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
193. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
194. 188 Colo. at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
195. Id
196. The Colorado Supreme Court based its adoption of this objective standard upon the
United States Supreme Court's approval of the "indifference to consequences" jury charge in
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 188 Colo. at 99, 538 P.2d at 457. While
Walker was a post-Gertz private-individual action, the fault standard applied was recklessness as
defined by Colorado tort law. Id See also Dixson v. Newsweek, 562 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir.
1977), and its conclusion that Cantrell was cited in Walker, "to support the conclusion that a less
demanding standard than that required by St. Amant was constitutionally permissible." Dixson
defines reckless disregard under Colorado law as being, "an act destitute of heed or concern for
consequences, especially foolishly heedless of danger; headlong, rash, without thought or care of
consequences." Id at 629. See also Anderson and Pagliuca, The Colorado Supreme Court's Develop-
ing Defamation Guidelines.- Colorado Enters the Quagmire, 59 DEN. L.J. 627, 630-32 (1982).
Walker was later cited as controlling in a public figure objective determination decision,
Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981). The Colorado
Supreme Court has since limited Walker's recklessness objective test to cases involving private
individual plaintiffs where, "matters of public or general concern" are not involved. Ste Diversi-
fied Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1109-10 (1982). The Walker deci-
sion had accepted the Gertz invitation to the states to define a fault standard by adopting the
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), plurality opinion as to applying the ac-
tual malice standard to matters of public interest, although that. choice, as a constitutional
criteria, was rejected by the Court in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. This line of Colorado cases well
illustrates the "quagmire" of attempting to decide upon motivation by circumstantial evidence
of a mental state at a particular point in time.
197. An objective determination of an unreasonable or imprudent risk assumption, reaching
the level of reckless disregard, would encompass those situations where one was not aware of
falsity by more than fifty percent.
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tuted as the benchmark. Juries, and not courts, would then again be
permitted to decide material issues of fact in the area of defamation.
The roadbed for such change has already been marked. The obscenity
cases' 98 demonstrated similar "intractible problems" 199 arising out of at-
tempts at defining standards of culpability on an ad hoc basis. Ultimately, it
was determined that what is or is not obscene is to be decided by a jury
based on an average person criterion, where the "rule of reason" is ap-
plied.2° ° Such a rule already applies to juries deciding compensatory defa-
mation claims by private individuals.20 1 There is no valid reason why the
reasonably prudent man should not be recognized as the determinant of the
conduct of those who falsely defame others through reckless disregard of
whether a defamatory falsehood is true or not.
198. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dal-
las, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
199. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
200. Id
201. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 329 (1974).
19831





In November of 1982 the Colorado Supreme Court decided United States
v. City and County of Denver,' a leading case in the area of federal reserved
water rights. The major issue addressed was the claim of the United States
for reserved water rights for national forests and national parks. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court, based on dictum from the United States Supreme
Court case of United States v. New Mexico,2 declared that when Congress en-
larged the purposes for which national forests are administered through pas-
sage of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 19603 (MUSYA), it did not
implicitly increase the amount of water reserved for national forests. 4 De-
spite this holding, the Colorado court allowed the United States to acquire
additional reserved water rights when lands originally reserved for national
forest purposes became part of Rocky Mountain National Park.
5
The court ruled Rocky Mountain National Park acquired reserved
water rights as of the date of creation of the national forest, but these re-
served rights were limited to purposes that were common to both forest and
park reservations, such as watershed and timber protection. Additional re-
served rights were granted for the enlarged purposes of the national park as
of the dates the land was reclassified.6 The court never explained how it
could deny increased rights for the enlarged purposes of the MUSYA, but
grant them when a reservation is reclassified. This ruling raises a question
concerning the treatment of reserved right claims for other reclassified fed-
eral reservations, and for reservations affected by a statutorily enlarged pur-
pose. As will be discussed, the courts have two alternatives: deny additional
reserved rights as was done when the purposes of the national forests were
enlarged by the MUSYA 7 or grant new rights for the enlarged purposes re-
sulting from reclassification as was done in Rocky Mountain National Park.8
This paper will explore the alternatives from a legal and practical stand-
* B.S., 1973, United States Air Force Academy; J.D., 1977, University of Denver. Attor-
ney at law, Hall & Evans, Denver, Colorado.
1. 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
2. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
3. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1976))
(statute applies to Forest Service lands and directs that the lands be managed so as to ensure
multiple use and sustained yield).
4. 656 P.2d at 24-27.
5. Id. at 30.
6. Id.
7. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v. City and County
of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
8. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d I (Colo. 1982).
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point, and offer a framework for resolving the conflict.9 Before proceeding,
however, it is necessary to have an understanding of the doctrines of prior
appropriation and federal reserved water rights.
II. BACKGROUND-FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS AND PRIOR
APPROPRIATION
In the arid western states, a system of laws developed for the regulation
of water usage that was completely alien to the Eastern and English systems
of riparian rights.10 Called the doctrine of prior appropriation, this system
provides that available water can be appropriated for a beneficial use by any
person."t Unlike the riparian system, an appropriator need not own land
bordering a stream, and the water right acquired is totally separate from the
land. The right to water from a particular stream is determined by priority
of appropriation. The holders of the senior, or oldest, water rights are enti-
tled to satisfy their water needs before the holders of junior rights.
1 2
A conflict that arose out of application of the prior appropriation doc-
trine concerned water rights for federal lands. One question concerned
whether the United States was bound by state prior appropriation laws af-
fecting federal lands, and if not, how was the United States to acquire water
for its federal reservations. A second question raised by the prior appropria-
tion doctrine concerned determination of the priority date for federal water
rights. The first case addressing these issues, Winters v. United States,
13 in-
volved a conflict over the use of water on Fort Belknap Indian Reservation
in Montana. Congress in 1888 reserved the Fort Belknap area as an Indian
reservation and simultaneously opened adjacent lands for homesteading.'
4
In 1898, after creation of the reservation, the Indians developed an agricul-
tural project requiring 5,000 inches of water per year from the adjacent Milk
River.1 5 Prior to 1898, but after 1888, the defendants homesteaded on land
upstream from the reservation and appropriated 5,000 inches of water from
the Milk River under the laws of Montana. 16 The United States, suing on
behalf of the Indians, sought to enjoin the defendants from diverting water
9. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text. A third alternative of backdating priori-
ties is also briefly discussed.
10. Riparian rights can generally be described as the right of a riparian landowner to a
reasonable quantity of water from the adjacent stream to supply his needs. In general, this right
is appurtenant and cannot be conveyed apart from the land. Se generally S. CIRCIACY-WAN-
TRUP, W. HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO, & A. STONE, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 16
(1967).
11. See generally R. BECK & E. CLYDE, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 405-14 (1972) (a
discussion of the prior appropriation doctrine).
12. Nine states apply a pure appropriation system. They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Other western states recognize
both riparian and appropriation rights, although appropriative rights apply predominately.
States that follow this mixed system are California, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW RESOURCE
USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11 (2d ed. 1974).
13. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
14. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
15. 207 U.S. at 566.
16. Id. at 568-69.
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from the river because it left the reservation with insufficient water for
irrigation.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in
favor of the United States and announced the proposition that the Indians
acquired the rights to adequate quantities of water for the reservation as of
the date when the lands were reserved. Although the 1888 reservation agree-
ment never specifically mentioned water, the Court found that Congress im-
plicitly reserved the water for reservation purposes. 17 Consequently, the
Indians' right to the water was held to be senior to any appropriation made
pursuant to state law after the reservation was created. '8
The Pelion Dam '9 case clarified the issue of federal reserved water rights
for land reserved2 ° from the public domain. The Supreme Court held that
the United States is not required to follow state laws regarding water appro-
priation for reserved lands.21 This holding refuted state claims that Con-
gress had provided for total state control over the use of water.
Arizona v. California ,22 the first case extending the application of the re-
served rights doctrine to federal reservations other than Indian reservations,
involved reserved right claims for national recreation areas and national for-
ests. 23 The Court extended the reasoning set forth in Winters and held that
federal reserved rights apply to non-Indian reservations. Because it would
have been meaningless for the United States to reserve land from the public
domain unless it also reserved sufficient water to accomplish the purposes for
which the land was reserved, the Court reasoned that the Government in-
tended to reserve water sufficient for future requirements. Consequently, re-
served rights were granted to the Government with priority dates as of the
creation of the reservations.
2 4
Congress, in 1952, passed the McCarren Amendment, 2 5 which granted
jurisdiction to state courts to adjudicate and administer water rights claimed
by the United States. Although arguably under the McCarren Amendment,
the United States relinquished its authority to claim reserved water rights,
the Supreme Court held the McCarren Amendment was a waiver of sover-
eign immunity only for purposes of state administration of federal reserved
rights. 26 Once the United States claims reserved rights, state courts can ad-
minister and quantify those rights. The state courts have no authority, how-
ever, over the creation of federal reserved rights.
17. Id. at 575-77.
18. Id. at 577.
19. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
20. Withdrawn land is land owned by the federal government that is withheld from pri-
vate appropriation and disposal under the public land laws. A withdrawal is usually accom-
plished by an executive order of the Secretary of the Interior, or an act of Congress. A
reservation is a withdrawal for a specific purpose such as an Indian reservation, national forest,
or national park. PuBuc LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND
42 n.1 (1970).
21. 349 U.S. at 444-45.
22. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
23. Id. at 601.
24. Id. at 595-601.
25. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
26. United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
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III. UNITED STATES V. NEW MEXICO
United States v. New Mexico 27 halted the Court's trend of enlarging the
scope of the federal reserved water rights doctrine. In New Mexico, the
United States asserted reserved water rights in the Rio Mimbres River for
the Gila National Forest. The forest was originally reserved in 1899 under
the Organic Administration Act of 1897.28 The MUSYA, which amended
the Organic Administration Act, legislatively expanded the uses for which
national forests are administered. 29 In its claim for reserved rights, the
United States argued that the MUSYA merely codified the purposes for
which national forests were already being administered. As a result, reserved
rights for Gila National Forest should be granted for the MUSYA purposes
with a priority date of 1899.30 The Court rejected this argument based on
the legislative history of the MUSYA.
The 1897 Organic Administration Act only authorized the creation of
national forests for two purposes-timber preservation and enhanced water
supply. The MUSYA expanded the purposes of national forests administra-
tion beyond these two,31 therefore there were no reserved water rights with
an 1899 priority for the MUSYA purposes. Furthermore, the Court stated
that the MUSYA purposes were secondary to the purposes for which the
national forests were created. Although the Court acknowledged that Con-
gress intended the national forests to be administered for broader purposes
after 1960, they could find no indication that Congress intended to reserve
additional water for secondary MUSYA purposes. 32 The Court refused to
grant reserved water rights with a 1960 priority date for these secondary
purposes. The 1960 priority date was rejected even though the United States
made no claims for the 1960 date.
33
IV. PROGENY OF THE NEW MEXICO CASE
Four cases since New Mexio have cited it for the proposition that there
are no federal reserved water rights for secondary purposes of federal reserva-
tions.34 In three of these cases, however, the citation was dictum to the deci-
sion. 35  In Colvlle Confederated Tribes v. Walton,36 the Ninth Circuit
27. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (1976). The Act states: "No national forest shall be established
except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and
necessities of citizens of the United States." Id. at § 475.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976). The MUSYA declared "[tlhat the national forests are estab-
lished and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife
and fish purposes. The purposes. . . of this title are declared to be supplemental to, but not in
derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests are established." Id.
30. 438 U.S. at 713 n.21.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 715.
33. Id. at 713.
34. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W.
5095 (1983); Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); United States v. City and
County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
35. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 51 U.S.L.W.
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determined the amount of reserved water available for the Colville Indian
Reservation in Washington. The court quoted the New Mexico Court's de-
nial of reserved rights for secondary purposes, but then proceeded to define
broadly the primary purposes of the Colville Reservation. Because histori-
cally the Indian tribes relied heavily on fishing and farming for their subsis-
tence, the Ninth Circuit found implicit in the reservation sufficient reserved
water to satisfy these historical uses. Secondary purposes were not men-
tioned further.
3 7
Sierra Club v. Watt38 also cited the New Mexico prohibition against grant-
ing reserved water rights for secondary purposes on federal reservations. The
issue was not, however, addressed fully. The land in question was in the
public domain and not reserved or withdrawn land; therefore, there were no
reserved water rights associated with those parcels.39 Another reference to
the secondary purpose prohibition occurred in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Ari-
zona.4° The primary issue in San Carlos was whether state or federal courts
had jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights. Aside from stating the
secondary purpose limitation, the doctrine was not mentioned.
V. UNITED STA TES V CITY AND CouNTY OF DENVER
The Colorado Supreme Court, in United States v. City and County of Den-
ver, 4 ' addressed the issue of federal reserved water rights for many federal
reservations within the state. One of the government's assertions in the case
was a claim of federal reserved water rights for the purposes of recreation
and wildlife conservation in seven national forests with a priority date of
1960 based on the MUSYA. 42 In rejecting the government's claim, the court
abided by the Supreme Court's statement in New Mexico that the MUSYA
was not a reservation of any additional water rights for national forests. 43
Although the statement may have been dictum,44 the Colorado court indi-
cated it was bound by the ruling.
45
The Denver ruling indicates that when the purposes of a federal reserva-
tion are changed to allow for broader administration, for example, outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish purposes, additional
federal reserved water rights will not be granted to accommodate the ex-
panded purposes. The difficulty with the Denver holding is that the opinion
contradicts itself; after ruling that no additional water rights will be granted
for national forests as a result of MUSYA, the court granted additional re-
served water rights for Rocky Mountain National Park based on the park's
5095 (1983); Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
36. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
37. Id. at 47-48.
38. 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
39. Id. at 206.
40. 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982), ree'd, 51 U.S.L.W. 5095 (1983).
41. 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
42. Id. at 24.
43. 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).
44. Id. at 718 n.l.
45. 656 P.2d at 24.
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change in designation from a national forest to a national park.46 The court
reasoned that the simple reclassification of national forest lands to national
park status did not rescind the national forest timber and watershed protec-
tion purposes for which the lands were originally reserved; therefore, the gov-
ernment was granted reserved water rights with a priority date of 1897 for
national forest purposes. For national park purposes, however, the reserved
rights were granted with a priority date as of the park's creation.4 7 Thus, the
court allowed expanded water rights when the classification of a reservation
was changed from national forest to national park, but not when the pur-
poses for administration of national forests was enlarged statutorily as under
the MUSYA.
The question then is: where do other federal reservations, whose classi-
fication has been changed or purposes enlarged, stand with regard to re-
served water rights? The courts have three alternatives: grant no additional
reserved water rights using the New Mexico rationale, grant additional re-
served rights for the enlarged purposes as of the date the purposes are ex-
panded using the Denver logic, or grant additional water rights with a
priority backdated to the creation of the original reservation as with the
Lake Mead National Recreation Area.
48
There are areas such as Zion National Park, 49 Capital Reef National
Park,50 and Arches National Park51 that were changed in designation from
national monuments to national parks where the issue of reserved rights is
not settled. National monuments were created in accordance with the
American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906,52 for the purpose of preserv-
ing areas of historic and scientific interest.5 3 The National Park Service Act
of 191654 brought national monuments into the national park system. 55 The
purposes of national parks, which include recreation and conservation of
scenery, natural objects and wildlife, are much broader than the purposes of
monuments.56 Arguably, the National Park Service Act modifies the Antiq-
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id.
48. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Court awarded reserved rights to the
Lake Mead Recreation Area based on 1929 and 1930 general withdrawals, even though the
express purposes of the area were not stated until 1964. Op. Solic. Dep't of Interior, 86 Interior
Dec. 553, 600 (1979).
49. Act of Nov. 19, 1919, ch. 110, § 1, 41 Stat. 356 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 344 (1976)).
50. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-207, 85 Stat. 739 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 273
(1976)).
51. Act of Nov. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-155, 85 Stat. 422 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 272
(1976)).
52. Pub. L. No. 209, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-458
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
53. The Antiquities Act states in part: "The President . . . is authorized . . . to declare
• . .historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scien-
tific interest . . . to be national monuments .. " Id. at § 431.
54. Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.)
55. Id. at § 2 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
56. The National Park Service Act directs that:
the [slervice . . . shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as
national parks, monuments, and reservations . . . which purpose is to conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for
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uities Act to enlarge the purposes of national monuments to coincide with
those of national parks. The United States made this assertion in Denver for
Dinosaur National Monument, but it was rejected by the Colorado Supreme
Court. The court held that the National Park Service Act of 1916 did not
eliminate the distinction between parks and monuments, but simply in-
cluded monuments in the National Park System to provide for administra-
tion and management by the National Park Service rather than the Forest
Service.
5 7
Accepting this interpretation of the National Park Service Act there are
still three possible outcomes for reserved water rights in an area such as Zion
National Park. Zion National Park was originally reserved in 1909 as a na-
tional monument. 58 The area was redesignated as a national park in 1919.
59
Following the rationale of New Mexico, no increased water rights should be
granted with a 1919 priority date, and only that water necessary for a na-
tional monument would be reserved with a priority date of 1909. Using the
Arizona v. California logic, Zion National Park would have enough reserved
water appropriate for a national park with a priority backdated to 1909. If
the Denver, Rocky Mountain National Park reasoning is applied, reserved
rights would be granted for monument purposes with a 1909 priority and
additional reserved rights for national park purposes would be granted with
a 1919 priority. No court, since Arizona v. Caliornia, has backdated the prior-
ity for reserved water rights for federal reservations; therefore, this concept
seems to carry little weight. It is necessary to explore the rationale of New
Mexico and Denver to determine which of the two remaining alternatives is
most consistent with congressional intent.
VI. REASONING BEHIND NEW MEXICO AND DENVER
The United States Supreme Court,6° and subsequently, the Colorado
Supreme Court,6 ' based their rulings that MUSYA did not create new fed-
eral reserved water rights on an interpretation of one sentence in MUSYA:
"The purposes of sections 528 to 531 of this title are declared to be supple-
mental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the national
forests were established as set forth in section 475 of this title. ' ' 62 Because of
this wording, the Court concluded the purposes established by the MUSYA
were secondary to the purposes for which the national forests were created,
and therefore, no additional water was reserved for those purposes. The
Court in New Mexico quoted a MUSYA House Report as support for its
conclusion that the MUSYA purposes were supplemental to the national
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
Id.
57. 656 P.2d at 28.
58. Zion National Monument was reserved by Presidential Proclamation reprinted in 36
Stat. 2498 under the authority of the American Antiquities Act, Pub. L. No. 209, 343 Stat. 225
(1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-458 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
59. Act of Nov. 19, 1919, ch. 110, § 1, 41 Stat. 356 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 344 (1976)).
60. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702, 713-15 (1978).
61. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d at 26.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
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forest purposes of timber and watershed protection. 63  The Court failed,
however, to include the next sentence of the House Report, "It is also clear
that the Secretary of Agriculture shall administer the national forests for all
of their renewable natural resources, and none of these resources is given a
statutory priority over the others." This negates the interpretation that the
MUSYA purposes are secondary to those enumerated in the Organic Act. 64
Whereas the Court implies the statute's wording that "the purposes. . . are
supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the na-
tional forests were established .... "65 gives the purposes of MUSYA secon-
dary characteristics, an investigation into the definitions of "supplemental"
and "derogation" gives a different result. Supplemental means an addition
"to supply a deficiency or defect." 66 Derogation is defined as a "nullifica-
tion, avoidance, or abrogation, in whole or in part, as a statute nullifying
common law rights."' 6 7  The plain meaning of the statute places the
MUSYA purpose on equal footing with the purposes of the 1897 Act because
the MUSYA was added to correct a defect, but not to nullify the purposes
for which national forests were established.
The House Report further supports the conclusion that MUSYA pur-
poses are not secondary in its statement of priority of resource use. Congress




Another interpretation of the MUSYA given by both the United States
and Colorado Supreme Courts is that the MUSYA expanded the purposes
for which the national forests are administered but did not expand the re-
served water rights of the national forests for the enlarged purposes.6 9 The
63. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714. The House Report contains the follow-
ing language:
The addition of the sentence to follow the first sentence in section 1 is to make it clear
that the declaration of congressional policy that the national forests are established
and shall be administered for the purposes enumerated is supplemental to, but is not
in derogation of, the purposes of improving and protecting the forest or for securing
favorable conditions of water flow and to furnish a continuous supply of timber as set
out in the cited provision of the act of June 4, 1897. Thus, in any establishment of a
national forest a purpose set out in the 1897 act must be present but there may also
exist one or more of the additional purposes listed in the bill. In other words, a na-
tional forest would not be established just for the purpose of outdoor recreation, range,
or wildlife and fish purposes, but such purposes could be a reason for the establishment
of the forest if there also were one or more of the purposes of improving and protecting
the forest, securing favorable conditions of water flows, or to furnish a continuous
supply of timber as set out in the 1897 act.
H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, repnhedi1) 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2380 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1551].
64. Id.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
66. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (3d ed. 1969).
67. Id. at 340.
68. The House Report indicates that:
In practice, the priority of resource use will vary locality by locality and case by case.
In one locality timber use might dominate; in another locality use of the range by
domestic livestock in another outdoor recreation or wildlife might dominate. . . .One
of the basic concepts of multiple use is that all of the named resources in general are of
equal priority. ...
H.R. REP. No. 1551 at 2379, 2382.
69. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 713 (1978); United States v. City and
County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 26 (Colo. 1982).
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counter argument to this is a practical one. How can the national forests be
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife
and fish purposes if the water to sustain these uses is not made available?
The courts have recognized the purposes, but have not given the Forest Serv-
ice the tools to carry out these purposes.
The final rationale used by the courts to justify the denial of additional
reserved water rights based on MUSYA is that increasing federal reserved
rights reduces the amount of water available to satisfy long-held, adjudi-
cated water rights, especially in fully-appropriated streams. 70 There are two
answers to this contention: 1) long-held rights would not be affected if the
additional reserved waters were given a priority date of 1960, and 2) in the
past, the courts have not been reluctant to grant federal reserved water
rights even when adjudicated water rights are affected adversely. If the na-
tional forests are granted reserved rights with a 1960 priority date for the
purposes enunciated in MUSYA, it is doubtful that any owners of adjudi-
cated water rights would be affected. All of the purposes stated in MUSYA
contemplate in-stream use meaning that the water would be available for
appropriation once it left the national forest. The only persons possibly af-
fected would be owners of water rights with a priority date after 1960 who
diverted their water from within the national forest. Thus, the most logical
alternative, when a federal reservation changes designation to allow for in-
creased purposes is to follow the Colorado Supreme Court's decision for
Rocky Mountain National Park and allow additional reserved water rights
with a priority date as of the change of designation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dissent in United States v. New Mexico asserted that the ruling deny-
ing additional reserved water rights for national forests with a 1960 priority
date was dictum. 71 The Colorado Supreme Court was of the opinion that
that ruling was binding even if dictum. The issue concerning additional
water for national forests based on MUSYA may never reach the Supreme
Court again, however, there are other federal reservations such as Zion,
Arches, and Capital Reef National Parks with analogous backgrounds con-
cerning water rights that have yet to be heard in court. There are many
legal and practical reasons to grant those areas additional water as of the
date their designation of use changed. As the New Mexico Supreme Court
said in Mimbres Vall Imgation Co. v. Salopek ,72 the case that became United
States v. New Mexico,
We are aware of the advancing environmental and aesthetic con-
cerns related to the use of our natural resources. Had the congres-
sional enactments and their interpretations by the Supreme Court
given us leeway so as to interpret more broadly the intent of the
Creative and Organic Acts we may have been persuaded to decide
70. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705, 715; United States v. City and County
of Denver, 656 P.2d at 26.
71. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 718 n.I.





Hopefully, the courts in the future will realize that the leeway to grant
additional water for federal reservations with expanded purposes exists. The
expansion of the purposes of federal reservations has a primary or secondary
impact of protecting the environment. By granting additional water for
these environmental purposes, the courts will help preserve our natural re-
sources for future generations.
73. Id. at 414, 564 P.2d at 619.
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ANTITRUST STANDING: LABOR IS GIVEN A NEW TEST IN
ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS
INTRODUCTION
The sparse legislative guidance 1 for interpreting section 4 of the Clayton
Act 2 has placed the burden of developing a framework for antitrust standing
analysis on the courts. The federal courts, searching for a consistent ap-
proach to determine whether a party allegedly injured by an antitrust viola-
tion has standing to sue,
3 have historically applied four tests: direct injury,
4
target area, 5 zone of interests, 6 and matrix of factors.7 Previously reluctant
to assess the utility of these tests, the Supreme Court in Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. Californza State Council of Carpenters8 has finally
reconciled the various approaches by formulating its own version of a bal-
ancing test.
In Associated General Contractors, the Court articulated six factors which
controlled their balancing test. Three of the factors, intent of the violator,
risk of duplicative recovery, and directness of the injury, will provide a co-
gent framework for future antitrust standing determinations. The other
three factors, type of injury, difficulty of damage apportionment, and specu-
lativeness of the claim, however, do not appear to be satisfactory considera-
tions for a standing analysis.
Concluding that the alleged injury was not of a type protected by the
antitrust laws, the Court in Associated General Contractors denied a labor union
standing to sue for treble damages under section 4.9 The consequences of
the Associated General Contractors decision are significant for labor organiza-
tions in that their ability to bring antitrust actions against alleged antitrust
law violators has been substantially diminished.
This comment provides an overview of the legal background of private
antitrust standing'0 and an analysis of the Associated General Contractors case.
1. The legislative history of§ 4 is sparse and sheds little light on the question of standing.
See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 811-12
(1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The original version of§ 4 was enacted as § 7
of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
3. The term "standing" in private antitrust actions differs from the meaning of "stand-
ing" in constitutional litigation. In antitrust law, standing is used to determine whether the
plaintiff is the proper party to maintain the action. A plaintiff must allege an injury in law as
well as an injury in fact. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 n.31. See Pollock, Standng to Sue, Remoteness of Injuly, and the
Passing-On Doctrine, 32 ANTrrRUST L.J. 5, 6-7 (1966). In constitutional law, standing requires
that the plaintiff allege an injury in fact. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975).
4. See infa text accompanying notes 21-30.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 31-35.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 42-45.
8. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
9. See infra text accompanying note 11.
10. The term "antitrust standing" as used in this comment refers only to pnate actions
under § 4. Actions brought by the government are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Particular reference is made to the positive and negative effects which this
newly articulated balancing test can have on a plaintiffs ability to achieve
standing in antitrust actions.
I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST STANDING
The Clayton Act's private damages provision, section 4, is a broadly
worded remedial statute which provides, in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court in the United States . . .and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained . ...
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress imposed this multiple
measure of damages in order to: 1) provide injured parties with an incentive
to bring antitrust actions, 2) deter potential violators, 3) deprive violators of
the fruits of their illegality, and 4) adequately compensate victims.'
2
In addition to section 4's remedial purpose, courts have also used this
provision to determine whether a plaintiff has a right to maintain an anti-
trust action. In an effort to consistently evaluate a plaintiff's standing to sue
for treble damages, the district and circuit courts have previously used four
tests: direct injury, target area, zone of interests, and matrix of factors. The
courts, however, have had great difficulty in applying any of these tests con-
sistently to antitrust standing cases. In addition, until Associated General Con-
tractors, the Supreme Court had not taken the opportunity to assess the
merits of the various approaches set forth above.
1 3
Despite its reticence in evaluating the various standing doctrines, the
Supreme Court has denied standing under section 4 to a particular group of
plaintiffs on two previous occasions. 14 In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 15 the
Court held that a state may not recover damages on behalf of its citizens for
antitrust injuries sustained by its "general economy."' 6 The Court reasoned
that duplicative recovery could result if individual consumers and busi-
nesses, as well as a state on behalf of its general economy, were able to main-
tain actions under section 4.17 In the second case, llhinois Brick Co. v.
Ilhnozs,'8 the majority held that only "direct purchasers" in the chain of
manufacturing and distribution were injured parties who may maintain a
11. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
13. Id at 476 n.12 (the Court noted that it had no occasion to "evaluate the relative utility
of any of [the] possibly conflicting approaches toward the problem of remote antitrust injury.")
For an overview of the different standing doctrines see generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2
ANTITRUST LAW §§ 333-42 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 247
(1977).
14. Two scholars have characterized the Supreme Court's approach in these two cases as a
categorization approach, which involves drawing analogies to various categories of plaintiffs
who in previous cases have been granted or denied standing. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note
1, at 820-30.
15. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
16. Id at 265.
17. Id at 264.
18. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
[Vol. 61:1
ANTITRUST STANDING
private antitrust action.' 9 The Supreme Court's decisions in both Hawaii
and Illinois Brick reflected strong judicial concern for minimizing the defend-
ant's exposure to potential multiple liability arising from a single antitrust
violation.
20
A. The Four Doctri'nes
1. Direct Injury
In 1910, the Third Circuit's decision in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co. 21 dis-
missed an antitrust suit by a shareholder of an injured corporation because
the plaintiff did not sustain any direct injury2 2 from the company's antitrust
violation.2 3 The court concluded that any injury Loeb might have received
as a shareholder was "indirect, remote, and consequential."
'24
The court's decision reflected judicial concern for the risk of duplicative
recovery. If shareholders, in addition to the company itself, were allowed to
recover treble damages from the antitrust violator, then duplicative damages
would be assessed against the defendant for the same unlawful act. The
court of appeals concluded that the statute's framers clearly did not envision
the violator being assessed sextupled damages for a single anti-competitive
act.
25
The direct injury test, which was the pervasive test used until the target
area approach was devised,2 6 opened the door to a flurry of court-seeking
methods to determine what constituted a direct or proximate injury stem-
ming from an anti-competitive activity. Tapping the resources of contract
and tort law, notions of privity 27 and intent 28 arose as a means of evaluation.
The requirement of privity of contract between the violator and victim was
dismissed, however, because it automatically excluded competitors from
maintaining private action suits. 29 Similarly, some courts have held that a
defendant's alleged intent to injure a plaintiff is insufficient to support anti-
19. Id. at 729.
20. In McCready the Supreme Court added another theme to its opinions in Hawaii and
Illinois Brzck: "the difficulty and consequences of apportioning damages may, in limited circum-
stances, be considered in determining who is entitled to prosecute an action brought under
section 4." McCready, 457 U.S. at 475 n. 11.
21. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
22. Although a federal judge had decided a similar case one year earlier in Ames v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909), the term "direct injury" did not arise until
the decision in Loeb.
23. 183 F. at 709.
24. Id.
25. See id
26. See infta text accompanying notes 31-35.
27. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956).
28. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955); Inter-
national Rys. of Cent. America v. United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aj'don other grounds, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976).
29. E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); FLM Collision Parts v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224,







In 1951, the Ninth Circuit developed the target area test.3 1 The target
area test requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that his antitrust injury is
within the economic area endangered by a breakdown of competitive condi-
tions.32 If the injury is found to be within the endangered area, then the
plaintiff has standing to maintain an antitrust action under section 4.33
Due to the broadness of the "endangered area" concept, the courts have
sought to define its parameters by applying the doctrine of foreseeability.
The foreseeability doctrine requires that the alleged injury is within the eco-
nomic area foreseeably harmed by an antitrust violation. 34 The foreseeabil-
ity approach, however, has been rejected by several courts because it allows a
party to sue without regard to their relationship to the defendant.
35
3. Zone of Interests Test
In 1975, the Sixth Circuit case of Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 36 intro-
duced the zone of interests analysis into the field of antitrust standing. In
Malamud, the court allowed a gasoline retailer to sue for treble damages for
alleged lost profits due to a gasoline supplier's failure to provide financial
assistance for the retailer's expansion plans.3 7 The court reasoned that the
availability of financing and the denial thereof by Sinclair arguably came
within a zone of interest-combination or conspiracies in restraint of trade
30. E.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp.
1339, 1342 (D. Md. 1974). For a discussion of the problems of an intent requirement, see gener-
ally, Sherman, Antitrusting Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374, 389-91
(1976).
31. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 919 (1952). The target area test has been adopted in other circuits as well. See, e.g.,
Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977);
Donovan Construction Co. v. Florida Tel. Corp., 564 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1007 (1978).
32. 193 F.2d at 54-55.
33. Compared to the direct injury rule, the target area approach shifts the emphasis from
the victim-violator relationship to the victim's relationship with the area of the economy alleg-
edly injured by the defendant. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122, 127-28, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
34. The foreseeability approach in antitrust standing ensued from language in Karseal, 221
F.2d at 358, where the court concluded that the plaintiff "was not only hit, but was aimed at"
by the defendant. Id. at 365. The court in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328
F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964), stated that the language "was intended to
express the view that . . . plaintiff's affected operation was actually in the area which it could
reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy." Id at 220. See also Hoopes v.
Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
35. In Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), the court rejected the foreseeability notion by
stating that, the "foreseeability test ... would permit anyone to sue, regardless of how distant
his interest or relationship . . . since it would be difficult to disprove the fact that remote eco-
nomic repercussions in the line of distribution result from almost every antitrust violation." Id.
at 1296 n.2.
36. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
37. Id at 1151-52.
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protected by the antitrust laws. 38 The court, articulating the zone of inter-
ests test, stated that if a plaintiffs injury arguably comes within the zone of
interests protected by the antitrust laws, he could maintain a treble damage
action under section 4.39
The Sixth Circuit, in Malamud, criticized the direct injury and target
area methods as prematurely deciding the merits of the antitrust claims
"under the guise of assessing" a claimant's standing to sue.40 Adopting the
zone of interests approach from administrative law, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that this test was preferable because it did not demand as much from
the plaintiff at the pleading stage of the action.
4 1
4. Matrix of Factors Analysis
The final method used to determine legal causation allowing a plaintiff
standing under section 4 is the balancing test espoused in 1976 by the Third
Circuit in Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. 42 Reasoning that
all antitrust standing analyses inherently include a weighing of factors, the
Third Circuit adopted a case-by-case balancing approach to antitrust stand-
ing evaluations.4 3 The court concluded that a matrix of important factors
should be analyzed to determine whether the plaintiff "is one whose protec-
tion is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws."'44 The court listed the
following as the controlling factors: the nature of the industry from which
the alleged antitrust violation flows, the relationship between the plaintiff
and the alleged violator, and the effect of the violation upon the injured
party.
45
II. AssociA TED GENERAL CONTRACTORS
A. Facts
Against this background of a judicial search for a proper standing crite-
ria, the Associated General Contractors case was brought before the courts. The
case involved a class action suit initiated by two labor unions, the California
State Council of Carpenters, 46 and the Carpenters 46 Northern Counties
38. Id at 1152.
39. Id at 1152 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970)).
40. I at 1150.
41. 521 F.2d at 1149.
42. 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
43. Id at 505-08. Other courts as well have followed a case-by-case approach which fo-
cused on the factual matrix and the policy considerations for and against standing in the partic-
ular case. See, e.g., Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581-87
(3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
44. 543 F.2d at 506.
45. Id
46. The California State Council of Carpenters is the collective bargaining agent for
carpenters and their affiliated local unions with respect to master collective bargaining agree-
ments governing the California carpentry industry. California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Conference Board.4 7 These two organizations (the Union) represented more
than 50,000 individuals employed in carpentry-related industries throughout
California.
48
The defendant was Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.
(Associated), a membership corporation comprised of more than 250 con-
struction contractors. 49 For more than twenty-five years, the Union and As-
sociated had entered into collective bargaining agreements governing the
terms and conditions of employment in the California construction
industry.
50
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy by Associated and its
members to weaken and destroy the collective bargaining agreements be-
tween the Union and those who employ the Union. 5 1 Among the acts alleg-
edly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy were Associated's coercion
of landowners to hire non-Union subcontractors. 52 The Union pleaded, in-
ter alia, that this alleged conspiracy violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
5 3
by adversely affecting the trade of certain unionized firms.5 4 The Union
claimed to have suffered twenty-five million dollars in damages, and sought
a trebling of those damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety for failing to
state a claim for relief.5 5 For the dismissal of the federal antitrust claim, the
court reasoned that while collective bargaining agreements may give rise to
antitrust violations, normal labor disputes between a union and an employer
do not state a cause of action under section 4.56
47. The Carpenters 46 County Conference Board is the collective bargaining agent for
carpenters employed in the drywall industry. Id
48. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897, 900 (1983).
49. d
50. Id
51. Paragraph 23 of the complaint alleged:
Since on or about April 1, 1974, and continuing to date, defendants and each of them
have entered into a plan, scheme, agreement and conspiracy, knowingly, willfully and
maliciously, whose purpose and ends are to abrogate, destroy, undermine and weaken
the collective bargaining relationship between plaintiffs and each of them and defend-
ants and each of them, and between plaintiffs and other parties to the above described
collective bargaining agreements; included within the other parties are the California
Drywall Contractors Association and all "memorandum contractors" to the above de-
scribed master collective bargaining agreements.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App. E- 16.
52. Paragraph 24(4) alleged that the defendants knowingly:
advocated, encouraged, induced, coerced, aided and encouraged owners of land and
other letters of construction contracts to hire contractors and subcontractors who are
not signatories to collective bargaining agreements with plaintiffs and each of them.
Id at 18. (emphasis added).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
54. The Union further claimed that, through this conspiracy, Associated breached its col-
lective bargaining agreements with the Union, violated California's antitrust statute, and com-
mitted the torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional
interference with business relationships. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 900 n. 1.
55. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 404
F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
56. Id. at 1069. The court observed that the allegations "appear typical of disputes a
union might have with an employer," which in the normal course are resolved by grievance and
arbitration or by the National Labor Relations Board.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Union's federal antitrust
claim.5 7 The court, with one member dissenting, used the target area theory
and concluded that the Union was within the area of the economy endan-
gered by a breakdown of competitive conditions. 58 The Ninth Circuit court
reasoned that the Union's injury was not only a foreseeable consequence of
Associated's alleged boycott, but also an intended result. 59 Rejecting the
lower court's holding that a labor dispute exemption6° be applied to this
antitrust action, 6 1 the court of appeals concluded that the Union had stand-
ing to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.6 2 Disagree-
ing with the Ninth Circuit's decision, Associated perfected an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
B. The Majority Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit in an eight to one decision.6 3 The broad issue the Court addressed
was whether the antitrust claim sufficiently alleged that the Union was in-
jured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws. 64 The Court held that the
Union's complaint was insufficient as a matter of law and denied the Union
standing to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
65
The Court began its antitrust standing analysis by reasoning that sec-
tion 4, although broadly worded, should be narrowly construed. Alterna-
tively stated, every injury incurred "by reason of" an antitrust violation
should not be actionable. 66 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, pro-
ceeded by noting the vain attempts federal judges have made to provide a
definitive rule which would determine whether a plaintiff is a proper party
to bring an antitrust action. 67 Stating that courts should analyze antitrust
standing issues through a case-by-case method, the majority settled on a bal-
ancing of specific factors.68
Although acknowledging the importance of Associated's alleged intent
to cause harm to the Union, the majority concluded that the improper mo-
57. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980). The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of all other claims. Id at
529.
58. Id. at 538.
59. Id
60. See infia text accompanying notes 113-19.
61. Id. at 536.
62. The court stated that its holding was consistent with several recent decisions in which
employee groups had been allowed to maintain private antitrust actions on the ground that
they were within the target area of the defendant's antitrust activities. Id at 539. See, e.g.,
Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1976); International
Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 397-98 (3d Cir.
1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F.
Supp. 867, 884-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
63. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 897.
64. Id. at 899.
65. Id at 913.
66. Id at 904-08.
67. Id at 907-08.
68. Id. The Court stated that "courts should analyze each situation in light of the factors
set forth in the text." Id at 908 n.33.
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tive of the plaintiff does not necessarily serve as the decisive factor for evalu-
ating a plaintiffs standing under section 4.69 Instead, the decision focused
on the nature of the Union's injury. The court sought to determine whether
the plaintiff's antitrust injury fell within the purview of congressional con-
cern. 70 Justice Stevens, citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,7t coined this
determination as the Brunswick test.
72
The Brunswick test involves a two-step analysis. The first step is to deter-
mine whether the injured party is a consumer or a competitor in the market
in which trade was allegedly restrained. 73 The test's second step asks
whether the injury was of a "type" Congress meant to redress by the anti-
trust laws.7 4 If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of the Brunswick require-
ments, its private antitrust claim will most likely be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's lack of standing to sue.
75
In Associated General Contractors, the Court held: 1) that the Union was
neither a consumer nor a competitor in the restrained market; 76 and 2) that
due to both the history of labor unions as unique organizations governed by
a separate body of labor law, and the long labor-related relationship be-
tween Union and Associated, the Union's injury was not of a type Congress
meant to redress. 77 Accordingly, the plaintiff failed both parts of the Bruns-
wick test.
The Court continued its standing analysis by addressing the directness
of the Union's injury. Stating that the individual unionized subcontractors
(the Union's members) would be the direct victims of the alleged coercion,
and not the Union itself, the majority concluded that the Union's injury was
only an indirect result of the alleged violation. An indirect victim, the Court
stated, is not guaranteed a right to maintain an action under section 4.78
An additional factor the Court applied was whether the Union's alleged
injury was tenuous and speculative. Citing Hawaiiv. Standard Oil,79 the ma-
jority stated that if the alleged harm is remote and obviously speculative,
then it may be appropriate to place the claim beyond the reach of section
69. Id at 908.
70. Id
71. 457 U.S. 465, 483-84 (1982).
72. The Brunswick test arose from the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). In Brunswick, operators of bowling centers
brought an action against a manufacturer of bowling equipment alleging that the manufac-
turer's acquisition of bowling centers violated antitrust laws. The Court held that the plaintiffs'
loss of income, which would have accrued had the failing centers acquired by the defendant
gone bankrupt, was not the type of injury the Clayton Act was intended to protect. Id at 487.
73. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 909.
74. Id at 910.
75. Although the Court in Associated Generat Contractors set forth a balancing test, the nu-
ances of the majority opinion indicate that because the nature of the plaintiff's injury was not
one which the antitrust laws intended to protect, the plaintiff should be denied standing regard-
less of the additional factors to be weighed. See id at 908-09.
76. Id. at 909.
77. Id at 909.10. The Court stated that a Union "will frequently not be part of the class
the Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in disputes with employers. Id. at
910.
78. Id. at 910-11.
79 405 U.S. at 262-63 n.14.
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4.80 Largely due to the Union's lack of alleging specific injury in its com-




Making a judicial economy argument, Justice Stevens also noted the
Court's policy to deny standing to a plaintiff whose antitrust claim would
likely overburden the courts when they have to ascertain damages.82 Find-
ing that the district court would be exposed to numerous problems of identi-
fying and apportioning the damages between the Union and its members
individually, the Court concluded that the Union's claim would overburden
the judicial system. 83 Adding this factor to its analysis, the majority held
that the factors against allowing the Union standing outweighed those fac-
tors in favor of a suit.
84
C. The Dissent
Justice Marshall's lone dissent argued that Congress' use of the words
"anyperson who [has been] injured. . . by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" in section 4 manifests a legislative intent to broadly enforce
alleged antitrust violations. 85 Noting the broad language of section 4 cou-
pled with the Supreme Court's prior expansive readings of the statute,8
6 Jus-
tice Marshall reasoned that the Union's antitrust injury did fit comfortably
within the framework for standing.
8 7
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's use of the direct-indirect injury
factor. 88 Analogizing antitrust claims to tort actions, Justice Marshall stated
that an inquiry into proximate cause has traditionally been rejected when
the defendant intends to inflict injury upon the plaintiff. He reasoned that
because the Union was the intended victim of Associated's coercive efforts to
induce construction contractors to refrain from using unionized carpeniers,
the remoteness of the Union's injury was irrelevant for standing purposes.8 9
Agreeing with the majority that the exact reduction in dues may be a
difficult fact-finding procedure, Justice Marshall stated that the plaintiff
need only provide a reasonable estimate of the harm.9° He emphasized the
80. 103 S. Ct. at 911.
81. Id The Court also noted that the indirect nature of the Union's claim influenced its
determination that the claim was highly speculative. Id.
82. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-38, 745 (1977) (massive and
complex damages litigation not only burdens the courts, but also undermines the effectiveness of
treble damage suits); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968) (denying defendants a defense that the plaintiff passed on their injury, the Court noted
that any attempt to ascertain damages with precision would involve massive evidence and com-
plicated theories).
83. 103 S. Ct. at 911-12.
84. Id at 913.
85. Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (provision is broad enough to
allow standing to a consumer who pays a higher price as a result of an antitrust violation);
Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (statutory phrase "any person" is broad enough to
include a foreign sovereign).
87. 103 S. Ct. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id at 914.
89. Id at 914-15.
90. Id. at 916.
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Court's policy of placing the burden of any uncertainty of damages upon the
wrongdoer, and not upon the victim.9 1
Justice Marshall also stressed that the risk of duplicative recovery, a
critical element in prior Supreme Court cases denying a plaintiff standing,
was not a factor in the Union's claim. 9 2 The loss of union dues, the dissent
pointed out, was an injury distinct from any possible claim that other in-
jured parties may bring. 93 Recognizing the absence of risk of duplicative
recovery, Justice Marshall concluded that the Union's action should not be
dismissed solely on the basis of the pleadings.
94
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Balancing Test-An Appropriate Standing Doctrine
Presented with different approaches to guide antitrust standing deter-
minations, the majority in Associated General Contractors wisely decided on a
compromise by creating its own version of a balancing test. Recognizing the
difficulties of formulating a precise test to apply to all standing evaluations,
the Court correctly averted adopting either the target area, direct injury,
zone of interests, or matrix of factors test for its analysis.95 Commentators
have also expressed the apparent impossibility of applying any of these vari-
ous tests and obtaining consistent results.
96
The Supreme Court's decision to weigh certain factors in private anti-
trust standing determinations will provide a long-lasting framework for fu-
ture standing cases. This is due to the flexible nature of balancing tests in
general. 97 The test proportions the weight of relevant policies as each situa-
tion warrants. This flexibility is especially desired in antitrust litigation be-
cause of its inherent complexity and the constantly changing economic
environment surrounding the antitrust laws.98
91. Id. (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946)).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 915-16.
93. Justice Marshall reasoned that the loss of individual unionized subcontractor's reve-
nues as a result of the alleged boycott would also decrease the amount of dues paid to the Union
because part of the annual payment of dues is based on a percentage of work. Id at 915.
94. Id. at 916.
95. The balancing test espoused in Associated General Contractors is quite similar, however, to
the matrix of factors approach used in Cromar. In Associated General Contractors, the Court relied
on a list of six factors to guide their analysis: intent of the violator, nature of the antitrust
injury, directness of the injury, speculativeness of the claim, difficulty of apportioning damages,
and the risk of duplicative recovery. 103 S. Ct. at 913. In comparison, the Third Circuit in
Cromar focused on a set of three factors: the nature of the industry from which the alleged
antitrust violation flows, the relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged violator, and the
effect of the violation upon the injured party. 543 F.2d at 506.
96. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 835, 843; Handler, The Shiflfrom Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antirust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 27-31 (1971); Sherman, supra note
30, at 407 (1976) ("it is simply not possible to fashion an across-the-board and easily applied
standing rule which can serve as a tool of decision for every case").
97. The balancing test, which is used frequently in modern first amendment jurisprudence,
has been noted as "an extremely flexible case-by-case approach." Gunther, In Search ofJudcial
Quality ofa Changing Court.- The Case of justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1972); See also
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-84 (1978).
98. It is widely recognized that each anti-competitive activity causes ripples of injury
through an entire economy. E.g., Billy Baxter, 431 F.2d at 187. Accordingly, any attempt to
divide damages in proportion to the amount of antitrust injury sustained by each consumer is a
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A countervailing argument can be made, however, to the point that the
balancing test may not provide rigid guidance to both the lower courts and
the plaintiffs themselves. Exactly how the courts will apply the six factors of
the balancing test to future antitrust standing cases remains to be seen. At
least now, the antitrust plaintiff knows which standing test and by what cri-
teria their standing status will be evaluated.
B. The Choice of Factors
Two of the six factors the Supreme Court used in its balancing test are
important factors for antitrust standing determinations, namely, the risk of
duplicative recovery and the intent of the violator. The majority, however,
used three other factors which appear to be less useful when evaluating anti-
trust standing cases: the difficulty of apportioning damages, the speculative
nature of the claim, and the nature of the injury.
First, the Supreme Court's concern for the risk of multiple recovery is a
policy well-founded in precedent. The policy was announced as early as
191099 and reinforced in 1982 by the Court in Blue Shield of Virginia v. Mc-
Cready. °° In addition to case law support, traditional notions of equity de-
mand that a defendant should not be penalized numerous times for the same
injury.
Second, an alleged violator's intention to cause injury to a particular
class of persons is also a relevant factor to consider in determining a plain-
tiff's standing to sue. It is well-settled that a defendant's specific intent may
be important to the question whether a violation of antitrust law has been
alleged.' 0 ' Moreover, because intent is a requirement for certain antitrust
violations, it is an important factor to consider in standing analyses. 1
02
The Supreme Court used three other factors in their balancing test
which are troublesome. First, although it is important to recognize the need
complex procedure. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-32. ("Permitting the use of pass-on theo-
ries under section 4 essentially would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to
apportion the recovery .. ") Formulating a consistent method to apportion antitrust dam-
ages is difficult not only because of the inherent complexity of the subject matter, but also
because of the continued growth and volatility in the economic environment.
Since their enactment in 1890, the antitrust laws have developed in economies which are
constantly changing. One sector which has served as a catalyst for this change is technology.
The amount of technological advancement which has been made within the last century is
outstanding. Moreover, the beginning of the computer era and its resultant increase in effi-
ciency and productivity guarantees a continuously changing economic environment. Therefore,
adopting a test such as the balancing test, which can more easily adapt to the economic realities
surrounding the antitrust laws, appears to be a prudent approach.
99. The sixth factor, directness of the injury, can have both positive and negative effects on
future antitrust standing determinations. A conclusion of whether this factor should be in-
cluded in a standing analysis is not reached by the author. Accordingly, a discussion of this
sixth factor is not included in this analysis.
100. 457 U.S. 465, 475 (1982) (consumer of psychological services was allowed to maintain
an action under section 4 against a health insurer because the defendant engaged in an unlaw-
ful conspiracy and there existed "not the slightest possibility of a duplicative" recovery).
101. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
102. Contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade, such as group boycotts, are often inten-
tionally inflicted upon the victims. An alleged intent to harm a party is well-exemplified in the
subject case Associated General Contractors where Associated's alleged anti-competitive activities
were directed solely at harming the Union's trade.
1983]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1
to decrease administrative burdens on the courts, dismissing a plaintiff's ac-
tion before trial because of the potential difficulties of damage apportion-
ment seems to be an unfair procedure to impose on a plaintiff.'0 3 Moreover,
Congress intended section 4 to rigorously promote the private enforcement
of antitrust claims, not to impose restraints. 10 4 The burden of formulating
mathematical equations to approximate the amount of antitrust injury sus-
tained by the victim should rest on the legislature and not the plaintiff.
10 5
Second, the Supreme Court's use of the tenuous nature of the plaintiff's
claim as a factor for standing also warrants criticism. Although the Supreme
Court has previously used the "speculative, abstract, or impractical" nature
of a claim as a basis for denying standing, 0 6 a determination of this kind
needs more information than the pleadings provide. As Justice Marshall
correctly pointed out in his dissent, if facts exist "to support an inference of
causation," the substance of a claim should be decided by trial.
10 7
The final factor employed by the Court which appears unsatisfactory is
the nature of the plaintiffs injury. Specifically, the Court asks whether the
alleged injury falls within the type the antitrust laws sought to protect and
redress.' 0 8 To maintain an action, a plaintiff should only have to sufficiently
allege the necessary requirements to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff
should not have toprove the merits of his claim in the pleadings.10 9 A plain-
tiff should be entitled to present at trial, inter alia, expert testimony explain-
ing the economic ramifications of the defendant's alleged anti-competitive
act. Without expert testimony and other fact-finding techniques, the courts
103. See Malamud, 591 F.2d at 1149.
104. The initial House debates reveal that private damage actions were conceived primarily
as "open[ing] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate
the antitrust laws." 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb); See, e.g., Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
105. An example of the misuse of the damage apportionment factor was seen here in Associ-
ated General Contractors. The Court weighed this factor against the Union because the District
Court would "face problems" of identifying damages if the Union was allowed to maintain the
action. Judges and juries, however, regularly "face problems" of awarding damages. Therefore,
except where serious difficulties of damage apportionment are present, see lhnois Brick, 431 U.S.
at 737, and Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493, it would appear that an antitrust claim should not be
dismissed at the pleading stage, even partly because the courts will "face problems" of damage
assessment.
106. McCready, 457 U.S. at 475, n.11.
107. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 916 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Perkins
v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969)). See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 854-55:
To deny standing on grounds of speculative injury is to prejudge the merits of the
plaintiff's claim for damages, for speculativeness of injury implies inability to prove
that injury exists. But issues of adequacy of proof are ordinarily handled through
motions for summary judgment or for directed verdict. An antitrust plaintiff should
not be denied an opportunity to present all its evidence on causation and extent of
injury before the court rules on whether its allegations are sufficient as a matter of law;
indeed, such a denial is contrary to accepted notions of civil procedure.
Id.
108. This analysis is coined the Brunswick test. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the problems created by incorporating substantive antitrust law in
standing determinations, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 835-40. See Malamud, 521 F.2d
at 1149-50; But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("Although standing in no way
depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, it often
turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.").
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are deprived of knowledge which could aid in their evaluation of whether
the alleged injury is one the antitrust laws were meant to protect.
C. Creating a Double Standard
In Associated General Contractors, the Court applied its standing determi-
nation factors to the Union's claim that Associated conspired to weaken and
destroy the Union. The factor which the Court apparently weighed most
heavily in its decision was the nature of the alleged injury.' 1° The majority
concluded that the Union's injury was not of a type which the antitrust laws
intended to redress. I I This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with prior
case law involving the clash between labor unions and the antitrust laws.'
12
1. Labor and the Antitrust Laws
Posed with a dilemma that labor unions, in theory and practice, were
conspiracies in restraint of trade, Congress had to harmonize labor policies
with policies favoring free competition."l 3  Reaching a pro-labor solution,
Congress explicitly exempted the collective bargaining activities of labor or-
ganizations from the antitrust laws by enacting two provisions of the Clay-
ton Act: section 6114 and section 20.115 Section 6 provides that labor unions
are not unlawful, and that neither the unions nor their members may be
considered illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Section
20 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against certain specified activi-
ties arising from labor disputes. Enacting these pro-labor statutory clauses,
Congress has clearly expressed its intention to promote labor organizations
within the framework of the antitrust laws.
Although these clauses exempt labor from specified anti-competitive vi-
olations, the Supreme Court has held that certain labor union activities are
punishable under the antitrust laws.1 16 One method used to determine
110. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 908.
111. Id at 913.
112. An in-depth discussion of the relationship between labor organizations and the anti-
trust laws is beyond the scope of this comment. The Court's decision to deny the Union stand-
ing, however, is so clearly adverse to previous Supreme Court decisions which allow, under
similar circumstances, an employer to maintain an antitrust action against a union, that a brief
discussion of the Associated General Contractors anti-labor decision is warranted. For additional
discussions on the interplay between union activities and the antitrust laws, see generally, P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, I ANTrrRUST LAw § 229 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 13, at § 237
(1977); Casey & Cazzillio, Labor-Antitrust. The Problems of Connell and A Remedy that Follows Natu-
rally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235; Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The
Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1981); Leslie, Principles of Labor
Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1980); Scheinholtz & Kettering, Exemption Under the Antitrust Laws
forjoint Employer Activity, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 347 (1983).
113. See Cox, Labor and the Antitnist Laws-A Prelimiaiy Analyst, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252, 254
(1955) ("The purpose and effect of every labor organization is to eliminate competition in the
labor market."); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and The Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 659 (1965); Comment, Antitrust Law in Colorado. Back on Track, 60 DEN. L.J. 645, 652
(1983).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
116. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumber & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 621-22, 625-36 (1975); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662-69 (1965);
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806-11 (1945).
1983]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
whether the labor activity is exempt from the antitrust laws has been to
draw a line between those anti-competitive acts which result from a typical
labor dispute" 7 and those which occur by reason of a concerted action or
agreement outside the normal bargaining arena." 8 If an antitrust injury
emerges from a typical "wage, hour or conditions" labor dispute between a
union and non-union party, the claim is exempt from the antitrust laws. 19
2. A Weak Analysis
In Associated General Contractors the Court should have addressed the dis-
tinction between the two types of circumstances which surround an anticom-
petitive act involving union and non-union parties. If the majority had
properly analyzed the Union's claim, 120 the Court would have recognized
that the Union's alleged injury was not a result of a typical labor dispute. A
labor-related conspiracy, especially one which involves coercive activities,1 2 1
restraining the trade of a particular business is, without doubt, a concerted
action not exempt from the antitrust laws. 122 Therefore, because 1) the
Union alleged that the defendants conspired to restrain the Union's trade, 123
2) for purposes of standing, all facts alleged are assumed to be provable,' 2 4
and 3) that a concerted anti-competitive act by a labor employer is not
within the antitrust exemption for labor activities, it appears that the Union
did sufficiently allege an injury which falls within the protection of the anti-
trust laws.
CONCLUSION
Since 1910,125 the framework used for antitrust standing decisions has
branched off in many directions. Until Associated General Contractors, there
were four different tests 126 applied to section 4 standing cases by the district
and circuit courts. Recognizing that these courts were interpreting the same
federal statute, it is fair to say that the field of antitrust standing was in a
117. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 112, at 189 (1978) ("The antitrust laws apply as
usual to agreements among employers concerning wages and working conditions unless inti-
mately related to genuine collective bargaining with a union embracing the workers of the
agreeing employers.") (emphasis added); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 13, at 727-28 (1977) ("There
are subjects, such as wages, hours and working conditions, which are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining. Where a union and employers in a bargaining relationship agree on
these, no antitrust violation occurs. .... )
118. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 622 (citing UnitedMfne Workers, 381 U.S. at 662).
119. See supra note 117.
120. The Supreme Court failed in itn analysis to cite any precedent which supported its
conclusion that a long labor-related relationship exempted a non-union party from an antitrust
violation directed at a labor union. See Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 910.
121. The Union in Associated General Contractors alleged that it suffered injuries as a result of
the defendants' coercion of landowners and other third parties. See supra note 52.
122. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648
F.2d 527, 532-36 (the Union's claim did not fall within either the statutory or non-statutory
antitrust exemptions afforded to certain labor activities).
123. See supra note 57.
124. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 902 "As the case comes to us, we must assume
that the Union can prove the facts alleged in its amended complaint."
125. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).




state of disarray. The Supreme Court in Associated General Contractors, how-
ever, has begun to shape a definitive antitrust standing policy.
Confronted with four standing doctrines currently in use by the circuit
courts-direct injury, target area, zone of interests, and matrix of factors-
the Court correctly selected a workable approach to antitrust standing deter-
minations by creating their own version of the balancing test. The balanc-
ing method is an extremely flexible test. 127 This flexibility is particularly
desirable in antitrust litigation because of the subject matter's inherent com-
plexity. The Court's selection of a balancing test, therefore, should provide a
cogent framework for antitrust standing analysis.
The Court's balancing test hinged on six different factors. Two of the
factors-the possibility of duplicative recovery and intent-are important
factors to evaluate to determine whether the plaintiff is a proper party to
maintain an action under section 4. Both of these factors have been well-
established in case law as important considerations in weighing a plaintiff's
antitrust standing status. 128
Unfortunately, however, three of the factors which the majority articu-
lated as controlling in the standing analysis appear to be unsatisfactory, and
thus, are subject to criticism. Two of these three factors-the nature of the
injury and the speculative character of the claim-delve into the merits of an
antitrust claim. It is unwise to place obstacles of substantive law in front of a
plaintiff during the pleading stage because of the possibility that these obsta-
cles will deter potential plaintiffs from bringing actions against antitrust vio-
lations. Any reduction in the private enforcement mechanism of American
antitrust law is an injury to our free enterprise system.
The Court's use of the difficulty of damage apportionment is also an
unsatisfactory factor for determining standing. In antitrust cases, the federal
courts inevitably face problems of apportioning the amount of antitrust in-
jury sustained by the victim because of the economic complexities involved
in anti-competitive acts. A plaintiff should not be denied standing merely
because the court envisions difficulty in awarding damages. '
2 9
The Court's decision in Associated General Contractors to deny the Union
standing was not only adverse to Congress's explicit attempts to harmonize
labor policies with antitrust policy, but also inconsistent with precedent rec-
ognizing that certain labor-related antitrust violations are not exempt from
the antitrust laws. The majority wrongly concluded that the labor union's
injury was not within the type of injury the antitrust laws sought to protect.
The alleged injury was a conscious, anti-competitive act by the defendant.
Ample precedent can be cited supporting the proposition that, although nor-
mal labor disputes involving wage, hour and working conditions do not war-
rant an antitrust action, concerted anti-competitive acts outside these typical
labor dispute areas are violative of the antitrust laws. Reconciling case law
with the alleged facts of the claim, the finding in Associated General Contractors
127. See supra note 97.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
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that the Union's alleged injury was not protected by the antitrust laws, was
clearly unsupported.
By dismissing the Union's antitrust claim before the Union had its day
in court, the Supreme Court has possibly reduced the capacity of labor orga-
nizations to maintain treble damage actions against employers who violate
the antitrust laws. Whether the Associated General Contractors decision will un-
fold a trend by the Court to dilute pro-labor policies remains to be seen. In
the meantime, although Associated General Contractors sets forth a much
needed skeleton framework for antitrust standing evaluations, the decision to
deny a labor union standing to maintain a antitrust suit under section 4 of
the Clayton Act will inevitably have some damaging effects on labor organi-
zations when they next collide with the antitrust laws.
C/ifrd Chanler
COMMISSIONER V TUFTS: A SOUND DECISION
INTRODUCTION
For federal income tax purposes, gross income includes the net gain or
loss derived from dealings in property.' The amount of gain or loss is the
difference between the taxpayer's adjusted basis2 in the property and the
amount realized upon disposition of the property.
3
Consider a partner in an apartment development financed almost en-
tirely with a nonrecourse mortgage loan. 4 The property is worth about
$400,000 less than the unpaid debt at disposition. The Third Circuit, based
on its decision in M llar v. Commi'ssioner,5 would find the amount realized to
be the the full amount of the unpaid debt, assumed by the new owner.
Treasury Regulation 1.1001-26 is similarly dispositive, if it is entitled to ef-
fect. 7 Recently, however, in Commissioner v. Tufts, 8 the Fifth Circuit majority
disagreed with the Third Circuit's decision in Mdlar and ignored the regula-
tion.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this
1. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1976). See also I.R.C. §§ 1201-1256 (1976 & Supp. V 1981 & West
Supp. 1983) (on treatment of, and rules for determining, capital gains and losses).
2. I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1012, 1014, 1016(a)(1)-(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The term "amount realized" is defined in
I.R.C. § 1001(b) as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received." I.R.C. § 1001(b).
4. A mortgage conveys an interest in property to secure the performance of an obligation.
If the debt is paid according to the terms of the note, the creditor-mortgagee's lien is discharged,
i.e., the security interest is extinguished.
A nonrecourse mortgage conveys a security interest in the property, but the mortgagor does
not personally oblige himself to pay the debt that the property secures. If there is default, the
creditor-mortgagee's only remedy is to foreclose his lien on the property. The creditor-mortga-
gee has no recourse against the mortgagor for any of the debt not satisfied by the value of the
property. The nonrecourse mortgage serves to remove the mortgagor's other assets from the
reach of the creditor-mortgagee. See G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 103 n.22 (1970); Note, Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498, 1498 & n.l (1982).
5. 67 T.C. 656 (1977), affdinpert.part, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1046 (1978). See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980). Section 1.1001-2 reads in pertinent part: "The fair
market value of the security [mortgaged property] at the time of sale or disposition is not rele-
vant for the purposes of determining under [the amount realized paragraph] of this section the
amount of liabilities from which the taxpayer is discharged or treated as discharged." § 1.1001-
2(b). The regulation was promulgated on Dec. 11, 1980, during the pendency ofCommsstonerv.
Tufts before the court of appeals. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1065 n.1 (5th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826, 1833 n.9 (1983). The facts hypothesized are based on the Tufts
facts.
7. The regulation is interpretive of I.R.C. § 1001(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2, T.D.
7741, 1981-1 C.B. 430, 430-31. The regulation will not be given effect ifit is "unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533
(1978) (quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948)). See also
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969) (applying the same statement).
8. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1826 (1983).
9. See 651 F.2d at 1060, 1063-64 n. 9. Judge Williams, in his concurring opinion, would
hold the regulation to be in conflict with the "plain language of the statute," because the value
of the release must correspond to the value of the property securing the nonrecourse indebted-
ness. 651 F.2d at 1065 (Williams, J., concurring); but see ifa notes 138-41 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the regulation, regardless of its interpretive effect, is invalid, according to Judge
Williams. 651 F.2d at 1065.
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conflict between the circuits.
On May 2, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled against the taxpayer's argu-
ment that amount realized should be limited to the fair market value of the
property in question. In Tufts, the Supreme Court decided that when a tax-
payer disposes of property encumbered by a nonrecourse obligation, the out-
standing amount of the obligation must be included in the amount realized
for the purposes of gain or loss determination, and that the fair market value
of the property is irrelevant to this calculation.' 0
This comment will examine the evolution of the principles forming the
context of the Tufts decision, and it will critique the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of those principles. As this critique will illustrate, the Supreme Court
not only reached the correct result, but the Court reached that result for
sound reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Foundation of the Tufts Controversy
Whether the value of the property is a ceiling on amount realized is
vitally important to owners of unprofitable real estate developments encum-
bered by a nonrecourse mortgage incurred to purchase or improve the prop-
erty." l A nonrecourse mortgage limits the personal liability of an owner
while it allows him the full cost as a depreciable basis. 12 But if an owner's
amount realized is a function of the unpaid debt and not of the property's
value, he could incur a tax gain on disposition of the property that has lost
value since acquisition.13
There is something "counter-intuitive" 1 4 about recognizing a gain when
the property has declined in value and, as in Tufts, the taxpayer received no
cash from the sale. 15 It is arguable that, if the property does in fact decline
in value as depreciation deductions presume, a taxpayer should not need to
recognize those deductions as a gain.16
In addition to this apparent inconsistency when value is not a limitation
on amount realized, there existed at the time of the Tufts appeal to the
Supreme Court a confusion of principles. There appeared to be two ratio-
nales available to support the rule that the amount realized includes the full
10. 103 S. Ct. at 1836.
11. Cf. Perry, Linited Partnershi)ps and Tax Shelters. The Crane Rule Goes Pubhc, 27 TAX. L.
REV. 525, 528 (1972) (Because the mortgage is included in the cost basis, a taxpayer can take
depreciation charges in excess of the cash contribution. This is significant to taxpayers investing
in property subject to a prior lien.).
12. I.R.C. § 1012 (1976). See in/ia text accompanying note 18. But see, e.g., Gladding Dry
Goods, 2 B.T.A. 336, 338 (1925) (holding a capital investment by the taxpayer, not just owner-
ship, is required before depreciation is allowed). This notion of requiring capital investment
was effectively overruled by Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See Note, Federal Income
Ta Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498, 1512-13 & n.91 (1982).
13. See generally Halpern, Footnote 37 and the Crane Case: The Problem That Never Really Was,
6 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 197, 199 (1978) (concerning failing tax shelters).
14. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX. L. REV. 277, 277
(1978).
15. 103 S. Ct. at 1829. See inMa text accompanying note 84.
16. See Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1060-61 n.4.
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amount of unpaid debt: the economic benefit theory and the tax benefit
theory. A conflict between the circuits was probable.
B. The Development of the Law
For a complete understanding of the Tufts opinion, a foundation is
needed. The economic benefit and tax benefit theories evolved in two inter-
twined lines of cases which will be discussed in four segments. The tax bene-
fit line of decisions began with the Supreme Court holding in Crane v.
Commissioner. 17
1. Crane: Basis and Amount Realized Include Nonrecourse Mortgage
The Crane case stands for two rules. First, basis includes nonrecourse
debt when incurred by the taxpayer's transferor and assumed by the tax-
payer. 8 Second, amount realized also includes the nonrecourse debt re-
maining unpaid at the time of transfer.' 9 The Supreme Court reached the
latter conclusion based on the following: 1) "property" in the definition of
amount realized 20 should mean the same as in the definition of basis, 2' be-
cause of the functional relation between basis and amount realized; 22 and,
2) the absence of personal liability is of no consequence, because a taxpayer
who transfers property subject to a mortgage receives a benefit as real and
substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if it were a personal
debt assumed by another.23 Thus, the taxpayer is faced with the same capi-
17. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. 331 U.S. at 11. In 1966, this rule was extended by the Tax Court to new nonrecourse
debt known as purchase-money mortgages. Mayerson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 340, 351
(1966). The absence of personal liability was immaterial. Id. at 351-52. See also Bolger v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 771 (1973) (a 100% financed acquisition and a minimal cash flow
did not matter for the right to a depreciable basis). For a criticism of Mayerson see Del Cotto,
Basi and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View oSome Tax Eects in Mortgage Financing,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 71-75 (1969). For a general criticism of including nonrecourse debt in
basis see Note, supra note 12, at 1511-14.
Other types of liens are properly included in basis. See, e.g., Blackstone Theatre Co. v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801, 805 (1949) (unpaid tax liens to which the property was bought
subject are included in basis, no matter when the tax liens are ultimately paid or for how much).
This comment deals only with the extent of the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in amount
realized. On the basis rule of Crane there is extensive literature. See, e.g., Friedland, Tufts &
Millar: Two New Views ofthe Crane Case and lts Famous Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510, 513-
15 (1982); Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Publi, 27 TAx. L.
REV. 525, 527-42 (1972); Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where Are You Now? 53
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-14 (1979).
19. 331 U.S. at 13.
20. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
21. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l) (1976 & Supp V 1981). If theproperty.to be valued on the date of
acquisition is the property free of liens, then the property priced on a subsequent sale must be the
same thing. 331 U.S. at 12. See Maguire v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 1, 8 (1941).
22. 331 U.S. at 12. The Court did not explain what "functional relation" means. The
Court had already concluded that property in § 1014(a)(1), defining basis, refers to the value of
the property undiminished by mortgages. Id. at I I.
23. Id. at 14. For criticism on the identification of personal liability and nonrecourse liabil-
ity, see Bittker, supra note 14, at 281-82. See also int ra notes 138-41 and accompanying text on
comparison of this idea with debt relief cases.
In this case, the Supreme Court also implied what the rule would be if the value of the
property were less than the debt: the amount realized would be the value. See 331 U.S. at 14
n.37 (dictum).
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tal gain treatment regardless of the type of mortgage lien.
The taxpayer in Crane had, during her six years of ownership, claimed
$25,00024 of the allowable $28,045 depreciation. 25 The Court appeared to
want to prevent a double deduction that it believed would result if the
amount realized did not include the amount of unpaid debt. 26 This tax
benefit reasoning was later developed in Parker v. Delaney27 and Mllar v.
Commtssioner.28
2. Parker and Mllar: Tax Benefit Theory
The tax benefit theory concerns inclusion of unpaid debt in amount
realized to account for the depreciation deductions taken on a basis that
included the debt. In Parker v. Delaney, the First Circuit held that where the
owner, who had acquired the property subject to a mortgage, conveyed the
property to a mortgagee in satisfaction of the debt, it was a disposition for
the purposes of computing a gain or loss.29 Therefore, Crane controlled on
determining the amount realized. 30 As in Crane, a taxpayer here took depre-
ciation deductions on a basis equal to the amount of the mortgage.3 This
reduced his basis to $31,291 less than the amount of the debt when conveyed
to the mortgagee. 32 The Parker decision holds the difference is a taxable gain,
and represents the amount of depreciation taken in excess of the taxpayer's
capital investment.
33
In Mllar, the taxpayers, upon receipt of loan funds from a corporate
organizer, executed nonrecourse notes secured solely by their stock in a Sub-
chapter S corporation. 34 They simultaneously contributed the funds to the
capital of the corporation, increasing their bases in the stock. After a period
of substantial tax losses that benefitted the shareholders, the stock was repos-
sessed for default on the notes.
35
24. 331 U.S. at 3 n.2. In Crane, the taxpayer acquired the property from a decedent.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 15-16. "The crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to exclude
allowable [depreciation] deductions from consideration in computing gain. We have already
showed that, if it does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of
assets." Id. In other words double deduction refers to recognizing a loss on the sale in addition
to the depreciation claimed.
27. 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
28. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
29. 186 F.2d at 457, 459. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
30. 186 F.2d at 458.
31. Id. at 457.
32. Id. at 458.
33. See id. at 459. For criticism of the Parker holding see Note, supra note 12, at 1505.
34. 577 F.2d at 213. A qualifying Subchapter S corporation is not taxed as an entity, but
instead, its profits and losses flow through to its shareholders in proportion to each shareholder's
interest. See I.R.C. §§ 1363(a), 1366(a) (West Supp. 1983). Section 1366(d)(1) limits losses de-
ductible each year by a shareholder to the adjusted basis of his stock plus any debt of the
corporation to the shareholder.
35. Millar v. Commissioner, 540 F.2d 184, 185 (3d Cir. 1976) (remanding the case to the
tax court). A repossession of property securing a debt constitutes a taxable sale or exchange. See
Hdlvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510 (1941); R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169
F.2d 247, 248 (3d Cir. 1948); Unique Art Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1341, 1342-43
(1947). See also Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980) (applying the same rule in an
abandonment of property to a mortgagee).
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The Third Circuit emphasized the tax benefit reasoning 36 with which
the Crane opinion concluded. 37 The taxpayers' bases were reduced by the
passed-through operating losses of the corporation. These losses were a sub-
stantial tax benefit. 38 In surrendering their devalued stock 39 in exchange for
the cancellation of the mortgage, the taxpayers clearly realized a taxable
gain equal to the value of the cancelled obligation less the adjusted basis of
their surrendered stock. 4°
Thus, in both Parker and Miar the courts followed Crane. The decisions
emphasize that the gain represents the depreciation claimed in excess of
amortization of the nonrecourse debt secured by the property ultimately sur-
rendered to the mortgagee.
4 1
3. Lutz & Schramm Co.: Economic Benefit Theory
The economic benefit theory concerns accounting for loan proceeds in
amount realized because the loan proceeds are untaxed. Before Crane and its
infamous footnote 37,42 the United States Tax Court's decision in Lutz &
Schramm Co. v. Commissioner43 began an important line of cases. Lutz &
Schramm Company, subsequent to purchasing its property, mortgaged it to
secure a new loan of $361,000. 4 4 After financial difficulties the taxpayer
transferred the mortgaged property to the creditor in full satisfaction of the
mortgage. 45 At the time of the transfer, the property had been depreciated
to an adjusted basis of $257,43546 while its value had declined to $97,000.
4 7
The court held that the facts of no personal liability and a low fair
market value were immaterial, 48 and the amount realized equaled the un-
paid debt. 49 The court reasoned that the issue was not whether the taxpayer
realized income from the discharge of indebtedness, 5° but whether the tax-
payer realized a gain upon disposition of the property. 5' The net result was
that the taxpayer received $300,000 without restriction 5 2 by mortgaging
property with a basis of only $257,435, and by making no repayment until
36. See 577 F.2d at 215.
37. See supra note 26 for the Crane text implying a tax benefit to the taxpayer.
38. 577 F.2d at 215. Subchapter S losses are analogous to depreciation deductions. See
Comment, Millar: Requiem for Crane's Footnote 37?, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 343, 345-46 (1980).
39. The value of the stock was less than the unpaid debt. 577 F.2d at 215.
40. Id. at 215.
41. See also Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, 215 (value of depreciated property disposed
of to mortgagee is immaterial; unpaid debt cancelled upon the transfer is the amount realized).
42. See supra note 23.
43. 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
44. Id. at 684.
45. Id. at 685.
46. Id. at 689.
47. Id. at 685.
48. Id. at 689.
49. Id.
50. See Bialock v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 649 (1961) (debts satisfied by transfer of all assets
of debtor business; result similar to Lutz & Schramm, but based on discharge of indebtedness
principle because creditor was not a mortgagee).
51. 1 T.C. at 689.
52. The taxpayer had transferred certain property to the creditor to reduce the debt to
$300,000. Id. at 684.
A reinvestment of the borrowed funds in capital improvements to the property would,
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foreclosure. 53 Thus, the economic benefit theory was born.
54
The principle of Lutz &Schramm was extended in Mendham Corp. v. Com-
missioner55 and Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner56 to the situation
where property is acquired subject to the prior owner's post-acquisition
mortgage. In both cases the courts held that the gain upon foreclosure
equaled the unpaid mortgage less the basis adjusted for the taxpayer's depre-
ciation deductions. 57 The Tax Court in Mendham emphasized that the gain
on the sale must reflect the ultimate profit from the entire operation.5 8 The
Woodsam court concluded that the value of the property at foreclosure was
immaterial.
59
Crane's economic benefit principles were applied in Johnson v. Commis-
sioner.60 The taxpayer had borrowed $200,000 against his highly appreci-
ated securities6' just before a gratuitous transfer of the stock to his
children.6 2 The notes were then re-executed to relieve the taxpayer of any
personal liability.
63
The Sixth Circuit held that the $200,000 was gross income on a clear
economic benefit theory, noting that Dr. Johnson had received $200,000 free
and clear of any obligation to repay that amount from any property in his
possession.64 It made no difference to what use the $200,000 was put, even if
it was used to pay the gift tax.6 5 The court then found Crane dispositive:
Johnson had shed a $200,000 debt by transferring the encumbered stock to
his children, so his amount realized is that debt, regardless of the fact that he
was not personally liable.
66
however,justify an increase in basis. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1016-2 (1960).
53. 1 T.C. at 689.
54. For thorough discussions of the economic benefit theory, see Halpern, supra note 13, at
208-20 (1979); Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and the Amount Realized" The Demise of Crane's Footnote
37, 59 OR. L. REV. 3, 16-18 (1980).
55. 9 T.C. 320 (1947).
56. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
57. Woodsam, 198 F.2d at 359; see Mendham, 9 T.C. at 325.
58. 9 T.C. at 324. Two commentators have noted their approval of the decisions in Lutz
Schramm and Mendham. See Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719, 730 (1975); Sim-
mons, supra note 54, at 13-14 (1980).
59. 198 F.2d at 359.
60. 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
61. Id. at 1080. The taxpayer's basis in the stock equalled approximately $10,000, and the
stock was worth at least $200,000. See id. at 1080 & n.2.
62. Id. at 1080.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1083.
65. Id. The taxpayer did argue that the $150,000 he paid in gift tax should escape taxa-
tion. Id. at 1081. This argument was disposed of by the Supreme Court in 1929. See Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). Accord Guarantee Title & Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1963); Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d
861, 864 (6th Cir. 1958); Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 112 (N.D. Miss. 197 1),af'd,
455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. 495 F.2d at 1083. The court of appeals recognized the absence of personal liability by
a taxpayer was persuasive but not dispositive. Id. See also First Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 404 F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969) (donor of property sub-
ject to a mortgage was charged with capital gain for the gift).
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4. Delman: The Most Recent Case Resting on the CraneTax Benefit
Principle
In Estate of Delman v. Commissioner,67 taxpayers who had purchased
equipment subject to a nonrecourse mortgage defaulted and the seller-mort-
gagee repossessed the goods.68 At the time of foreclosure, the unpaid debt
was $1,182,542, and the taxpayers' basis had been depreciated to $504,625. 6 9
The value of the equipment had declined to $400,000.70 The Tax Court
held that the partners collectively realized a gain of $1,182,542 minus
$504,625, equalling $677,917. The value of the property was irrelevant.
7t
The court relied on Lutz & Schramm , Mendham, Woodsam, M'/ar,7 2 and
the Tax Court's decision in Tufts. 7 3 As in Md/ar and Tufls, 74 the taxpayers
here benefitted from the nonrecourse loans by including them in basis and
consequently in depreciation deductions. 75 These depreciation deductions
supplied the taxpayers with tax losses.
76
The taxpayers argued that cases applying the tax benefit rule 77 were
inapplicable because those decisions required an actual receipt of funds or a
discharge of liability increasing the taxpayer's net worth before income re-
sulted. 78 The court countered by applying Crane: no such requirements ex-
ist when a sale or exchange of property subject to a nonrecourse liability
takes place. 79 Neither element was present in Crane. The Crane court had
concluded that the nonrecourse liability was properly included in amount
realized.8 0
The taxpayers also argued that neither the instant facts nor those in
dllar or Tufts involved new money obtained by nonrecourse financing sub-
sequent to the initial purchase, and therefore the fair market value irrele-
vancy rule, upheld in Lutz & Schramm, Mendham, and Woodsam, is
inapplicable. 8 ' The court responded that those decisions rest on the eco-
nomic benefit theory and the economic benefit achieved by subsequent
mortgaging can also be achieved by a purchase-money mortgage, as in the
instant case.
82
67. 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
68. Id. at 25.
69. Id. at 27-28.
70. Id. at 28.
71. See id. at 37.
72. Id. at 28.
73. Id. Commissioner v. Tufts, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (1981), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 1826 (1983).
74. See uhfra text accompanying note 91.
75. 73 T.C. at 30.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Tennessee Carolina Transp. Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
78. 73 T.C. at 30 n.3.
79. Id. See ina note 123 and accompanying text.
80. 73 T.C. at 30 n.3 (interpreting the Crane decision).




5. Summary of the Law Before Tufts
The existing rules and reasoning prior to the court of appeals decision in
Tufts can be easily summarized. A tax benefit results from the debt's inclu-
sion in basis which in turn contributes to depreciation deductions. Therefore
where property is acquired subject to a mortgage or by means of a new mort-
gage, it is fair to include in amount realized the amount of debt unpaid,
because the difference between it and adjusted basis represents the amount
of depreciation claimed in excess of the loan principal paid. The value of the
property does not matter.
Depreciable basis does not include the mortgage amount when property
is mortgaged for cash subsequent to acquisition. Nevertheless, the unpaid
mortgage debt must be included in amount realized to avoid an untaxed
economic benefit because the loan proceeds were never taxed. As with. the
tax benefit theory, the decline in the property's value does not reduce the
untaxed economic benefit.
II. COMMISSIONER v TuFTs
A. The Facts
The taxpayers in Tufts were general partners building an apartment
complex. They contributed a total of $44,212 of their own money and bor-
rowed $1,851,000 from a bank, securing the debt with a nonrecourse
mortgage.
8 3
After completion of the apartment complex, a shortfall in revenue
caused the partners to convey their interests to an unrelated third party
solely in consideration of the selling expenses and the assumption of the non-
recourse mortgage. 84 At this time, the debt was $1,851,500, the value of the
property was only $1,400,000, and the partners had depreciated the property
down to $1,455,740.85
The issue was whether the amount realized is all of the unpaid debt or is
limited to the value of the property given up. This issue could be deter-
mined either by prior judicial interpretation or by the Internal Revenue
Code provision 86 concerning the treatment of liabilities to which partnership




First, the Court identified section 752(d) as controlling: liabilities in-
curred in the sale or exchange of a partnership interest are to be treated in
the same manner as liabilities are treated in connection with the sale or ex-
83. 103 S. Ct. at 1828-29.
84. Id. at 1829.
85. Id. at 1829 nn. l-2.
86. I.R.C. § 752(c) (1976 & Supp V 1981). Section 752 contains a fair market value limita-
tion. See thfia note 97.
87. The sale of partnership interest is governed by I.R.C. § 752(d) (1976 & Supp V 1981).
See infra note 97.
[Vol. 61: 1
1983] COMMISSIONER v. TUFTS
change of property not associated with partnerships.8 8
The Court then adopted Crane: inclusion of the debt in basis requires
inclusion in amount realized. But here, the Court announced as its reason-
ing that it is the economic benefit of the original loan proceeds, untaxed
because of the obligation to repay, that justifies inclusion. This is true re-
gardless of the property's value.8 9 Unless the outstanding amount of the
mortgage is deemed to be realized upon disposition, the loan proceeds will
ultimately go untaxed. 9°
The Court found its rule consistent with Treasury Regulation 1.1001-
2(b),9 t Revenue Ruling 76-111,92 Mtllar,9 3 Mendham, 94  and Lutz &
Schramm.95 Moreover, to permit the taxpayer to limit his amount realized to
the value of the property would be to permit recognition of tax loss for which
he has suffered no corresponding economic loss.
9 6
The partners argued that Congress intended asymmetrical treatment in
the sale or disposition of partnership property under section 752(c), because
they believed this section should apply to section 752(d).9 7 The Supreme
Court, as did the Tax Court,98 met this argument with the legislative history
of section 752. 99 The mention of a fair market value limitation occurred
only in the context of transactions between the partner and the partner-
ship.100 The fair market value limitation on the liability to which property
is subject does not apply to sales of partnership interests to unrelated third
parties.1
88. 103 S. Ct. at 1829. See infra note 97.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 1831. Crane rests on the Commissioner's policy of identical treatment of
recourse and nonrecourse debt, which the Tufis Court accepted as reasonable. Id. at 1831-32.
Thus, the purchaser's assumption of the mortgage was accounted for in the computation of
amount realized. Id. at 1832 (citing United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1938)).
The Court declines to call the economic benefit a cancellation of indebtedness. For the Court's
discussion see 103 S. Ct. at 1833 n. ll.
90. Id. at 1832.
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b) (1980). See supra note 6.
92. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, 215. See supra note 41.
93. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
95. 103 S. Ct. at 1832-33. The Lutz &Schramm decision is discussed supra notes 43-54 and
accompanying text.
96. 103 S. Ct. at 1834.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 1835. Section 752 reads in part:
(c) For the purposes of this section [752], a liability to which property is subject shall,
to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be considered as a liability of
the owner of the property. (d) In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a
partnership, liabilities shall be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection
with the sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships.
98. I.R.C. § 752. 70 T.C. at 767-68.
99. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A236, reprnted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4091-98; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 405, reprthted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4721-33.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c) (1982) is consistent with this limited applicability of section
752(c). See also Simmons, Tufts v. Commissioner: Amount Reahlzed Limited to Fair Market Value, 15
U.C.D. L. REV. 577, 611-13 (1982) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's opposite interpretation of this
legislative history).
101. 103 S. Ct. at 1836. For a discussion of the § 752 issue see Charyk & Sexton, Liabilites in
Excess of Fair Market Value.- The Consequences of the Reversal of the Tufts Case, 10 J. REAL EST.
TAX'N 159 (1982); Simmons, supra note 100, at 609-16.
The legislative history applied by the Supreme Court is quite direct, and will not be ana-
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Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, would reach the same re-
sult, but would separate the excess of the debt over the value of the property
as income from cancellation of indebtedness, and not include it in amount
realized.' 0 2 This would allow that part of the gain to be treated as ordinary
income instead of as capital gain.' 0 3 She declined to adopt this judicially,
though, because of the Commissioner's position in Revenue Ruling 76-
111104 and the decisions in Millar and Delman. 105 Justice O'Connor recog-
nized the majority's interpretation of the definition of amount realized is
defensible, because the reference of section 1001(b) to amount realizedfrom
the sale or other disposition of property can reasonably be read to allow the
collapse of the two aspects of the transaction.
10 6
III. ANALYSIS
The results in Ai/lar, Delman, and Tufts in the Tax Court appear to be
well reasoned decisions, yet the reasons given have engendered a notion that
the tax benefit of the depreciation deductions matters. Mllar, Delman, and
the Tax Court in Tufts all view Crane as a tax benefit rule for recapturing
depreciation. 10 7 That view of the Crane reasoning is misleading. Crane's
novel term "functional relation" is conclusionary and should not be applied
in the unified economic benefit analysis presented by the Supreme Court in
Tufts. If the Supreme Court in Tufts failed, it was in neglecting to firmly
discard this misleading emphasis on depreciation in Millar and Delman. 108
A. A Unified Economic Benefit Rule
Adjusted basis and amount realized form a continuum and function in
tandem' 0 9 to account, upon disposal of property previously mortgaged for
lyzed in this comment. The logic for potential tax shelter abuse was mentioned. See 103 S. Ct.
at 1836.
102. Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1836 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (adopting argument of amaus curae
submitted by Professor Wayne G. Barnett). See also Del Cotto, supra note 18, at 87 (advancing
same rule). But see Tuts, 103 S. Ct. at 1833 n.l I (majority agrees that this could be a justifiable
mode of analysis, except the Commissioner has not adopted it and the code does not require it,
plus the amicus's approach assumes recourse and nonrecourse debt may be treated identically).
See also inra note 141.
103. It is important to classify the unpaid debt in excess of the property's value as debt
relief, not amount realized, because the former is ordinary income, I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1976),
while the latter may result in capital gain treatment, I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, reflected in Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980). See supra
notes 6, 41.
105. See supra notes 34-41, 67-82 and accompanying text. See also Peninsula Properties Co.
v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84, 92 (1942) (unsecured debt settled at a discount by transfer of
securities; amount realized reflects debt relief but is a capital gain).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1838 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. See, e.g., Tufts, 70 T.C. at 764; see supra text accompanying notes 34-41, 67-82. At least
two commentators view the tax benefit aspect of Crane and, therefore, the reasoning in Mllar,
Delman, and Tufts in the Tax Court, as correct. See Bittker, supra note 14, at 282; Friedland,
Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 510, 526-28 (1982).
108. See 103 S. Ct. at 1832 n.8.
109. See Sanders, Sup. Ct., Ending Crane Controversy, Says Nonrecourse Debt Is Always Part of Sales
Prce, 59 J. TAX'N 2, 4 (July 1983); Simmons, supra note 54, at 18.
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the owner's benefit, for that original untaxed 110 accession to that property I II
or some other property. 112 The exact amount of benefit depends upon how
much capital is retained at the end of the transaction compared to how
much was invested.' 13 Basis, including any reductions for depreciation' 14 or
Subchapter S losses, 115 and amount realized, including any reductions for
payments of principal, together account for the excess of capital extracted
from the property transaction over the after-tax capital actually invested. 1
6
This rule explains Lutz &Schramm and its progeny." I 7 None of the loan
proceeds have been taxed, so at the close of the mortgage transaction when
the debt disappears by conveyance to the mortgagee, the proceeds are ripe
for taxation. At this point the economic benefit to the taxpayer becomes
ascertainable and equals the amount of previously enjoyed capital that now
need not be repaid.
The economic benefit rule fully justifies the results in purchase-money
mortgage cases,1 "8 where the taxpayer or his transferor mortgaged the capi-
tal asset to acquire it. The mortgaging enables a tax-free receipt of the capi-
tal asset itself, such as real property or securities. 1 9 The amount of this debt
is included in basis because of the obligation to repay,' 20 and it is included
in amount realized, to the extent it has not been amortized, because the
inclusion in amount realized serves to tax the accession to the capital beyond
what after-tax capital was committed in the form of repayment of the debt.
Otherwise, the gain of capital would escape taxation simply because of the
nonrecourse nature of the mortgage.
Millar is illustrative. In Millar the taxpayers acquired the Subchapter S
stock without taxation and they enjoyed this capital asset by having the tax
losses pass through to their own tax returns,' 2 ' sheltering other income from
taxation. They clearly acquired and enjoyed a capital asset, so at its disposal
to the mortgagee, their gain properly reflected the difference between the
capital extracted and their own capital committed to the asset, their amorti-
zation of the mortgage. The decline in the property's value did not affect
that excess of capital extracted over capital invested, and thus the value at
the time of foreclosure was irrelevant. Exactly the same rationale applies in
Delman where, because the taxpayers owned the business assets directly as
110. Loan proceeds are not taxable. See Popkin, The Taxation ofBorrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43,
43 & n.1 (1980); 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5.12 (1981) (cases
annotated therein). See also Halpern, supra note 13, at 221.
111. See, e.g., Millar, 577 F.2d 212; Delman, 73 T.C. 15.
112. See, e.g. ,Johnson, 495 F.2d 1079; Lutz &Schramm, 1 T.C. 682.
113. See Halpern, supra note 13, at 228 (an account must be made of the after-tax invest-
ment initially credited with that amount remaining unpaid at the time of the transfer).
114. Depreciation is a return of capital. See Doyle v. Mitchel Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185-
88 (1918) (taxable income does not include restoration of capital). Because it is a return of
capital, basis is reduced. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Seegenera{y Simmons,
supra note 18, at 6-14; Note, supra note 12, at 1511 n.85.
115. Subchapter S losses are also a return of capital. See supra note 38.
116. See Simmons, supra note 100, at 593-94, 604, 606-09.
117. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 29-41, 67-82 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 110.
120. See supra note 18. See generaly Simmons, supra note 54, at 20 n.82.
121. See supra note 34.
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partners, the depreciation deductions shielded other income. The actual
economic benefit 1 22 of the capital asset was a tax shelter, so the effect was
termed a tax benefit.'
23
B. The Economic Benefit Does Not Depend on Depreciation
The economic benefit rule does not depend on depreciation having been
claimed. 124 This is illustrated by a variation on the facts in Tufts. The Code
might have allowed more or less depreciation than was claimed or none at
all.1 25 The depreciation does not trigger the rule. It is simply additional
capital extracted by the partners, and is reflected by an increased gain or
decreased loss by adjusting their bases downward. If the partners had pledg-
ed the property by a second nonrecourse mortgage to borrow $100,000 for
purposes other than the development, when they sold their interests subject
also to that mortgage, they would have in addition realized that $100,000.
This additional $100,000 gain would not have been attributable to any de-
preciation claimed; it was never added to the basis. i26
The Fifth Circuit held in Tufts that value must limit the amount real-
ized1 27 in part because the court completely misunderstood the economic
benefit theory. 128 The codrt of appeals reasoned that any tax benefits that a
taxpayer receives in the form of prior deductions are factored into the gain
equation129 by adjustment to'basis.' 30 Therefore, it does not appear logical
that, if the property does in fact decline in value as was assumed by Con-
gress, the taxpayer must be taxed on an amount realized that reflects a re-
capture of depreciation, the debt in excess of value. Adjusted basis already
reflects that depreciation claimed, resulting in a double taxation on the same
122. See Delman, 73 T.C. at 31 n.5 (dictum) (the court recognizes the economic benefit of the
taxpayer's use of the property while limiting his liability).
123. Id. The tax benefit rule is codified at I.R.C. § 111 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and it does
not apply to recovery of depreciation deductions. Treas. Reg. 1.11 1-1(a) (1956). Cf. Commis-
sioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969) (earlier
expenses recouped in sale of rental items preceding liquidation were not a recovery of deprecia-
tion, therefore ordinary income and not capital gain).
For a comparison of the § I I tax benefit rule and the depreciation aspect of the economic
benefit rule, see Del Cotto, supra note 18, at 84 n.81. For a better application and thorough
analysis of the tax benefit rule, see Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 103 S. Ct. 1134, 1142-
49 (1983). On the tax benefit rule generally, see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265 (1978).
124. See 103 S. Ct. at 1832 n.8. See generally Simmons, supra note 54, at 18-21: Note, supra
note 12, at 1526-29.
125. Depreciation deductions are still a matter of legislative grace. See Perry, supra note 11,
at 534.
126. See Halpern, supra note 13, at 225-27 (commenting that the amount realized rule of
Crane does not depend on depreciation having been claimed, that depreciation deductions need
only be indirectly taken into account).
127. 651 F.2d at 1063.
128. The court of appeals doubted the "double deduction" language in Crane. 651 F.2d at
1060 n.4. See supra note 26. The Supreme Court in Tufts just avoided that part of Crane by
deciding Tufts on other grounds, an economic benefit theory. 103 S. Ct. at 1833 n.10. See infra
text accompanying notes 136-37.
129. See I.R.C. § 1001(b). Gain equals amount realized less basis adjusted for depreciation
and other returns of capital.
130. 651 F.2d at 1061.
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component of gain. '
3 '
The court's reasoning is flawed. Depreciation is itself a return of capi-
tal, as is amount realized; they are not the same component of gain. The
amount realized less adjusted basis serves to tax the combined recoveries of
capital in excess of the original investment.
The court's reasoning can be viewed also as an erroneous assumption
that the taxpayer has actually lost capital by the devaluation of the prop-
erty, when in truth the taxpayer has lost capital only to the extent he has
invested capital by amortization of the debt, 132 which is accounted for by
the economic benefit rule.
The Tufts facts provide a good illustration of this erroneous assumption.
The taxpayers claimed that they lost $55,740,133 which necessarily means
they invested that much more in capital than they extracted by the end of
the whole transaction. This is not supported by the facts. In the course of
ownership they invested only $44,212 but extracted in the form of deprecia-
tion a total of $439,722.'1 4 This benefit of excess capital returned to them
did not depend on the value of the property. The property could have been
worthless when transferred subject to the mortgage, and their economic ben-
efit, ascertainable at the close of the transaction, would still have been calcu-
lated as above. This is where the court of appeals erred. The basis, adjusted
by returns of capital, and amount realized, reflecting the investment of capi-
tal, completely account for the economic benefit. The taxpayer has not lost
any capital unless he has amortized the debt as fast as he has depreciated the
property.'
3 5
The Supreme Court in Tufts recognized the economic benefit of tax-free
loan proceeds and that the loan proceeds would go untaxed at the close of
the transaction if amount realized did not include the unpaid debt. 136 In
support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that the taxpayer
loses nothing by devaluation of the property below the unpaid debt and,
therefore, he should recognize no tax lOSS.
1 3 7
C. Tufts Concerns Dtsposal of Mortgaged Property
Some commentators have found inconsistency between the inclusion of
nonrecourse debt beyond value and the principle of discharge of indebted-
131. Id. at 1061 n.4. At least two commentators agree with this reasoning. See Newman,
The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 10 (1982);
Pietrovito, Tufts v. Commissioner, A Limitation on the Inclusion of Nonrecourse Liabilities in Amount
Realized, II CAP. U.L. REV. 265, 281-82 (1982).
132. The mortgagee who forecloses at a value less than the unpaid debt has a deductible loss
under I.R.C. §§ 165 or 166(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
133. 103 S. Ct. at 1829. The taxpayers calculated their loss by subtracting the property's
value, $1,400,000, from its adjusted basis, $1,455,740. Id. at 1829 n.l.
134. Id. at 1829.
135. For an excellent presentation of this unified economic benefit analysis, see Simmons,
supra note 54, at 4, 18-21, 27-31; Simmons, supra note 100, at 602-09.
136. See Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at 1832, 1833 n. 1l, 1834.
137. Id. at 1834.
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ness,1 38 which relies on a freeing of the taxpayer's assets to the claims of
other creditors. 139 There need not be any consistency, because the discharge
of indebtedness principle originated in cases not involving the ownership
and disposal of a mortgaged capital asset. 14° They are not applicable be-
cause there was not an adjusted basis and an amount realized accounting for
the ultimate gain reflecting the net accession to capital at the close of the
transaction.14 As presented earlier in this analysis, such gain in value is not
a function of the value of the property at disposition.
The inclusion of debt in amount realized beyond the value of the prop-
erty is not inconsistent with the purchase money exception to the discharge
of indebtedness principle.142 The exception properly applies only where the
debtor continues to own the property after the reduction in debt,' 43 and
where the parties actually agree to reduce the price of the property
transferred. 144
CONCLUSION
The Tax Court in Tufts reached the same result as the Supreme Court,
but the implication that the recovery of depreciation deductions is the heart
of the justification weakens the Tax Court's reasoning.' 4 5 The tax shelter
aspect is just the particular economic benefit that the owner values.' 46 The
Supreme Court did note that the basis, adjusted for depreciation as a return
of capital, and amount realized, including all unpaid debt, factor in depreci-
ation but do not depend on it' 47 in accounting for the net economic benefit
to the taxpayer.
The Tufts opinion buries Crane's footnote 37.148 Although dictum, the
footnote generated much controversy and necessitated the Supreme Court's
138. Bittker, supra note 14, at 284; Del Cotto, supra note 18, at 85; Note, supra note 12, at
1502 n.31; Comment, supra note 38, at 349.
139. See Simmons, supra note 100, at 599. A nonrecourse mortgage by definition is a lien
only on that asset, so its discharge frees no other assets. See Delman, 73 T.C. at 32. See also id. at
31 & n.6. The court of appeals in Tufts, 651 F.2d at 1062, analogized relief from nonrecourse
debt to relief from future property taxes by selling the property, which provides no relief. That
is a non sequitur. Capital gains do not need a pure debt reliefjustification. See Tufts, 103 S. Ct. at
1833 n. 11 (the freeing of assets is irrelevant).
140. See Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 (1949) (repurchase by debtor of leasehold
bonds at discount); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (retirement of corpo-
rate debt at a discount); Bialock v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 649 (1961) (satisfaction of unsecured
debts by a transfer of assets).
141. See Simmons, supra note 54, at 37 n.177. In Tufts, the Court chooses not to characterize
the transaction as cancellation of indebtedness. 103 S. Ct. at 1833 n. 1I ("We note only that our
approach does not fall within certain prior interpretations of that doctrine." The freeing-of-
assets theory "is irrelevant to our broader approach.").
142. Contra Del Cotto, supra note 18, at 77-79.
143. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940). See generaly Simmons,
supra note 54, at 35-40.
144. See Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656, 661, aJ'd in part, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
145. 70 T.C. at 765.
146. Congress can always limit this benefit. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)
(taxpayer's depreciation limited to his capital at risk; presently not applicable to real estate).
147. 103 S. Ct. at 1832 n.8.
148. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (dictum implying that amount realized
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attention in Tufts to overrule the unsound court of appeals decision 4 9 which
had briefly elevated that dictum to law.
Due to the depth of precedent to the contrary, Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach,150 distinguishing the capital gain from the debt relief, was not per-
suasive to the majority. The loss to the Treasury, however, is the practical
result of a Congressional policy to tax capital gains more favorably than
other income. 
5 1
Treasury Regulation 1.1001-2(b) t52 resolved Tufts in advance of the ap-
peal to the Fifth Circuit, but the court of appeals impliedly found it a distor-
tion of amount realized.' 53 The Supreme Court has sustained it with sound
reasoning.
Roger . Randall
should be limited to value). Crane's footnote 37 has not been persuasive to the courts. See Tufts,
103 S. Ct. at 1831; Millar, 577 F.2d at 214; Tufts, 70 T.C. at 765-66; Delman, 73 T.C. at 29-30.
The court of appeals in ufts reached a result consistent with footnote 37, based on a
fundamental disagreement with Milar's interpretation of Crane as a depreciation recapture rule,
651 F.2d at 1060-61, and based on a view of the debt relief as the economic benefit and, there-
fore, necessarily limited to the property's value. 651 F.2d at 1061-62. Accord Bittker, supra note
14, at 282. This reasoning overlooks the untaxed economic benefit of the loan proceeds origi-
nally. See supra text accompanying notes 109-23.
149. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981). Had the Supreme Court not reversed the Fifth Circuit,
the Treasury Department would have proposed overriding the result to Congress. See Taxes on
Parade, Release No. 54, STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) (Nov. 4, 1981) (speech by a treasury
officer to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).
150. 103 S. Ct. at 1836-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. I.R.C. § 1202(a). For the justifications of capital gain treatment, see Rosenberg, Better
to Burn Out than to Fade Away? Tax Consequences on the Disposition of a Tax Shelter, 71 CAL. L. REV.
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